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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court on May 7, 1992, in a domestic 
relations case. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting judgment in 
favor of Edwin F. Guyon who is not a party to the action? 
Inasmuch as divorce actions are equitable proceedings, the 
Appellant Court should review the law and the facts to fashion 
its own remedy as a substitute for the judgment of the trial 
court. The trial court's action should be disturbed only to 
prevent manifest injustice. Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 
(Utah 1982); Mitchell v. Mitchell. 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). 
The authorities submitted by Defendant on this issue are as 
follows: Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Shaw v. 
Jeppson, 239 P.2d (Utah 1952); Rule 24 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P.2d 970 (Utah 
1966). 
2. Did the trial court err in amending a judgment 
initially entered in favor of Plaintiff and subject to 
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offsetting judgments against Plaintiff without affording 
procedural due process of lawr? The standard of review is the 
same as stated in paragraph 1. The authorities submitted by 
Defendant on this issue are as follows: Nelson v. Jacobsen, 
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1978); Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984). 
3. Did the trial court err in amending a judgment 
originally entered on October 30, 1991, after the time period 
specified in Rules 59(e) and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? The standard of review is the same as stated in 
paragraph 1. The authorities submitted by Defendant on this 
issue are as follows: Rules 59(e) and 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering 
the Subject Order on the basis of mistake? The standard for 
review is the same as stated in paragraph 1. The authority 
submitted by Defendant on this issue are as follows: Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the conclusion of the trial on March 28, 1991, the 
trial court granted judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
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Defendant in the sum of $7,500 for attorney's fees. This 
judgment was formally entered in a Decree of Divorce on 
October 30, 1991.1 (Appendix, Exhibit E). 
Judgments had previously been awarded in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff on February 16, 1991, for $250 
(R. 533, Appendix, Exhibit C) and on August 7, 1991, for 
$3,846 (R. 795, Appendix, Exhibit D).2 Thus, Defendant had 
offsetting judgments of $4,096, reducing his obligations 
(exclusive of interest) from $7,500 to $3,404.3 On May 7, 
1992, without prior notice to Defendant, and without providing 
Defendant with notice and a right be heard, the trial court, 
sua sponte, issued a Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 1068-
1070) (hereinafter "subject order") providing that the 
1
 After entry of the Decree on October 30, 1991, the parties 
entered into a stipulation to amend the visitation provisions of 
the Decree (R.955). Pursuant to the stipulation, an Amended Decree 
was entered on December 12, 1991. The Amended Decree had no effect 
on the judgment. The wording of both Decrees with respect to the 
judgment are identical. (R. 920, para. 14; R. 989, para. 14). 
2
 In addition to the judgments already entered in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff, there is currently pending a 
motion for an additional judgment (R. 1078) arising out of 
Plaintiff's refusal to abide by paragraph 13 of the Decree (R. 988 
- 989) with respect to the payment of indebtedness to Mountain 
America Credit Union. 
3
 If Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment noted in fn. 2 
is granted, the judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant would be fully off set. 
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judgment previously entered in favor of Plaintiff was amended 
to provide judgment in favor of Edwin F. Guyon rather than the 
Plaintiff, thereby removing the judgment from the offsetting 
judgments in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. (A 
copy of the Subject Order is attached as Appendix Exhibit A). 
Thereafter, Edwin Guyon sought to enforce the amended 
judgment against Defendant without any allowance for 
offsetting judgments previously entered in favor of Defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in granting judgment in favor 
of Edwin Guyon who was not a party to the action. 
2. The judgment in favor of Plaintiff, naming Edwin 
Guyon as the judgment creditor, was entered without notice to 
Defendant and without providing Defendant with an opportunity 
to be heard and deprived Defendant of the right to setoff in 
violation of procedural due process. 
3. The amendment of the judgment in favor of Plaintiff, 
by naming Edwin Guyon as the judgment creditor, was untimely 
having been entered after the ten-day period prescribed in 
Rule 59(c), and after the three-month period stated in Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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4. The trial court abused its discretion in entering a 
judgment in favor of Edwin Guyon on the basis of mistake. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. On March 28, 1991, at the conclusion of trial of 
this matter, the trial court orally announced its decision. 
Included in the court's decision was the following: 
With regard to attorney's fees, the Court 
finds there is a need on the part of 
Plaintiff for attorney's fees and awards 
attorney's fees in the amount of $7,500. 
(Tr. 9) 
2. On October 30, 1991, the Court entered a final 
Decree of Divorce. Paragraph 14 of the Decree provided as 
follows: 
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against 
Defendant in the sum of Seven Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500) as 
attorney's fees. (Emphasis added). (R. 
920, Appendix, Exhibit E). 
3. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, an 
Amended Decree of Divorce was entered on December 12, 1991. 
Paragraph 14 of the Amended Decree of Divorce awarding 
Plaintiff judgment for attorney's fees incorporated the exact 
wording of the original Decree as quoted in the preceding 
paragraph. The specific wording of the Decree naming 
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Plaintiff as the judgment creditor was expressly approved by 
Plaintiff and her then attorney, James Watts. (R. 989, 
Appendix, Exhibit F). 
4. Prior to the entry of either of the Decrees of 
Divorce, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff on February 16, 1991, in the 
sum of $250 as a sanction for contempt of court arising out of 
Plaintiff's detention of the child in violation of a court 
order (R. 533, Appendix, Exhibit C). 
5. Prior to the entry of either of the Decrees of 
Divorce, the trial court entered second judgment in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff in the sum of $3,846 on August 
7, 1991, as a sanction for contempt of court arising out of 
Plaintiff's detention of the child in violation of a court 
order (R. 795, Appendix, Exhibit D). 
6. Prior to the entry of either Decrees of Divorce, 
Defendant filed a motion for an additional judgment in the sum 
of $7,000 against Plaintiff by reason of Plaintiff's refusal 
to pay indebtedness to Mountain America Credit Union (R. 1078-
79).4 
4
 On December 17, 1991, the Court found that "it appears 
probable that said motion would be granted." (R. 1000, Appendix, 
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7. In September or October, 1991, Plaintiff terminated 
Edwin Guyon as her attorney (R. 1019, para. 7; R. 878). 
However, Mr. Guyon refused to formally withdraw as attorney 
for Plaintiff. 
8. In November, 1991, after being terminated as 
Plaintiff's attorney, Edwin F. Guyon sought to execute on the 
judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff. Mr. Guyon obtained a 
Praecipe and Writ of Execution describing all property awarded 
to Defendant in the divorce decree. In response thereto, on 
November 25, 1991, Defendant filed a Motion to Quash Praecipe 
and Execution and Alternative Motion to Stay Enforcement of 
Praecipe and Execution (R. 933-34). On December 17, 1991, the 
trial court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining 
the sale of Defendant's property pursuant to the praecipe and 
execution (R. 999-1001). The Temporary Restraining Order 
stated: 
1. The sale of Defendant's property 
purports to be based upon a judgment 
entered in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant in the sum of $7,500.00, and 
Defendant appears to have valid setoffs 
against said judgment in the sum of 
$4,096.00 by reason of judgments 
Exhibit G). As of the date of the Notice of Appeal, no hearing has 
been held on said Motion. 
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heretofore entered in favor of Defendant 
and against Plaintiff, 
2. It appears that Plaintiff has failed 
and refused to comply with the prior 
order of the Court that she pay and 
discharge all indebtedness to Mountain 
America Credit Union secured by the 1988 
Ford van and that such failure gives rise 
to a claim on the part of Defendant 
against Plaintiff in a sum in excess of 
$3,404,00, which would set-off and 
discharge the judgment upon the proposed 
sale is based, 
3. Defendant has filed a motion for 
judgment against Plaintiff arising out of 
Plaintiff's failure to pay indebtedness 
to Mountain America Credit Union and it 
appears probable that said Motion would 
be granted. If such Motion were granted, 
the judgment of $7,500,00, upon which the 
proposed sale is based, would be fully 
paid and discharged. (R. 999-1000, 
Appendix, Exhibit G). 
9. On January 16, 1992, the trial court issued a Minute 
Entry announcing its decision to quash the Praecipe and 
Execution. In the Minute Entry, the court stated: 
The court is of the opinion that this a 
judgment granted in favor of the 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel must look 
to Plaintiff for actual payment of his 
attorney's fees. . . . In any event the 
Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's 
counsel must look to Plaintiff for 
payment of his fees and accordingly 
grants the Motion to Quash the Praecipe 
and Execution. (R. 1013-1014, Appendix, 
Exhibit H), 
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10. On February 7, 1992, the trial court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Quashing the 
Praecipe and Execution obtained by Edwin F. Guyon. In this 
regard, the Order entered by the trial court provided as 
follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Quash Praecipe 
and Execution and to Stay Enforcement of 
Praecipe and Execution obtained by 
Plaintiff's former counsel, Mr. Edwin 
Guyon, is hereby vaca4ec^.m^said Praecipe 
and Execution are quashed and are of no 
effect and enforcement of the same is 
stayed. 
2. Plaintiff's former attorney, Edwin 
Guyon, must look directly to his client, 
Tamera A. McDonald, Plaintiff, for 
payment of his attorney's fees. (R. 
1031-1032, Appendix, Exhibit I) 
11. On May 7, 1992, without prior notice or hearing, the 
trial court suddenly reversed its position and entered the 
Subject Order in a Memorandum Decision wherein the trial court 
held as follows: 
The court is going to set aside that 
portion of the Decree that granted 
Plaintiff judgment for attorney's fees 
and is going to sua sponte order an 
amendment to the Decree which grants a 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff's counsel 
at the time, Mr. Edwin Guyon, in the sum 
of $7,500. (R. 1068-1070, Appendix, 
Exhibit A). 
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12. The Memorandum Decision of May 7, 1992, provides 
"This decision will serve as the order of the court" 
(R.1070). This is the Subject Order which is the focus of 
this appeal.5 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF A NON-PARTY, 
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
"every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real 
party in interest." 
In this action, Plaintiff engaged the services of Edwin 
Guyon to represent her in the action and she thereby incurred 
attorneyfs fees for his services. Accordingly, Plaintiff was 
5
 After Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on May 13, 1992 
(R. 1093), specifying the subject order of May 7, 1992, as the 
order being appealed, Mr. Guyon unilaterally prepared an "Amendment 
to Judgment" (hereinafter "judgment") dated July 2, 1992 (R. 1207, 
Appendix, Exhibit J). The judgment was executed by the trial court 
on July 15, 1992. Inasmuch as the "judgment" is contrary to the 
wording of the subject order of May 7, 1992 (which, among other 
things, expressly states "this decision will serve as the order of 
the Court") and inasmuch as the "judgment" was submitted in 
violation of Rule 4-504(1), Code of Judicial Administration (which 
requires judgments and orders to be submitted within 15 days of the 
ruling) (Appendix, Exhibit W), Defendant has regarded the 
"judgment" as invalid and superfluous. To the extent this Court 
regards the "judgment" as valid or effective, Defendant extends his 
appeal to include said "judgment." 
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directly liable to Edwin Guyon for such fees. If Mr. Guyon 
pursued claims for collection, his client, Plaintiff in this 
action, and was the party directly liable for the fees. 
In paragraph 10 of her Complaint (R. 3), Plaintiff sought 
an order that Defendant "pay to Plaintiff" a reasonable sum 
for attorney's fees. At the conclusion of trial, the Court 
granted Plaintiff's prayer in that regard. There was no 
suggestion in the pleadings that Plaintiff's attorney was 
directly seeking judgment against Defendant for attorney's 
fees. Mr. Guyon never filed a complaint in intervention or 
otherwise assert any basis for a claim of attorney's fees 
directly against Defendant. 
One of the purposes for the requirement of Rule 17, that 
an action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest, is to permit the Defendant to assert all defenses 
and counterclaims against the real owner of the cause. Shaw 
v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952). Defendant respectfully 
submits that it is grossly unfair to allow a person not 
subject to offsetting judgments to "stand in" for the real 
party in interest who is so liable in order to circumvent the 
offsetting judgments. Moreover, under the Shaw decision, such 
a procedure violates the purpose of Rule 17. 
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As previously noted herein, at the time of the Subject 
Order on May 7, 1991, which purported to change the identity 
of the judgment creditor from Plaintiff to Edwin Guyon, 
Defendant had judgments against Plaintiff in the sum of 
$4,096, with a pending motion for an additional judgment of 
$7,000 which the trial court found would likely be granted 
thereby totally offsetting Plaintiff's judgment (R. 1000)6. 
The subject order circumvented offsetting judgments and claims 
which Defendant had against Plaintiff. 
Apart from the inherent injustice in circumventing 
Defendant's offsetting judgments, the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P.2d 970 
(Utah 1966), expressly prohibits Edwin Guyon from directly 
enforcing a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff or 
obtaining a judgment in his own name in the absence of a 
complaint in intervention. 
A person not a party to an action who seeks relief or 
believes his interests will be adversely affected by an 
adjudication in an action must file a motion seeking leave to 
file a complaint in intervention thereby allowing the adverse 
6
 The right to setoff judgments is well established - 47 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Judgments, §§ 999-1002 (Appendix, Exhibit X). 
12 
party notice of his claims and an opportunity to be heard with 
respect to the claims. Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P. 2d 970 (Utah 
1966). 
At no time prior to the entry of the subject order did 
Edwin Guyon seek leave to file a complaint in intervention nor 
did he file any such complaint. Accordingly, not being a 
party to the action, Defendant had no notice of his claims, if 
any claims he had, for direct judgment. Moreover, Edwin 
Guyon, not being a party or intervener in the action, was not 
entitled to present his "claims" to the trial court or obtain 
a judgment in his favor against Defendant. On the basis of 
the above argument and authorities, the Subject Order should 
be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING 
DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
At no time prior to the entry of the Subject Order was 
Defendant given any notice or right to be heard on the issue 
of whether the judgment should be amended or a new judgment 
entered in favor of Edwin Guyon rather than Plaintiff. It is 
readily apparent that Defendant had a vital interest in such 
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decision inasmuch as the amendment, or new judgment, deprived 
him of his right of offset with respect to judgments 
previously entered in his favor and against Plaintiff• The 
trial court acknowledged in the text of the Subject Order that 
such order was entered without prior notice as a sua sponte 
order. 
The only motion before the trial court at the time of the 
entry of the Subject Order was the "Motion For Stay Of Entry 
Of Order and To Set Aside Judgment re Attorney's Fees" filed 
on January 28, 1992 (hereinafter "Motion To Set Aside") (A 
copy of the Motion To Set Aside is attached as Appendix, 
Exhibit B). The Subject Order recited that it was entered 
pursuant to this Motion To Set Aside. However, the Motion to 
Set Aside made no claim that the prior judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff should be amended to name Edwin Guyon as the 
judgment creditor nor did the motion otherwise give notice of 
any relief that would circumvent Defendant's offsetting 
judgments. On the contrary, in the text of the Motion, Edwin 
Guyon expressly acknowledged that the judgment was properly 
entered in favor of Plaintiff and that "Plaintiff is entitled 
to enforce the judgment." (R. 1018, Appendix, Exhibit B). 
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Thus, at no time prior to the entry of the Subject Order 
did Defendant have notice or opportunity to be heard to argue 
the unfairness of changing the identity of the judgment 
creditor to a person not subject to offsetting judgments and 
claims. To the extent of the offsetting judgments and claims. 
Defendant was deprived of property without due process of law. 
In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
Timely and adequate notice and 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful 
way are the very heart of procedural 
fairness . . . . 
An elementary and fundamental requirement 
of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections. The notice must be of 
such nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information, and it must afford 
a reasonable time for those interested to 
make their appearance. 
Many cases have held that where notice is 
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party 
of the nature of the proceedings against 
him or not given sufficiently in advance 
of the proceeding to permit preparation, 
a party is deprived of due process. 
Accord, Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 
(Utah 1978); Wells v. Children's Aid 
Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). 
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The Subject Order should be reversed inasmuch as it was 
entered without affording Defendant procedural due process of 
law. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE JUDGMENT 
AFTER THE TIME PERIODS SPECIFIED IN RULES 59 
and 60, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
A. RULE 59(e) 
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as 
follows: 
A motion to alter or amend the judgment 
shall be served not later than ten days 
after entry of judgment. 
The Subject Order violates the terms and provisions of 
Rule 59(e). At no time prior to the entry of the Subject 
Order was any motion or other notice given to Defendant that 
such amendment was contemplated or considered, Moreover, if 
the subject order is not considered as a new judgment entered 
without notice or right to be heard, it must be construed as 
an amendment to the judgment originally entered on October 30, 
1991. In such case, the amendment was made 189 days after the 
original judgment. 
16 
At some point, the litigating parties must be able to 
rely on the certainty of a final judgment. In the instant 
case, by reason of prior rulings of the trial court, 
Defendant's belief that the matters relating to judgments and 
offsets had been finally determined had been affirmed and 
reaffirmed. 
Defendant respectfully submits that a procedure allowing 
amendments to judgments 189 days after the judgment is entered 
opens the door to chaos and confusion with respect to finality 
of litigation and violates the provisions of Rule 59(e). 
B. RULE 60(b) 
The Subject Order recited that it was entered pursuant to 
a "Motion For Stay Of Entry Of Order And To Set Aside Judgment 
re attorney's fees" (hereinafter "Motion To Set Aside") 
(Appendix, Exhibit B). The referenced Motion To Set Aside was 
filed by Edwin Guyon on January 28, 1992. Although the Motion 
To Set Aside was filed within the time limits specified in 
Rule 60(b), said Motion did not even suggest that the judgment 
should be amended to name Edwin Guyon as the judgment 
creditor. On the contrary, the Motion To Set Aside expressly 
acknowledged that the judgment for attorney's fees should be 
in favor of Plaintiff and "Plaintiff is entitled to enforce 
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the judgment" (Appendix, Exhibit B, p. 1018, para, 4). Thus, 
on the date of the Subject Order, no motion requesting the 
relief granted in the Subject Order had been filed. This 
circumstance was apparently acknowledged by the trial court 
when it noted that the Subject Order was entered sua sponte. 
Thus, the amendment of the judgment naming Edwin Guyon as the 
judgment creditor was not made within the three-month time 
period stated in Rule 60(b). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING 
THE SUBJECT ORDER ON THE BASIS OF MISTAKE. 
According to the terms of the Subject Order, the entry of 
judgment in favor of Edwin Guyon was made to correct a mistake 
in originally entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff rather 
than Edwin Guyon. The rationale of "mistake" is contrary to 
all facts and circumstances surrounding the entry of the 
original judgment in favor of Plaintiff. First, after entry 
of the judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the trial court 
considered and reconsidered the precise issue of Edwin Guyon's 
rights to enforce the judgment for his direct benefit. On 
these occasions the trial court reaffirmed that the judgment 
was in favor of Plaintiff, not Edwin Guyon, and subject to 
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offsetting judgments and claims of Defendant. (See Temporary 
Restraining Order, R. 999-1000, Appendix, Exhibit G; Minute 
Entry R. 1013-1014, Appendix, Exhibit H; Order Quashing 
Praecipe and Execution, R. 1031-1032, Appendix, Exhibit I). 
Second, if a mistake had been made in not entering judgment in 
favor of Edwin Guyon, it is readily apparent that Edwin Guyon 
would promptly notified the court of the mistake. No such 
notice was ever given to the court. In this regard, on April 
8, 1992, Defendant submitted a proposed Decree to the trial 
court (R. 581-589). Paragraph 14 of the proposed Decree (R. 
587) provided as follows: 
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff for the 
use and benefit of her attorney, the sum 
of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7,500). Said obligation shall be 
discharged by installment payments in 
accordance with an agreement between 
Defendant and Plaintiff's attorney and 
execution shall be stayed so long as 
payments are made in accordance with the 
agreement or subseguent court order. In 
the event Defendant and Plaintiff's 
attorney are unable to agree, the court 
shall, after hearing, establish an 
installment payment schedule. 
On August 20, 1991, Edwin Guyon filed objections to the 
proposed decree submitted by Defendant. (R. 797-800, 
Appendix, Exhibit K). Mr. Guyon's objections to paragraph 14 
of the proposed decree made no reference to any mistake in 
ordering that the payments be made "to Plaintiff." On the 
contrary, Edwin Guyon's objections expressly demanded that 
judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff. Edwin Guyon's 
objections to paragraph 14 of the proposed Decree were as 
follows: 
Attorney fees are a matter of judgment, 
not agreement, defendant's obligation is 
a matter of judgment, not agreement and, 
in the event no agreement is reached, 
plaintiff is entitled to enforce 
judgment. (Emphasis added). 
Edwin Guyon's objections were accepted resulting in the 
wording of paragraph 14 of the final Decree awarding judgment 
to Plaintiff. 
Inasmuch as there was no mistake in entering the judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff rather than Edwin Guyon, the rationale 
for the Subject Order is invalid. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Subject Order should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that an element of chaos 
would be imposed in the judicial system if courts are 
permitted to grant judgments in favor of persons whom are not 
parties to the action, in favor of persons who the judgment 
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creditor did not even realize was his adversary, and without 
notice or opportunity to be heard in the matter. Moreover, 
the procedure followed in this action imposes substantial 
uncertainty with respect to the finality of judgments. 
The Subject Order should be reversed so that the original 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and subject to setoffs and 
pending claims, would be reinstated as the measure of 
Defendant's liability. 
DATED this J) day of October, 1992. 
^ ^ v A. CS^O—" 
Suzanne Benson 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and .accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant this 
<y'' day of October, 1992, to the following: 
Edwin F. Guyon 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 17697 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
James I. Watts ? 
124 South 600 East #10'<T) 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA MCDONALD, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : Civil No. 894901447 DA 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
ROBERT MCDONALD, : 
Defendant. : 
The Court notes that there is now before it a "Motion for 
Stay of Entry of Order and to Set Aside Judgment RE: Attorneys 
Fees," filed by Mr. Edward F. Guyon, and defendant's "Motion to 
Dismiss the Motion of Ed Guyon Dated the 25th day of January, 
1992 to Set Aside Judgment and Stay Entry of Order and Motion to 
Enter Order Consistent with the Court's Minute Entry." The 
Court has reviewed the entire history regarding this "Attorney's 
Fees" matter and now enters an Order disposing of these motions 
and resolving the issue of plaintiff's attorneys fees. The 
Court previously entered a minute entry dated the 16th day of 
January, 1992 indicating that Mr. Guyon should look to plaintiff 
for payment of his attorneys fees. That opinion was based on 
the precise wording of the Decree of Divorce which stated: 
MCDONALD V, MCDONALD PAGE 2 MEMO DECISION 
"Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in the sum 
of $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) as attorneys 
fees." 
The Court is of the opinion that the precise wording of the 
Decree required that result. Mr. Guyon has now filed a Motion 
to Set Aside that judgment relating to attorneys fees relying on 
Rule 60 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing this 
entire matter, including portions of the Court transcript cited 
by the parties, and the Court's notes together with the Court's 
recollection of this matter, the Court is the opinion that Mr. 
Guyon's Motion is W€>11 taken. It was and is the Court's intent 
that Mr. Guyon be given a judgment for attorneys fees for 
services rendered up to the time of the Court's order awarding 
attorneys fees. The technical language that finally emerged in 
this matter (although the specific issue here presented was not 
addressed earlier) granted the judgment in favor of plaintiff 
rather than to Mr. Guyon. 
The Court is going to set aside that portion of the Decree 
that granted plaintiff judgment for attorneys fees and is going 
to sua sponte order an amendment to the Decree which grants a 
judgment in favor of plaintiff's Counsel at the time, Mr. Edwin 
Guyon, in the amount of $7,500.00. 
The Court urged the parties to try to work out an 
arrangement for payment of attorneys fees. Mr. Guyon was 
willing to accept monthly payments as the Court specifically 
MCDONALD V. MCDONALD PAGE 3 MEMO DECISION 
recalls during a colloquy between defense Counsel and Mr. Guyon 
during hearings before the Court, and the Court continues to 
encourage the parties to work out a payment arrangement but if 
that is not possible then it appears to the Court that Mr. Guyon 
would be entitled to collect on his judgment for attorneys fees 
as provided by law. 
This decision will serve as the order of the Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ( day of May, 1992. 
MCDONALD V. MCDONALD PAGE 4 MEMO DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this ~"7 day of May, 1992: 
Edwin F. Guyon 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Glen M. Richman 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAHT/CLERK 
TAMERA A. McDONALD 
MOTION FOR STAY OF ENTRY 
plaintiff OF ORDER and TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT re ATTORNEY FEES 
v s
- i| 
ROBERT M. McDONALD case no, 8949014^7 - DA 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
defendant 
Plaintiff moves the court for an order staying the entry 
of the proposed order and findings of fact forwarded to the court 
by counsel for defendant on the 22nd day of January, 1992; and, 
further, moves the court for an order, pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, setting aside the 
Judgement herein entered as It relates to attorney fees and in 
support thereof would show the court the following: 
1. On March 28, 1991 the court, in making oral 
findings, conclusions and orders regarding attorney fees stated: 
With regard to attorney's fees, the Court finds 
that there is a need on the part of the plaintiff for 
attorney/s fees and awards attorney's fees in the amount 
of seventy-five hundred dollars, . . . March 28, 1991 
transcript, page 9, lines 12 to 15, 
2, At the March 28, 1991 hearing above referenced the 
following conversation occurred as a result of defendant's counsel 
indicating that Mr. McDonald had some tax problems which prevented 
him from borrowing money, to take care of this obligation, [trans., 
p. 14, lines 21 and 223: 
Mr. Guyon: I agree with that, Your Honor. If it 
places a cash flow burden on Mr. McDonald to pay 
001016 
those, I think we need to work some program out. 
The Court: Work out some payment. How much can he 
pay a month on the attorney's fees? Let me ask you 
this first. How long will it take to come up with 
the $2,000 In Cash settlement? 
Mr. Richman: That is something that can be arranged 
within thirty days. . . . 
The Courtt How much per month on the attorney's fees? 
Mr. Richman: Could we get with Mr. Guyon on that in the 
next few days? 
Mr. Guyon: Yeah. 
The Court: Try and work that out. 
Mr. Guyon Have no gripes about working with him on that 
Issue, trans., p. 14, line 23 to p. 15, line 20. 
[emphasis added] 
3. On April 8, 1991, and based upon the findings, 
conclusions and orders rendered during the proceedings concluded 
March 28, 1991, counsel for defendant forwarded to counsel for 
Plaintiff proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
proposed decree of divorce which contain the following references 
to the payment of attorney fees: 
Plaintiff requested alimony from Defendant and 
payment of her attorney's fees. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 6, page 2. • • • 
Defendant should be required to pay to 
Plaintiff, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff's 
attorney, the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7,500.00). By reason of the financial condition of 
Defendant, said sum should not be immediately due and 
payable. Said sum should be paid In accordance with an 
agreement with Defendant and Plaintiff's attorney. In 
the event Defendant and Plaintiff's attorney are unable 
to agree as to a payment schedule, said matter should be 
submitted to the Court for further determination. 
Execution should be stayed so long as payments are made 
In accordance with the aforesaid agreement or subsequent 
order of the Court. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, paragraph 19, pages 14 and 15. [emphasis added] 
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Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff for the use 
and benefit of her attorney, the sum of Seven Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00). Said obligation shall 
be discharged by Installment payments in accordance with 
an agreement between Defendant and Plaintiffs attorney 
and execution shall be stayed so long as payments are 
made In accordance with the agreement or subsequent court 
order. In the event Defendant and Plaintiffs attorney 
are unable to agree, the Court shall, after hearing, 
establish an installment payment schedule. Decree of 
Divorce, paragraph 14, page 7. [emphasis added] 
4. On August 16, 1991 plaintiff filed her objections to 
the proposed findings and Judgment above referenced, in relevant 
part as follows: 
Objection to conclusions? page 14, paragraph 
19; lines Iff - Statements regarding payment of attorney 
fees are wholly without regard to representations by 
plaintiffs counsel (see transcript, page 14, lines 23 to 
25 and page 15, lines 1 to 20). The purpose of 
plaintiffs agreement regarding fees was made as a 
courtesy, convenience and benefit to defendant, not to 
change the terms and conditions of the Judgment nor to 
permit defendant to unilaterally determine what he wasted 
as payment schedules. . . . 
Objections to decree: 6. page 7, paragraph 
14, lines Iff - Attorney fees are a matter of Judgment, 
not agreement, defendant's obligation is a matter of 
Judgment, not agreement and, in the event no agreement Is 
reached, plaintiff is entitled to enforce Judgment, 
5. The court, in a memorandum decision dated October 9, 
1991, ruled upon the above referenced objections to proposed 
findings and Judgment as follows* 
Objections to conclusions of laws Plaintiff's 
objection to paragraph 14; 19; 1 et. seq. is sustained. 
Objections to decree: 6. T h e C o u r t 
sustains plaintiffs objections. 
6. The Court, also in its memorandum decision dated 
October 9, 1991, Included the following Instruction: 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare new 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree 
consistent with this decision, submit them to opposing 
VOiOlS 
counsel for approval as to form and then to the Court for 
signature* 
7. At some time subsequent to October 9, 1991 Edwin F. 
Guyon was Informed by plaintiff that she was in the process of 
seeking other counsel and that she anticipated that it would be 
J.I. Watts of Salt Lake City. 
8. On October 21, 1991 Edwin F. Guyon, as counsel for 
plaintiff, forwarded to counsel for defendant a letter indicating 
that he had received no information regarding the new findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and Judgment as directed by the court on 
October 9, 1991. A copy of said letter is attached hereto and made 
a part hereof for all purposes labeled exhibit A. 
9. On October 25, 1991 Mr. Rlchman in response to the 
above letter (exhibit A) forwarded to Edwin F. Guyon a letter 
Indicating that Mr. Watts had filed an appearance in the case and 
that he was dealing with him (Mr. Watts). A copy of said letter Is 
attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes labeled 
exhibit B. 
10. On October 26, 1991, in response to the above letter 
(exhibit B) Edwin F. Guyon forwarded a letter to Mr. Rlchman. A 
copy of said letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof for 
all purposes labeled exhibit C. 
11. On or about November 15, 1991 Edwin F. Guyon, in 
response to a call to the clerk of the court regarding the docket 
sheet in the Instant matter, was advised that findings, conclusions 
and Judgment had been entered on October 9, 1991. 
12. At no time prior to entry of said findings, 
conclusions and decree above referenced did Glen M. Rlchman comply 
001019 
with the memorandum decision of the court dated October 9, 1991, 
which states: 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare new 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree 
consistent with this decision, submit them to opposing 
counsel for approval as to form and then to the Court for 
signature, 
13, By Minute entry of the court dated January 16, 1992 
Edwin F, Guyon, as counsel for plaintiff, was first Informed that 
the precise wording of the Decree of Divorce pertaining to 
attorneys fees had been altered from the form Indicated in the 
earlier proposed orders to read as follows: 
Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against defendant in the 
sum of $7,500.00 (Seven thousand five hundred dollars) as 
attorneys fees, 
14, At no time prior to the receipt of the above 
referenced minute entry dated January 16, 1992 was Edwin F, Guyon, 
counsel for plaintiff, Informed of the alteration of the provision 
in the decree related to attorney fees, nor did Glen M, Rlchman 
notify, either orally or In writing of the alternation of the terms 
of said decree provision. 
Wherefore defendant moves the court for an order setting 
aside the portions of the October 99, 1991 Judgment as It relates 
to attorney fees and staying the entry of any order thereto 
relating until a hearing on the Instant motion is had. 
Dated the ^ d E _ Z _ day of , 
Edwin F. 'Gutfon, counsel fp^ plaint if f 
noi02n 
I certify that on the above date a copy of the foregoing 
was mailed, first class, postage prepaid to Glen M. Rlchman, Esq., 
60 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 and James I. 
Watts, Esq., 124 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102. 
3&c£&cfi' ^s. . 3 ^ Up&fts 
Jotwmdt/fau 4t£ JJLAM* 
October 21, 1991 
Glen M. Rlchman, Esq. 
60 south 600 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
#JJ S/Lie #005£*a 
<r0//jss-<fcr// 
&L> 00//SSA0JSS 
RE: McDonald v. McDonald 
Inasmuch as I have not heard from you regarding the preparation of 
new findings of fact, conclusions of law and Judgment as directed 
by Judge Noel in his memorandum decision of October 9, 1991, I wish 
to notify you that, unless payment in full of the amounts awarded 
as attorney fees are made prior to November 1, 1991, I wi 11 cause 
execution to issue to obtain such funds from your client. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Kindest regards* 
Edwin F. Gy 
EG/me 
cc J,I. Watts, Esq. 
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Glen M. Richman 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 532-8844 
FAX (801) 596-8285 
October 25, 1991 
Barbara W. Richman 
(of counsel) 
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq. 
43 3 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, 84111 
Re: McDonald v. McDonald 
Dear Mr. Guyon: 
I received your letter dated October 21, 1991, on October 22, 
1991 regarding the McDonald matter and your intention to execute 
against my client's assets to collect your attorney's fees for your 
representation of Tamera McDonald. 
I have passed the content of your letter onto Mr. McDonald. 
I will be in touch with you regarding his reply. 
I have been dealing with Mr. Watts on this matter since he 
entered an appearance in the case. He related to me that you have 
refused to file a withdrawal. If you feel I should be dealing with 
you on the case, please advise and let me see something from one of 
you signed by Tamera McDonald stating which of you represents her. 
Sincerely yours, 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
V 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorney at Law 
l^llf\{H^l^^ 
GMR:11 
cc: Robert M. McDonald 
James Watts 
OQ109? 
M33 9ocUk 400 iaU 
S01/355.S&H 
fFax S01/SU235S 
October 26, 1991 
Glen M. Rlchman, Esq. 
60 South 600 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: McDonald v. McDonald 
I read with great surprise your letter of October 25, 1991. Please 
be advised that I am counsel of record and, unless and until you 
are advised otherwise by me, will remain so. 
I believe the rules specify that, in the event a party is 
represented by more than one attorney, you are obligated to provide 
notice of your activities to both. 
To the extent that you have communicated with other counsel without 
notifying me, please forward to me any and all documents involved 
in such communication and inform me Cin writing) of the time, date 
and content of any oral communications with Mr. Watts to which I 
was not a party. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Kindest regards. 
cc J . I . W a t t s , Esq. 
n n - j n o M 
Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
ERK 
TAMERA A. McDONALD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
MOTION OF ED GUYON DATED 
THE 25TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1992 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND STAY 
ENTRY OF ORDER AND MOTION TO 
ENTER ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE 
COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 89-4901447 DA 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant, through counsel, moves the Court to dismiss the 
motion of Mr. Ed Guyon as above referred to for the following 
reasons: 
1. Mr. Ed Guyon has no standing before the Court on the 
issue of attorney's fees av/arded to Plaintiff 
2. Mr. Guyon cannot act on behalf of Plaintiff because he 
does not represent her. 
3. Said motion as it purports to be brought under Rule 60 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is premature and inappropriate as 
it may relate to an order that is not entered. 
H01Q25 
4. If Mr. Guyon's motion under Rule 60 (b) relates to the 
Decree itself, it is without merit and pertains to a matter upon 
which the Court has ruled and has sustained its ruling as shown by 
the Court7s Minute Entry dated the 16th day of January, 1992. The 
Decree that has carried the language upon which the Court has ruled 
was reviewed by Mr. Guyon over a considerable period of time; it 
was a decree to which he made numerous objections, but at no time 
did he make objections to the language with which he now disagrees. 
5. Defendant requests the Court to enter the Findings and 
Order submitted herewith. 
6. This Motion to Dismiss will be supported by a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities. 
DATED this y day of February, 1992. 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
GLEN M. RICHMAN/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
)ss, 
) 
Leora Loy, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
She is a secretary in the law firm of RICHMAN & RICHMAN, 
attorneys for Defendant herein., 
That she served the attached Motion to Dismiss the Motion of 
Ed Guyon dated January 25, 1992, upon Plaintiff by placing a copy 
in an envelope addressed tc: 
James I. Watts, Esq. 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and 
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq. 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed with first class postage prepaid 
thereofin the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
^"^Tday of February, 1992 and also hand delivering the same. 
cSC-Q^ &>i^  
Leora Loy 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1992. 
NOTARY PUBUC 
GLENM RICHMAN 
60 So 600 East #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
MyComm Expires 8-10-93 
Stats of Utah 
day of February, 
t/yw^L*^ 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
8-10-93 
001097 
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Third Judicial District 
Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
By. 
FEB 1 6 1991 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA A. MCDONALD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
a-av-si-^sio^. 
Civil No, 89-4901447 DA 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The above matter came on for hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel in his courtroom on the 17th day of 
January, 1991 pursuant to the defendant's Motion for Contempt, 
Sanctions and Fees and defendant's Motion for an independent mental 
and psychological Examination under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 
The plaintiff moved the Court to continue the hearing on 
contempt on the basis that the plaintiff who resides in Denver, 
Colorado, planned to arrive in Salt Lake on the 18th of January; is 
employed in Denver and unable to reschedule her travel arrangements 
or rearrange her work schedule to participate in the hearing 
without substantial expense. 
The plaintiff, through her attorney, objected to the motion 
under Rule 35 as not conforming to said Rule. 
The Court heard arguments of counsel and denied plaintiff's 
motion to continue the hearing on contempt; d€*nied plaintiff's 
objection to the defendant's motion under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; granted defendant's motion for an independent 
mental and psychological examination of the plaintiff by Dr. Ralph 
Gant at the expense of the defendant. 
The Court further ordered that defendant's counsel communicate 
with Dr. Ralph Gant as to the scope, time, place, manner and 
conditions of the examination to be done and report to the Court so 
that those items may be included in the Court's Order. 
The Court found that there was good cause shown for the 
independent examination. 
The Court then heard testimony concerning the matters of 
contempt, fees and sanctions and heard argument of counsel; found 
the plaintiff in contempt of the Court's order and imposed 
sanctions. 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion to continue the hearing on contempt is 
denied. 
2 
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2. Plaintiff's objection to the motion of defendant for an 
independent mental and psychological examination under Rule 35 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is denied. 
3. Defendant's motion for an independent mental and 
psychological examination of the plaintiff by Dr. Ralph Gant is 
granted. Defendant, through his counsel, is to report to the Court 
the time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the examination to 
be done after communicating with Dr. Ralph Gant, and a report 
thereof to be filed with the Court and counsel for the plaintiff. 
4. The Court finds plaintiff in contempt of the Court's 
order regarding visitation by not bringing the child home at the 
scheduled time on the 23rd of December, 1990; by picking the child 
up earlier than scheduled on January 3, 1991; by bringing the child 
back two days later than scheduled on January 9, 1991; by failing 
to let the defendant know the flight the child was to be on and the 
time the flight would arrive, and not delivering the child to the 
defendant as soon as possible after arrival on her flight on the 
23rd of December, 1990. 
5. The Court imposes as a sanction, a sentence upon the 
plaintiff to serve five (5) days in the Salt Lake County jail; 
withholds execution of the sentence and allows the plaintiff to 
purge herself of the contempt by abiding strictly to the Court 
orders, requires a report to be made by the end of January, 1991 of 
3 
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the visitation scheduled for the weekend of the 18th of January, 
1991; requires further that the next visitation period on the first 
weekend of February shall also be reported to the Court. Said 
reports of visitation shall be prepared by counsel for defendant 
and forwarded to the Court. 
6. The Court further awards judgment against the plaintiff 
in favor of defendant for the use and benefit of his attorney; fees 
in the sum of $250.00. 
7. The Court has previously ordered that an evaluation be 
made concerning the use of alcohol or drugs of each of the parties 
to determine if treatment is needed, and if so to recommend a 
program for the appropriate party or for one or each of the parties 
if required; withholding a determination as to payment of the 
expenses thereof for further hearing until after the evaluation and 
recommendation is made; ordered the parties to submit names of 
those who could be chosen to do the evaluation. Each of the 
parties through counsel have submitted three names. The Court 
restates that order and will make a determination as to an 
evaluator and will inform the parties through counsel, whereupon 
each of the parties is ordered forthwith, within a reasonable time, 
to make an appointment and to complete the evaluation. 
8. This matter is set for a first place setting for final 
trial of the remaining issues on the 25th day of March, 1991, 
4 
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beginning at 10:00 a.m. Anticipated trial time is three days, 
March 25, 26 and 27, 1991. 
9. The mental and psychological examination of plaintiff 
shall be completed in accordance with the following: 
a. Time: The examination is to be on either the 15th or the 
18th of February, beginning at the hour of 1:00 p.m., and will last 
approximately seven (7) hours, or until completed. The choice of 
those dates should be made known to Dr. Gant's office as soon as 
possible, and no later than the next five (5) days. 
b. Manner: The manner of the examination will be in the 
form of clinical interviews and objective and subjective 
psychological testing, including the Minnesota Multi-Phasic 
Personality Inventory. 
c. The conditions and place of the examination. The 
examination will occur in the office of Dr. Ralph Gant at 716 East 
4500 South, Suite N 150, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107; telephone 
number 263-1103. 
d. Scope: The scope of the examination shall be an 
assessment of intellectual functioning; an assessment of 
personality functioning as/and evidenced by history and examination 
of dissociative process. A written report will be prepared. 
e. Person conducting the examination: The examination will 
be conducted by Dr. Ralph Gant, a licensed psychologist. 
5 
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DATED this % day of February, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
Glen M. Richman certifies that he served the attached Order 
and Judgment upon plaintiff by placing a copy in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq. 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and hand delivering the same this I ff day of January, 1991. 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
r 
GLEN M. RICHMAN * 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Glen M. Richman (2752) 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant h •^•T..,«f:>{ OUNTV 
60 Sou th 600 E a s t , S u i t e 100 S v _ L m : , ^ 0 } ^ ^ 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84102 " Oc^ITcST 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AMD FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA A. McDONALD, : £* * ^  J^ >, ^ r-. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89-4901447 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Hearing on the Order to Show Cause heretofore entered by the 
Court on Monday, July 15, 1991, was held before the Honorable Frank 
Noel, District Judge, on Monday, July 29, 1991. Present at said 
hearing were Plaintiff and her attorney Edwin F. Guyon and 
Defendant and his attorney Glen M. Richman. The Court having heard 
the evidence presented by the parties and being fully advised in 
the premises, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The second segment of summer visitation as specified in 
the decision announced by the Court at conclusion of trial is 
hereby forfeited and canceled and Plaintiff shall have no right to 
visit the child for all or any portion of the second three-week 
segment of summer visitation. 
00Q794 
2. Plaintiff shall retain all other visitation rights as 
provided by the decision of the Court at the conclusion of the 
trial of this matter and which shall be more particularly stated in 
the Decree of Divorce. Provided, however, that such visitation 
shall be subject to strict supervision for a period of three (3) 
months. The identity supervisor shall be based upon the 
recommendations of Dr. Mercedes Riesinger, the child custody 
evaluator appointed by the Court in this action. The requirements 
with respect to the supervised visitation shall be stated in a 
separate order. 
3. As a sanction for contempt of Court, judgment is hereby 
entered for and on behalf of Defendant, Robert M. McDonald, and 
against Plaintiff, Tamera A. McDonald, in a sum of $3,846.00. Said 
judgment shall hereafter bear interest at the rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum. 
DATED this y day of *t&y, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: >-N 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL \^ 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 1991, I 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment 
2 
00O7or 
upon the following named persons by depositing said document in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Edwin F. Guy on 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 17697 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
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Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA A. McDONALD, : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
: (Integration of Prior Orders) 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 89-4901447 DA 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, : 
: Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant, : 
The trial of this matter was held before the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel, District Judge, commencing on Monday, March 25, and 
concluding March 28, 1991. Prior to trial, the Court made various 
orders relating to the issues raised by the pleadings that are 
incorporated herein. Present at the trial and prior hearings were 
Plaintiff and her attorney, Edwin F. Guyon, and Defendant and his 
attorney, Glen M. Richman. The Court having considered the 
evidence presented by the parties, and being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
OCT 3 0 1991 
By — —
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ORDERED# ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. On the basis of evidence presented to the Court on 
December 19, 1990, and the Findings and Conclusions of the Court 
with respect thereto, Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded a Decree 
of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences which was 
entered on the 7th day of January, 1991. 
2. Defendant is awarded 'the care, custody and control of the 
minor child born of the marriage, Robert Andrew McDonald, born 
September 11, 1987, subject to reasonable and liberal rights of 
visitation on the part of Plaintiff as specifically described 
hereunder or as the parties may agree. 
3. Plaintiff shall have the right to visit the child born of 
the marriage as follows: alternate weekends to commence on Friday 
at 9:00 p.m. and to end on Sunday at 8:00 p.m.; holiday visitation 
on alternate red-letter holidays, (New Years, President's Day, 
Easter, Mother's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, 
one day during the week of the child's birthday, Thanksgiving, 
Christmas); and six (6) weeks during the summer months of June, 
July and August, provided, however, that summer visitation shall be 
exercised in no les«/than two (2) segments not to exceed three (3) 
weeks each. The extended visitation during the summer months is 
under review by the Court as if on a motion to conform to standard 
summer visitation as applied in the Third District Court of four 
2 
(4) weeks, but in two (2) equal segments. The Court shall review 
the matter without prejudice to either party, and without the need 
to show a change of circumstances. The matter may be briefed by 
each party in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration. Defendant shall file a memorandum of 
points and authorities and Plaintiff may respond thereto. Either 
party shall file a notice to submit for ruling after Plaintiff's 
memorandum and the matter shall be determined without oral 
argument, A Plaintiff is required to give notice of intent to 
exercise weekend visitation at least ten (10) days prior to the 
commencement of the weekend visitation period and shall give notice 
of intent and desired date to exercise summer visitation prior to 
May 1 of each calendar year. Unexercised visitation shall not 
accumulate. Other visitation-shall be as the parties may agree. 
However, their agreement must be in writing. 
4. Each of the parties is ordered to fully cooperate in 
visitation and custody matters and shall adhere strictly to the 
provisions of the Decree. Defendant shall have the child available 
and ready for visitation at the appointed times. Plaintiff shall 
promptly return the minor child to Defendant timely and without 
incident, at the conclusion of each visitation period. Failure to 
return the child to Defendant at the conclusion of the agreed 
visitation period may be punishable by contempt of court by ex-
3 
parte order obtained upon Defendant's appropriate affidavit. 
5. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff, for her 
continued maintenance and support, the sum of Three Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($350.00) per month as alimony, payable 1/2 on the 5th and 
1/2 of the 20th of applicable* months, beginning in April, 1991. 
Said obligation shall absolutely cease and terminette at the end of 
March, 1996 or such earlier time of Plaintiff's death, remarriage, 
or cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex. Defendant may 
pay to Plaintiff a sum of money equal to the difference between the 
alimony award stated herein and Plaintiff's obligation to Defendant 
for child support during" the time alimony is applicable. In the 
event Defendant elects to exercise this method of payment, the 
difference between alimony and child support shall be regarded as 
full payment of Defendant's alimony obligation. 
6. Child support shall bie as established by the Utah Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines as found in §78-45-7.2 - §78-45-7.14 Utah 
Code Annotated. Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant, for the use and 
benefit of the child born of the marriage, the sum of Three Hundred 
Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($302.5>u) per month as child support. Said 
payment obligation shall commence in April, 1991, and shall 
continue until such time as the child attains the age of eighteen 
(18) years or graduates from high school with his expected 
graduating class, whichever last occurs. In the event Defendant 
4 
exercises the method of payment of alimony stated in the preceding 
paragraph, Plaintiff's child support obligation shall be discharged 
by an off-set against Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff 
during the applicable period. Fifty percent (50%) of the child 
support shall abate for periods of visitation with Plaintiff for 
twenty five (25) or more consecutive days of any thirty (30) day 
period in accordance with §75-45-7.11 Utah Code Annotated. 
7. In accordance with §78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
Defendant is ordered to maintain hospital and medical insurance in 
effect for the minor child during his minority to age 18 years so 
long as it is reasonably available to him at a reasonable cost 
through his employment. Plaintiff is also ordered to maintain 
hospital and medical insurance for the benefit of the minor child 
during minority to age 18, provided it is reasonably available to 
her through her employment at a reasonable cost. Each of the 
parties shall be responsible to pay one-half of any hospital, 
medical and dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including 
orthodontics, not otherwise covered by insurance. 
8. Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and 
to the real property situated 1167 Brickyard Road, #802, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, more particularly described as: 
Unit No. 802 in Building 8 of Brickyard Condominiums, 
Phase I, together with the undivided ownership interest 
in the common areas and facilities which is actually 
appurtenant to said .unit,' and subject to the project's 
5 
declaration, which provides for alteration both in the 
magnitude of said undivided ownership interest in the 
composition of the common areas and facilities to which 
said interest relates, all of which is set forth, 
established and identified on the record of survey map of 
the Brickyard, Phase I, filed for record in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on the 
18th day of August, 1978, in Book 78-8, Page 231 of 
Plats, as Entry No. 3155499 and as set forth in the 
declaration for the said Brickyard Condominiums, Phase I, 
dated the 5th day of June, 1978 and recorded cis Entry No. 
3155498 in Book 4725 at Page 830 of official records, 
subject to and together with all easements and rights of 
way as shown and described in said Record of Survey Map 
and as set forth in said declaration of said Brickyard 
Condominium, Phase I, including, but not limited to 
Brickyard Declaration dated the 18th day of August, 1978 
and recorded on the 18th day of August, 1978 as Entry No. 
3155497 in Book 4725 at Page 814 of official records, and 
all amendments thereto 
free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall execute 
and deliver to Defendant any and all deeds or other documents 
necessary to clear record title to said property in Defendant's 
sole name. 
9. Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and 
to the personal property described on Exhibits "A", "D" and "E" 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Plaintiff 
shall execute and deliver to Defendant any and all certificates of 
title or other documents necessary to establish record title in 
said property in Defendant's sole name. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and 
to the personal property described on Exhibits "B" and "F" attached 
hereto and incorporated.• herein by reference. Defendant shall 
6 
execute and deliver to Plaintiff any and all certificates of title 
or other documents necessary to establish record title to said 
property in Plaintiff's sole name. 
11. In order to equalize the division of personal property 
values, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of Two Thousand 
Forty Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,042.50) within thirty (30) days 
after the entry of this Decree. 
12. Defendant shall pay and discharge all obligations to the 
following creditors: 
APPROXIMATE MONTHLY 
CREDITOR BALANCE PAYMENT 
Valley Mortgage Co. $55,000.00 $635.59 
Ford Motor Credit 20,000.00 657.00 
Mt. America C.U.(Lincoln) 7,000.00 469.70 
Internal Revenue Service 30,000.00 500.00 
Utah State Tax Comm. 8,000.00 300.00 
Pension Plan 20,000.00 
Centurion Bank 9,000.00 385.00 
Brickyard Homeowners Assoc. 99.00 
Defendant shall indemnify Plaintiff and save her harmless from 
liability with respect to the claims of said creditors arising out 
of the indebtedness above described in this paragraph. 
13. Plaintiff shall pay and discharge all obligations to the 
following creditor: Mountain America Credit Union in the 
approximate amount of S17.44S.00 secured by the 1988 Ford van. 
Plaintiff shall indemnify Defendant and save him harmless from 
liability from the claims of the creditor described in this 
7 
paragraph. 
14. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the 
sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) as 
attorney's fees. 
15. The parties are enjoined from making any derogatory 
statements concerning the other party in the presence of the minor 
child. 
16. In the event Plaintiff enters Defendant's home over the 
objection of Defendant, an ex parte injunction shall be entered by 
the Court enjoining such entry upon filing by Defendant of an 
appropriate affidavit noting such unauthorized entry. 
17. The parties are each required to execute any and all 
documents necessary to implement the provisions of this Decree. 
DATED this o>ff *" day of October, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
< u ^ 
HONORABLE FRANK G. WOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
JAMES I. WATTS ST/.~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff PAfE 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TPtiP r^v r~ *»• 
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Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
FU.EDW3TMCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 2 1991 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
utyCtarfc 
TAMKRA A . MCDONALD, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
(Integration of Prior Orders) 
Civil No. 89-4901447 DA 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The trial of this matter was held before the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel, District Judge, commencing on Monday, March 25, and 
concluding March 28, 1991. Prior to trial, the Court made various 
orders relating to the issues raised by the pleadings that are 
incorporated herein. Present at the trial and prior hearings were 
Plaintiff and her attorney, Edwin F. Guyon, and Defendant and his 
attorney, Glen M. Richman. The Court having considered the 
evidence presented by the parties, and being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED# ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. On the basis of evidence presented to the Court on 
December 19, 1990, and the Findings and Conclusions of the Court 
with respect thereto, Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded a Decree 
of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences which was 
entered on the 7th day of January, 1991. 
2. Defendant is awarded the care, custody and control of the 
minor child born of the marriage, Robert Andrew McDonald, born 
September 11, 1987, subject to reasonable and liberal rights of 
visitation on the part of Plaintiff as specifically described 
hereunder or as the parties mav agree. In the event the parties 
agree to visitation in excess of the visitation specified in the 
following paragraph, the parties shall acknowledge the terms and 
provisions of such agreement for additional visitation in writing 
prior to exercise of the visitation including, but not limited to, 
the date, time and place when the child shall be returned. 
Plaintiff is hereby ordered to strictly abide by the conditions 
stated in the writing and failure to do so shall be a violation of 
the provisions of this Decree and the Court may impose sanctions or 
punishment as it deems appropriate. 
3. Plaintiff shall have the right to visit the child born of 
the marriage as follows: alternate weekends to commence on Friday 
at 9:00 p.m. and to end on Sunday following at 8:00 p.m.; holiday 
2 
visitation on alternate red-letter holidays specified herein: in 
odd numbered calendar years New Year's vistation from December 29 
of the preceding year to January 2 of the odd numbered year, Martin 
Luther King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, Labor Day and 
Christmas vacation from December 23 to December 28; in even 
numbered calendar years, Easter, Independence Day, and Thcinksgiving 
Day; Mother's Day of every calendar year and Plaintiff's birthday 
in every calendar year. Plaintiff shall have the right to visit 
the child on the child's birthday in even nunmbered calendar years 
and, in odd numbered calendar years, the right to visit the child 
on a date in close proximity (within 10 days) of the child's 
birthday. Defendant shall have the right in all calendar years to 
spend the following days with the child: Father's Day, Defendant's 
birthday and all holidays not designated for visitation with 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall also have summer visitation for six 
weeks during the months of June, July and August, provided, 
however, the visit shall be exercised in no less than two (2) 
segments not to exceed three (3) weeks. The extended visitation 
during the summer months is under review by the Court. The Court 
shall review the matter without prejudice to either party, and 
without the need to show a change of circumstances. The matter may 
be briefed by each party in accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration. Defendant shall file a 
3 
memorandum of points and authorities and Plaintiff may respond 
thereto. Either party shall file a notice to submit for ruling 
after Plaintiff's memorandum and the matter shall be determined 
without oral argument. Holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation schedule. No changes shall be made to the established 
rotation of alternate weekends. It is understood this may result 
in Plaintiff losing a regular visitaiton (a weekend falling on a 
holiday reserved to Defendant) or may result in Plaintiff having 
consecutive weekends (when the first of said weekends is a regular 
weekend visitation).. Plaintiff is required to give notice of 
intent to exercise weekend visitation at least ten (10) days prior 
to the commencement of the weekend visitation period and shall give 
notice of intent and desired date to exercise summer visitation 
prior to May 1 of each calendar year. Unexercised visitation shall 
not accumulate. Other visitation shall be as the parties may agree 
in writing. 
4. Each of the parties is ordered to fully cooperate in 
visitation and custody matters and shall adhere strictly to the 
provisions of the Decree. Defendant shall have the child available 
and ready for visitation at the appointed times. Plaintiff shall 
promptly return the minor child to Defendant timely and without 
incident, at the conclusion of each visitation period. Failure to 
return the child to Defendant at the conclusion of the agreed 
4 
visitation period may be punishable by contempt of court by ex-
parte order obtained upon Defendant's appropriate affidavit. 
5. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff, for her 
continued maintenance and support, the sum of Three Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($350.00) per month as alimony, payable 1/2 on the 5th and 
1/2 of the 20th of applicable months, beginning in April, 1991. 
Said obligation shall absolutely cease and terminate at the end of 
March, 1996 or such earlier time of Plaintiff's death, remarriage, 
or cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex. Defendant may 
pay to Plaintiff a sum of money equal to the difference between the 
alimony award stated herein and, Plaintiff s obligation to Defendant 
for child support during the time alimony is applicable. In the 
event Defendant elects to exercise this method of payment, the 
difference between alimony and child support shall be regarded as 
full payment of Defendant's alimony obligation. 
6. Child support shall be as established by the Utah Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines as found in §78-45-7.2 - §78-45-7.14 Utah 
Code Annotated. Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant, for the use and 
benefit of the child born of the marriage, the sum of Three Hundred 
Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($302.50) per month as child support. Said 
payment obligation shall commence in April, 1991, and shall 
continue until such time as the child attains the age of eighteen 
(18) years or graduates from high school with his expected 
5 
graduating class, whichever last occurs• In the event Defendant 
exercises the method of payment of alimony stated in the preceding 
paragraph, Plaintiff's child support obligation shall be discharged 
by an off-set against Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff 
during the applicable period. Fifty percent (50%) of the child 
support shall abate for periods of visitation with Plaintiff for 
twenty five (25) or more consecutive days of any thirty (30) day 
period in accordance with §75-45-7.11 Utah Code Annotated. 
7. In accordance with §78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
Defendant is ordered to maintain hospital and medical insurance in 
effect for the minor child during his minority to age 18 years so 
long as it is reasonably available to him at a reasonable cost 
through his employment. Plaintiff is also ordered to maintain 
hospital and medical insurance for the benefit of the minor child 
during minority to age 18, provided it is reasonably available to 
her through her employment at a reasonable cost. Each of the 
parties shall be responsible to pay one-half of any hospital, 
medical and dental expenses incurred for the minor child, including 
orthodontics, not otherwise covered by insurance. 
8. Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and 
to the real property situated 1167 Brickyard Road, #802, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, more particularly described as: 
Unit No. 802 in Building 8 of Brickyard Condominiums, 
Phase I, together with the undivided ownership interest 
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in the common areas and facilities which is actually 
appurtenant to said unit, and subject to the project's 
declaration, which provides for alteration both in the 
magnitude of said undivided ownership interest in the 
composition of the common areas and facilities to which 
said interest relates, all of which is set forth, 
established and identified on the record of survey map of 
the Brickyard, Phase I, filed for record in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, on the 
18th day of August, 1978, in Book 78-8, Page 231 of 
Plats, as Entry No. 3155499 and as set forth in the 
declaration for the said Brickyard Condominiums, Phase I, 
dated the 5th day of June, 1978 and recorded as Entry No. 
3155498 in Book 4725 at Page 830 of official records, 
subject to and together with all easements and rights of 
way as shown and described in said Record of Survey Map 
and as set forth in said declaration of said Brickyard 
Condominium, Phase I, including, but not limited to 
Brickyard Declaration dated the 18th day of August, 1978 
and recorded on the 18th day of August, 1978 as Entry No. 
3155497 in Book 4725 at Page 814 of official records, and 
all amendments thereto 
free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall execute 
and deliver to Defendant any and all deeds or other documents 
necessary to clear record title to said property in Defendant's 
sole name. 
9. Defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and 
to the personal property described on Exhibits "A", nDff and nE,f 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Plaintiff 
shall execute and deliver to Defendant any and all certificates of 
title or other documents necessary to establish record title in 
said property in Defendant's sole name. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and 
to the personal property described on Exhibits "B" and "F" attached 
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hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Defendant shall 
execute and deliver to Plaintiff any and all certificates of title 
or other documents necessary to establish record title to said 
property in Plaintiff's sole name. 
11. In order to equalize the division of personal property 
values, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of Two Thousand 
Forty Two Dollars Fifty Cents ($2,042.50) within thirty (30) days 
after the entry of this Decree. 
12. Defendant shall pay and discharge all obligations to the 
following creditors: 
APPROXIMATE MONTHLY 
CREDITOR BALANCE PAYMENT 
Valley Mortgage Co. $55,000.00 $635.59 
Ford Motor Credit 20,000.00 657.00 
Mt. America C.U.(Lincoln) 7,000.00 469.70 
Internal Revenue Service 30,000.00 500.00 
Utah State Tax Comm. 8,000.00 300.00 
Pension Plan 20,000.00 
Centurion Bank 9,000.00 385.00 
Brickyard Homeowners Assoc. 99.00 
Defendant shall indemnify Plaintiff and save her harmless from 
liability with respect to the claims of said creditors arising out 
of the indebtedness above described in this paragraph. 
13. Plaintiff shall pay &nd discharge all obligations to the 
following creditor: Mountain America Credit Union in the 
approximate amount of $17,443.00 secured by the 1988 Ford van. 
Plaintiff shall indemnify Defendant and save him harmless from 
8 
liability from the claims of the creditor described in this 
paragraph. 
14. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the 
sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) as 
attorney's fees. 
15. The parties are enjoined from making any derogatory 
statements concerning the other party in the presence of the minor 
child. 
16. In the event Plaintiff enters Defendant's home over the 
objection of Defendant, an ex parte injunction shall be entered by 
the Court enjoining such entry upon filing by Defendant of an 
appropriate affidavit noting such unauthorized entry. 
17. The parties are each required to execute any and all 
documents necessary to implement the provisions of this Decree. 
DATED this ( £ day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE FRANK G. J\0EL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
FORM AND CONTENT: 
DATE: 
WATTS 
brney for Plaintiff EPUTY COURT CLERK 
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Glen M. Richraan (275 2) 
At torney for Defendant 
60 South 600 Eas t , S u i t e 100 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA A. MCDONALD, 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, 
Defendant. 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Civil No. 89-4901447 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Based upon the affidavits of Defendant dated November 25, 
1991, and December 16, 1991, and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff, Edwin Guyon and 
any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of Plaintiff or 
Edwin Guyon, including Constable John Sindt, are hereby restrained 
from conducting a sale of Defendant's property on December 19, 
1991, or at any other time, or in any other manner selling, 
transferring or assigning or purporting to sell, transfer or assign 
any of Defendant's property. 
This Order is based upon the following findings by the Court: 
1. The sale of Defendant's property purports to be based 
upon a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 
in the sum of $7,500.00, and Defendant appears to have valid set-
BATE 
CP/R 
UPON 
SINDT 
/fd? 
000999 
offs against said judgment in the sum of $4,096.00 by reason of 
judgments heretofore entered in favor of Defendant and against 
Plaintiff. 
2. It appears that Plaintiff has failed and refused to 
comply with the prior order of the Court that she pay and discharge 
all indebtedness to Mountain America Credit Union secured by the 
1988 Ford van and that such failure gives rise to a claim on the 
part of Defendant against Plaintiff is a sum in excess of 
$3,404.00, which would totally set-off and discharge the judgment 
upon the proposed sale is based. 
3. Defendant has filed a motion for judgment against 
Plaintiff arising out of Plaintiff's failure to pay indebtedness to 
Mountain America Credit Union and it appears probable that said 
motion would be granted. If such motion were granted, the judgment 
of $7/500.00/ upon which the proposed sale is based/ would be fully 
paid and discharged. 
4. Defendant may be irreparably harmed if the sale scheduled 
for December 19, 199lf is not restrained. 
This Temporary Restraining Order is entered after the Court 
has made telephone contact with Edwin Guyon and given Edwin Guyon 
full opportunity to address the merits of Defendant's motion for 
temporary restraining order. 
This Temporary Restraining Order is granted this f ' day of 
December, 1991/ at the hour of //
 % LsJ Q\ .m. and shall 
expire by its terms on December ^D j , 1991/ at the hour of 
ooiopo 
/ 
shown 
/ / y ^ * b /f^- »m. unless extended by the Court for good cause 
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BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUD' 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA A. McDONALD, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : Civil No. 894901447 DA 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, : 
Defendant. : 
Now before the Court is defendant's Motion to Quash 
Praecipe and Execution and Alternative Motion to Stay Enforcment 
of Praecipe and Execution. The Court has reviewed the memos and 
affidavits filed in connection with said Motion and now rules as 
follows: 
The precise wording of the Decree of Divorce pertaining 
to attorneys fees is as follows: 
"Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant in the 
sum of $7,500.00 (Seven thousand five hundred dollars) 
as attorneys fees." 
The Court is of the opinion that this is a judgment 
granted in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff's Counsel must 
look to plaintiff for the actual payment of his attorneys fees. 
The record does not reflect the current balance claimed by 
either plaintiff or plaintiff's Counsel, to be owed for attorneys 
MCDONALD V. MCDONALD PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
fees. In any event the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff's 
Counsel must look to plaintiff for payment of his fees and 
accordingly grants the Motion to Quash the Praecipe and 
Execution. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order consistent 
with this ruling. / 
DATED this /(y day of January, 1992. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUD' 
001014 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this li/D day of January, 1992: 
Edwin F. Guyon 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Glen M. Richman 
Attorney for Defendant 
-60 South 60a East,—Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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1 -si-ci Judicsal District 
Glen M. Richman, Esq. (2752) 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
60 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-8844 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA A. MCDONALD, 
: ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 89-4901447 DA 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, r-
: Judge Frank 6. Noel 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Praecipe and Execution and 
Alternative Motion to Stay Enforcement of Praecipe and Execution 
came before the Court on Defendant's motion in writing, supported 
by affidavit and memorandum. The Court also received responsive 
memorandum of Plaintiff. The matter was submitted for decision by 
Plaintiff through her counsel dated the 27th day of November, 1991, 
and the Court having reviewed the matter and being fully advised in 
the premises, grants Defendant's Motion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Quash Praecipe and Execution and to 
Stay Enforcement of Praecipe and Execution obtained by Plaintiff's 
FEB 0 7 1992 
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former counsel, Mr. Edwin Guyon, is hereby granted. Said Praecipe 
and Execution are quashed and are of no effect and enforcement of 
the same is stayed. 
2. Plaintiff's former attorney, Edwin Guyon, must look 
directly to his client, Tamera A. McDonald, Plaintiff, for payment 
of his attorney's fees. <~> K 
DATED this n day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
FRANK G. NOEL-
DISTRICT COURT 
001032 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
)ss. 
) 
Leora Loy, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
She is a secretary in the law firm of RICHMAN & RICHMAN, 
attorneys for Defendant herein. 
That she served the attached Order upon Plaintiff by placing 
a copy in an envelope addressed to: 
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq. 
433 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
— and 
James I Watts, Esq. 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and depositing the same, sealed with first class postage prepaid 
thereon in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
£fi Vh: day of January, 1992. 
A*A 
Leora Loy 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ ^ " d a y of January, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
8-10-93 
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Edwin F. Guycn 
205 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801/355-8811 Oy. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUMTY, UTAH 
TAMERA A. McDONALD 
AMENDMENT TO JUDGMENT 
A )(/} L] tfo 
case no. 8904901447 - DA 
Judce Frank 0. Noel 
plaintiff 
vs. 
ROBERT K. McDONALD 
defendant 
* * * * * * * 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
vs. 
ROBERT M. McDONALD 
On the 25th to 28th of March, 1991 came on to be heard 
the instant action; thereafter, on December 12, 1991 the court 
entered its amended decree of divorce; and the court upon motion 
and hearing and for the reasons stated in its memorandum decision 
entered the 7th day of May, 1992 it is hereby ordered that said 
December 12, 1991 decree be and hereby is amended to provide, in 
lieu of payment of attorney fees directly to plaintiff, as follows: 
Defendant shall pay directly to Edwin F. Guycn as counsel 
for plaintiff, as attorney fees, the sum pi $7,500.00. 
Dated the / ^ day of ,J i^UUy\ £_, 1992 
Judge Frank G.c$| 
On the 2na day of July, 1992 copies of th$\%8tp^ing were 
001On^ 
mailed to Glen M. Richman, Esq., 60 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84102; James I. Watts, Esq. 124 South 600 East, #100, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 and Tamera A. McDonald. 16211 East 
Flora Place, Aurora, Colorado, 80013. 
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Edwin F. Guyon - 1284 
counsel for plaintiff 
433 South 400 East v^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801/355-8811 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
TAMERA A. McDONALD 
plaintiff OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS and JUDGMENT 
vs. 
ROBERT M. McDONALD case no. 894901477 - DA 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
defendant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 28, 1991 subsequent to hearing in the 
instant action regarding property distribution, custody, support 
and visitation matters the court orally stated its rulings and 
opinion. A copy of the transcript of said findings and opinion is 
attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes labeled 
exhibit A. 
2. Defendant subsequently filed with the court 
documents labeled "findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(integration of prior findings and conclusions)" and "decree of 
divorce (integration of prior orders)". Copies of said documents 
have been filed with the court and are made a part hereof for all 
purposes as fully and completely as if attached hereto and made a 
part hereof. 
3. Plaintiff advised the court that said documents did 
not conform to the rulings of the court, objected to them generally 
and thereafter filed with the court documents labeled "findings of 
A0079? 
fact and conclusions of law" and "judgment" which in the opinion of 
plaintiff more closely comply with the rulings of the court. 
Copies of said documents have been filed with the court and are 
made a part hereof for all purposes as fully and completely as if 
attached hereto and made a part hereof, 
4. On August 12, 1991 and subsequent to notice the 
court heard argument of counsel as to the position of the parties 
thereto (including related motions) and directed that plaintiff 
file written objections to defendants proposed findings and 
decree. 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS 
Plaintiff objects to defendants proposed "findings of 
fact" as follows: (references are to page, paragraph and line) 
1. 2;4;1 - The statement regarding the appointment of 
Dr. Reisinger is not an ultimate fact. 
2. 2;5;1 - The statements regarding insurance are not 
relevant to the Judgment. 
3. 2;6;1 - The statement regarding alimony/attorney 
fees is not relevant and is redundant. 
4. 2;7;1 - The statements regarding divorce are 
redundant, a divorce having been granted prior to the instant 
action, are not ultimate facts, are subordinate material facts. 
5. Defendant wholly failed to include as a finding of 
fact that: " . . . defendant has that (substance abuse) somewhat 
under control; and in the future if it should appear that he no 
longer has that under control, that may very well indeed be a 
change of circumstances that the court would have to consider with 
000798 
regard to custody of this boy, because I believe that's Ca] very 
important factor that has to be considered by the Court." 
(transcript, page 7, lines 10 to 16) 
OBJECTIONS TO MIXED FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff objects to defendant's proposed "mixed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law" as follows: (references are to 
page, paragraph and line) 
1. 5;14;1 to end - Plaintiff is not aware of the 
existence of any statutory authority "mixing" findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Plaintiff is not aware of any binding judicial 
decision permitting the "mixing" of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Defendant's statements are generally not 
ultimate facts, not subordinate material facts, nor relevant to 
any issue before the court and are, at best, conclusory. The very 
purpose of separating findings of fact from conclusions of law is 
to permit review of facts and law separately. Further, defendant's 
statements do not conform with the actual findings of the Court. 
OBJECTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff objects of defendant's proposed "conclusions of 
law" as follows: (references are to page, paragraph and line) 
9;2;4 - The date the decree of divorce in the instant 
action was entered is January 7, 1991. 
9;3;1 - This paragraph recites a finding of fact and, in 
the event it supports a judgment, should be included in the 
findings of fact. 
12;8;9 to 11 - The conclusion granting to defendant the 
election as to how payment of funds between parties is to occur is 
000799 
does not conform to the oral findings. 
14; 19; Iff - Statements regarding payment of attorney fees 
are wholly without regard to representations by plaintiffs 
counsel (see transcript, page 14, lines 23 to 25 and page 15, lines 
1 to 20), The purpose of plaintiffs agreement regarding fees was 
made as a courtesy, convenience and benefit to defendant, not to 
change the terms and conditions of the judgment nor to permit 
defendant to unilaterally determine what he wanted as payment 
schedules, 
OBJECTIONS TO DECREE 
Plaintiff objects to defendant's proposed "decree of 
divorce" as follows: (references are to page, paragraph and line) 
1. 2;1;1 - The date of entry of the decree of divorce 
in the instant action is January 7, 1991 not December 29, 1990, 
2. 2;2;1 - Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable 
visitation not as "specifically described hereunder" but at least 
a minimum of the described visitation. 
3. 2;3;2 to 5 - Plaintiff is entitled to visitation on 
all odd numbered weekends, no limitation should exist as to the 5th 
weekend of each month. 
4. 3;5;7 to 10 - The court's oral findings do not grant 
to defendant the option regarding the circumstances by which 
payments are made. 
5* 4;6;9 to 12 - The court's oral findings do not grant 
to defendant the option regarding the circumstances by which 
payments are made. 
6. 7;14;Iff - Attorney fees are a matter of judgment, 
n00r>n 
not agreement, defendants obligation is a matter of Judgment, not 
agreement and, in the event no agreement is reached, plaintiff is 
entitled to enforce Judgment. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
1. Rule 52<a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in relevant part that: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a Jury . . . 
the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately it conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; . . . 
2. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further 
provides that: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. 
3. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically provides that: 
It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of the evidence or appear in an 
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
4. Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in relevant part that: 
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the 
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be 
raised whether or not the party raising the question has 
made in the district court an objection to such findings 
or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
5. Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in relevant part that: 
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an 
000801 
issue of fact: „ . . 
6. Rule 52 does not mandate the entry of signed, 
written findings and conclusions but specifically permits the trial 
court the opportunity to state its findings orally if it chooses, 
Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514 (Utah App 1989). 
7. Findings by the court should be limited to the 
ultimate facts and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and 
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the evidence to support 
the judgment, are sufficient, Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 
(Utah 1977). 
8. In entering an order awarding or modifying child 
custody the trial court must enter specific findings on the factors 
relied upon in awarding/modifying such custody. Hutchison v. 
Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1983); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 312 
(Utah 1986). 
9« In actions involving custody, oral findings made by 
the trial judge at the close of the evidence are sufficient to 
support a custody award if they demonstrate that the determination 
was based on factors relevant to the best interests of the child, 
Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App) cert denied 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987). 
10. Rulings in custody actions must be firmly anchored 
in findings of fact, whether written or oral, that are sufficiently 
detailed, include sufficient facts to disclose the process through 
which the ultimate conclusion is reached, indicate the process is 
logical and properly supported, and are not clearly erroneous, 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App 1987). 
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11. Credlbi 1 ity of a witness is not a factual issue that 
is appropriately the subject of the trial court/s findings as the 
ultimate findings themselves reflect the consideration of a 
witnesses'" credibility, McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1981). 
12. The trial court should make findings on al 1 material 
subordinate and ultimate factual issues with the limitation that it 
is not necessary to resolve other lesser or non-relevant 
evidentiary issues, Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 762 (Utah 1980). 
13. While failure to find upon all material issues 
raised in the pleadings is reversible error, LeGrand Johnson Crop. 
v. Peterson. 420 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966) the court has a duty to find 
facts upon all material issues submitted for decision unless such 
findings are waived, Bover v. Lignel1. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977) or 
where the evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and only capable of 
supporting a finding in favor of the judgment, Kinkellav. Baugh. 
660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983). 
Wherefore plaintiff requests that the court adopt the 
findings, conclusions and judgment submitted by plaintiff as the 
findings, conclusions and judgment of the court in the instant 
matter. 
Dated the A /> day of , 1991. 
counsel f or pLaifit i f f 
°ooeo3 
I certify that on the above date a copy of the foregoing 
was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to Glen M. Richman, Esq., 
60 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
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PENROSE 
Cite as, Utat 
all support the finding that these were sep-
arate entities. So does the conduct of the 
parties, including the monthly lease pay-
ments from Fairfield Services to Fairfield 
Enterprises, and the filing of separate tax 
returns for each organization. In the lease 
agreement, the manager expressly agreed 
to "pay all bills related to the operation of 
the business." We therefore reject the 
manager's attack upon this key finding, and 
sustain the district court's conclusion that 
the manager was responsible for the unpaid 
debts of the service station. 
2. The manager also argues that the 
financing partner had a duty to disclose the 
value of the manager's limited partnership 
interest before acquiring it from him in the 
settlement. This failure to disclose is char-
acterized as "constructive fraud." 
[2, 3] Partners obviously occupy a fidu-
ciary relationship and must deal with each 
other in the utmost good faith. U.C.A., 
1953, § 48-1-18; Nelson v. Matsch, 38 Utah 
122, 128, 110 P. 865, 868 (1910). This duty 
applies when one partner (especially a man-
aging partner) seeks to purchase the inter-
est of another partner. W.A. McMichael 
Construction Co, v.D&W Properties, Inc., 
La.App., 356 So.2d 1115, 1120-22 (1978); 
Annot, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122, 1129-45 (1981). 
In such a case, a breach of duty occurs if 
the acquiring partner falsely represents or 
conceals matters with respect to the value 
of the interest of the selling partn^—Nel-
son v. Matsch, supra, 38 Utah at 128-29,110 
P. at 868; WA. McMichael Construction 
Co. v. D & W Properties, Inc., supra, at 
1122; U.C.A., 1953, § 48-1-17,. 
[4] In this case, however, no false repre-
sentation or concealment has been alleged. 
Rather, the manager's only claim is that the 
financing partner did not voluntarily dis-
close to him the value of his partnership 
interest. Such a failure is not a breach of 
fiduciary duty where the manager has am-
ple access to information about the value of 
his partnership interest. Here the party 
who was relinquishing the limited partner-
r. PENROSE Utah 1017 
656 P^d 1017 
ship interest managed and kept the finan-
cial records of the primary partnership as-
set, the service station. He also admitted 
to having ready access to the records of the 
partnership, Fairfield Enterprises, as was 
his right under the limited partnership 
agreement and by law. U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 48-1-16. Whatever duty of affirmative 
disclosure might exist in a circumstance 
where the partners have decidedly unequal 
access to information about the nature or 
value of the partnership assets, that duty 
does not exist or was not violated on the 
facts of this case.1 Cf. Craft v. Bates, 
Okla., 372 P.2d 10, 13 (1962); Geddes's Ap-
peal, 80 Pa. 442, 462 (1876). 
The manager makes several other argu-
ments in his brief. However, inasmuch as 
each of these is based on the allegation of 
constructive fraud, none need be considered 
here. 
The judgment is affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
O I KEYNUM8ERSYSTCM 
Ruth Jeppson Peterson PENROSE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
' Wallace Herbert PENROSE, 
Defendant and Appellants 
No. 17576. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 16, 1982. 
Husband appealed from judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Christine M. Durham, J., 
1. This is not a case where a managing general ner who has no independent access to informa-
partner acquires the interest of a limited part- tion about the nature and value of the business. 
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resulting in judgment in wife's favor in 
sum of $30,000 as lump-sum alimony and 
monthly alimony of $200 per month; pro-
vided that upon payment of $30,000 lump 
sum, monthly obligation would cease. The 
Supreme Court, Dee, District Judge, held 
that: (1) record supported trial court con-
clusion that wife was in need of and enti-
tled to $200 per month, and (2) $30,000 
lump-sum award would have to be condi-
tioned so as to allow corpus to revert back 
to husband or his estate upon termination 
of husband's obligation to support wife. 
Remanded with directions. 
1. Divorce *=»239 
Record in divorce action supported trial 
court's conclusion that wife was in need of 
and entitled to $200 per month alimony. 
2. Appeal and Error <$=> 847(1), 1153 
It is duty and prerogative of Supreme 
Court in equity matters, where occasion 
warrants, and after review of both facts 
and law, to fashion its own remedy as sub-
stitute for judgment of trial court, but that 
court's action should only be disturbed to 
prevent manifest injustice. 
3. Divorce <s=>241 
Where $30,000 lump-sum alimony 
award violated antenuptial agreement 
which only required husband to provide for 
support needs of wife, and those needs were 
$200 per month, $30,000 lump-sum award 
would have to be conditioned so as to allow 
corpus to revert back to husband or his 
estate upon termination of husband's obli-
gation to support wife. 
Macoy A. McMurray, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Fred L. Finlinson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
DEE, District Judge: 
This is an appeal from a judgment en-
tered by the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, awarding a 
lump sum and monthly alimony in a Decree 
of Divorce to Mrs. Penrose, the plaintifj 
and respondent. The defendant and appel-
lant appeals from the lower court decision 
which resulted in a judgment in plaintiff's 
favor for the sum of thirty thousand dollars 
($30,000.00) as "lump sum alimony," and 
monthly alimony of two hundred dollars 
($200.00) per month; provided however, 
that upon payment of the $30,000.00 lump 
sum, the monthly obligation would cease. 
The relevant facts on appeal are as fol-
lows: 
Mr. and Mrs. Penrose, hereinafter the de-
fendant and plaintiff respectively, were 
married on August 13, 1959, a late-in-life 
second marriage for both. The defendant 
was sixty (60) years of age, the plaintiff 
fifty-four (54) years of age, at the time of 
the marriage. Each party owned substan-
tial assets which each had accrued separate-
ly prior to the marriage. Pursuant to the 
circumstances, the parties entered into an 
antenuptial agreement which, among other 
things, provided: -' . 
It is mutually desired and agreed by the 
parties that the estate of each of the 
parties shall remain separate, and be sub-< 
ject to the sole control and use of its 
owner, its well after marriage as previous 
thereto . . . 
* * * * * * 
It is further agreed by the party of the 
first part (defendant herein) that he does 
and will from his own personal estate 
assume the necessary expenses of the 
support and maintenance of the party of 
the second part (plaintiff herein). 
The parties generally conducted their busi-
ness affaire in accordance with the provi-
sions of the agreement throughout their 
twenty (20) years of marriage. In the mid-
dle* part of 1977 the marriage began to 
deteriorate, followed by a divorce action in 
the latter part of 1977. The lower court, 
after trial, determined that the plaintiff 
should be awarded a divorce, and proceeded 
to make the above referred to judgment. 
The defendant and appellant argues two 
issues on appeal. First, whether the award 
of any alimony was proper, and second, if 
the plaintiff is entitled to alimony, whether 
PENROSE v. PENROSE 
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the type of award fashioned by the lower $200.00 per month.1 
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court is proper. 
[1] As to the first issue, whether any 
award of alimony was proper, both parties 
argued their respective positions on the is-
sue, and the lower court determined that 
the plaintiff was in need of support of two 
hundred dollars ($200.00) per month and 
that the defendant had "unilaterally, and 
deliberately put himself in a position where 
he was unable to respond to the support 
need" of the plaintiff. Pursuant thereto 
the lower court awarded plaintiff monthly 
alimony of $200.00 per month and lump sum 
alimony of $30,000.00, the $200.00 monthly 
alimony to terminate upon payment of the 
$30,000.00 lump sum. A review of the rec-
ord supports the lower court's conclusion 
that the plaintiff was in need of and enti-
tled to $200.00 per month alimony. There-
fore, since the plaintiff was entitled to 
$200.00 per month alimony, the only issue 
left for the Court to decide on appeal is 
whether the $30,000.00 lump sum award 
was proper. 
The defendant contends that the lower 
.court has made a property distribution in 
contravention of the antenuptial agreement 
by giving the plaintiff a $30,000.00 award 
after the lower court found that plaintiff 
was only entitled to $200.00 a month sup-
port. The lower court, on the other hand, 
called the award a "lump sum alimony" 
which did not result in a property distribu-
tion, but was only in payment of the sup-
port obligation. 
It is evident from the record, and more 
particularly the court's Memorandum Deci-
sion, that in using the lump sum award the 
court was essentially attempting to provide 
a monthly income of $200.00 to the plain-
tiff. The lower court made the award on 
the assumption that income from the $30,-
000.00 would provide the plaintiff with 
1. $30,000.00 X 8 (interest on judgment) = 
$2,400/year. This is equivalent to $200.00 per 
month. 
2. Jackson 
(1980). 
v. Jackson, Utah, 617 P.2d 338 
Pursuant to that in-
tent the lower court ordered the defendant 
to pay $200.00 per month, and when the 
$30,000.00 was paid to secure the monthly 
amount, the $200.00 per month obligation 
would cease. Otherwise, the $200.00 per 
month obligation would be paid until termi-
nated at death or remarriage of plaintiff. 
The problem with the $30,000.00 lump 
sum award as security for the $200.00 
monthly support obligation is there was no 
condition placed on that amount that would 
require the corpus to revert to the defend-
ant or his estate when the support obliga-
tion ceased. In effect, once the lump sum 
was paid to the plaintiff to secure the 
$200.00 per month established need for sup-
port, it was lost forever to the defendant or 
his estate in that nothing required the cor-
pus to be returned for any reason. 
[2] It is the duty and prerogative of this 
Court in equity matters, where the occasion 
warrants,2 and after a review of both the 
facts and the law, to fashion its own reme-
dy as a substitute for the judgment of the 
trial court,3 but that court's actions should 
only be disturbed to prevent manifest injus-
tice.4 
[3] Viewed in that light, it is clear that 
the $30,000.00 lump sum award violates the 
antenuptial agreement which only required 
the defendant to provide for the support 
needs of the plaintiff, i.e., $200.00 per 
month. Accordingly, it is the opinion of 
this Court that the $30,000.00 lump sum 
award must be conditioned so as to allow 
the corpus to revert back to the defendant 
or his estate upon the termination of the 
defendant's obligation to support the plain-
tiff. 
The Court does not suggest that a lump 
sum award to secure alimony is improper, 
only that such an award must revert to the 
3. Article 8, § 9, Constitution of the State of 
Utah. Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
4. Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980); 
Provo City v. Lambert, Utah, 574 P.2d 727 
(1978); Mitchell v. Mitchell, Utah, 527 P.2d 
1359 (1974). 
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obligor at the termination of the alimony 
obligation. 
The case is remanded to allow the lower 
court to rewrite its judgment in accordance 
with the views of this opinion. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS, and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate here-
in; DEE, District Judge, sat. 
Av 
(o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM I M) 
William A. LANGLEY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
N.D. "Pete" HAYWARD, Sheriff, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 18456. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec 16, 1982. 
Petitioner, who was arrested on an ex-
tradition warrant for a robbery committed 
in Idaho, appealed from a judgment of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Kenneth Rigtrup, J., denying his habeas 
corpus petition. The Supreme Court, Oaks, 
J., held that: (1) district court could not 
redetermine probable cause for issuance of 
the underlying arrest warrant; (2) substan-
tial evidence supported district court's find-
ing that petitioner was the person named in 
the underlying arrest warrant and extradi-
tion papers; and (3) record supported dis-
trict courts findings that petitioner failed 
to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that he was not in Idaho when the crime 
was committed and that documents on file 
were legally sufficient for the extradition 
of petitioner to Idaho for trial on the 
charges named. 
Judgment affirmed. 
1. Habeas Corpus <3=>92(2) 
In evidentiary hearing on habeas peti-
tion filed by petitioner, who was. arrested 
on extradition warrant, district court could 
not redetermine probable cause for issuance 
of the underlying arrest warrant U.C.A. 
1953, 77-56>-l et seq. 
2. Extradition and Detainers <^ »36 
Verified complaint sworn before magis-
trate who made finding of probable cause 
satisfied statutory requirement that extra-
dition warrant be issued on the basis of an -
affidavit made before a magistrate. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-30-3. 
3. Habeas Corpus <*=>92(2) 
Claim of mistaken identity was a ques-
tion that could be raised by habeas corpus 
in the asylum state. 
4. Extradition and Detainers <s=>39 
State has a burden of proving that the 
person arrested is the person named in the 
extradition papers. 
5. Extradition and Detainers *=»34 
State makes a prima facie case that the 
person arrested is person named in the ex-
tradition papers by showing that the arrest-
ed person has, or is known by, the same 
name as that appearing on the extradition 
papers. 
6. Habeas Corpus <&=>85.2(4) 
When state has made its prima facie 
case that the person arrested is the person 
named in the extradition papers, petitioner 
has the burden of going forward with af-
firmative evidence that he is not the person 
named in the extradition papers. 
1. Habeas Corpus *=>S5.&U) 
Where the petitioner, by sworn testi-
mony or by a verified pleading, produces 
evidence that he is not the person named in 
the extradition papers and where the state 
provides no evidence in addition to its bare 
prima facie case, petitioner is entitled to 
release. 
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ing the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency 
proceeding, 'the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the accused against conviction except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged. 
Since this case must be reversed and re-
manded to the juvenile court to make spe-
cific findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, it would be more appropriate that the 
fact finder assess the evidence in light of 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 
The judgment of the juvenile court is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
HENRIOD, ELLETT, CROCKETT 
and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
KIT NUHIER JT5TIM 3> 
Delores Blood MITCHELL, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
William Keith MITCHELL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 13565. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Nov. 7, 1074. 
Petition to modify alimony and child 
support payments awarded to "wife in de-
cree of divorce. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., in-
creased amounts of alimony and child sup-
port, and husband appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Callister, C. J., held that where hus-
band-appellant did not include in record on 
appeal transcript of hearing on petition for 
modification, presumptions of validity of 
trial court's determination that there was a 
substantial change of circumstances justi-
fying increase of support and maintenance 
payments applied to require affirmance of 
trial court's order. 
Affirmed. 
MITCHELL Utah 1359 
P.2d 1350 
1. Divorce <§=>I64, 245(1), 309 
Proceeding to modify divorce decree is 
equitable, and same authority is conferred 
upon trial court to make subsequent 
changes as to support and maintenance as 
it could have dealt with them originally. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
2. Appeal and Error <§=*847(l), 1122(2) 
It is both duty and prerogative of Su-
preme Court in an equitable action to re-
view the law and the facts to make its own 
findings and substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court. Const, art. 8, § 9. 
3. Divorce <8=252, 286(2) 
In a divorce action, trial court has 
considerable latitude of discretion in^ ad-
justing financial property interests, and its 
actions are indulged with a presumption of 
validity. U.CA. 1953, 30-3-5; Const, art. 8, 
§9. 
4. Divorce e=>!84(4, 12) 
On appeal in a divorce action, burden 
is on appellant to prove that evidence 
clearly preponderates against findings as 
made, that there was a misunderstanding 
or misapplication of law resulting in sub-
stantial prejudicial error, or that serious 
inequity has resulted so as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-5. 
5. Divorce C=286(2), 312.6(3) 
On appeal in divorce action, where ap-
pellant did not include in the record on ap-
peal a transcript of the hearing on petition 
for modification of alimony and child sup-
port payments, presumption of validity of 
trial court's determination that there was a 
substantial change of circumstances justi-
fying increase of support and maintenance 
payments applied to require affirmance of 
trial court's order. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
"Jackson Howard of Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen, Provo, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
Kay M. Lewis of Jensen & Lewis, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
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CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff filed a petition to modify the 
alimony and child support payments award-
ed to her in a decree of divorce entered in 
February, 1970. The original decree 
awarded plaintiff $1 per year alimony and 
$90 per month for each of five minor chil-
dren. Upon hearing of the petition, the 
trial court increased plaintiffs alimony to 
$100 per month and child support to $150 
per child for the four minor children resid-
ing with her. 
The trial court found that since the time 
of entry of the original decree, defendant's 
earnings had increased from a base salary 
of $13,196 per year plus bonus to a base 
salary of $19,355 per year; that the cost of 
living had increased considerably; and 
that plaintiffs living expenses for herself 
and minor children had increased to an 
amount in excess of $800 per month. The 
trial court concluded that there had been a 
substantial change of circumstances with a 
substantial increase in the cost of living, 
which justified an increment in the award. 
Defendant appeals from the order de-
creeing'the aforementioned modification. 
He contends that the amount of alimony to 
which plaintiff is entitled should be based 
upon her station in life at the time the de-
cree of divorce was entered and should not 
be measured by defendant's present wealth 
and earning capacity. Defendant claims 
that the sole ground for modification of al-
imony was the increase in his income, and 
such a factor is relevant only insofar as 
ability to pay is concerned; and that there 
must be a change of circumstances to justi-
fy an increase in alimony. Defendant fur-
ther urges that there must be a material 
change of circumstances to modify an 
award of child support, and such burden 
was not sustained by plaintiff. Defendant 
finally contends that in the original decree 
plaintiff was awarded the family home in 
lieu of substantial alimony payments, and 
such a property settlement should be 
I. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2<I 430, 491 
P.2d 231 (1971). 
deemed res judicata and held to preclude 
any subsequent modification of alimony. 
Section 30-3--5, U.C.A.1953, as amended 
1969, provides: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation 
to the children, property and parties, and 
the maintenance of the parties and chil-
dren, as may be equitable. The court 
shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support and 
maintenance, or the distribution of the 
property as shall be reasonable and nec-
essary. 
[1-4] In accordance with this statute, 
this court has held that a proceeding to 
modify a divorce decree is equitable and 
the same authority is conferred upon the 
trial court to make subsequent changes as 
respect to support and maintenance as it 
could have dealt with them originally.1 
Under Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution 
of Utah, it is both the duty and preroga-
tive of this court in an equitable action to 
review the law and the facts and make its 
own findings and substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial court. However, in a 
divorce action, the trial court has consider-
able latitude of discretion in adjusting fi-
nancial and property interests, and its ac-
tions are indulged with a presumption of 
validity. The burden is upon appellant to 
prove that the evidence clearly preponder-
ates against the findings as made; or 
there was a misunderstanding or misappli-
cation of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or a serious inequi-
ty has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion.2 
[5] In the instant action, defendant has 
not included in the record on appeal a 
transcript of the hearing for the petition 
for modification. Defendant's points on 
2. Harding v. Harding 26 Utah 2d 277, *& 
P.2d 308 (1971); Searle v. Searle, 522 V^d 
697 (Utah 1974). 
MITCHELL \ 
Cite as 52: 
appeal involve a factual determination, 
which this court obviously cannot under-
take without a transcript of the hearing. 
The determination of the trial court that 
there had been a substantial change of cir-
cumstances, which justified the increase of 
support and maintenance, is presumed val-
id. This court must assume that the trial 
court, in evaluating the petition for modifi-
cation for support, considered the parties' 
.^MITCHELL Utah 1361 
' P.2d 1359 
respective economic resources and deter-
mined what constituted the equitable share 
each should contribute to the household to 
maintain the family according to their sta-
tion in life.3 
The order of the trial court is affirmed. 
Costs are awarded to plaintiff. 
HENRIOD, ELLETT, CROCKETT, 
and TUCKETT, JJ, concur. 
3. Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155 (1973). 
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SHAW v. JEPPSON. 
No. 7711. 
Buprenic Court of Utah. 
Jon. 12, 1!»"»2. 
Action by IMrnn Slniw, doing business ns 
Arthur Murray l»nmv Slnillo, against A m 
II I'irix.ml .lc|'|.-..ii for liijinictluii reslrnln-
Inf. dvfeiimmt from leiiclilng ilniu liiK In eoin-
|.tltl«»n wiih plaintiff. The Tlilnl .Imllclnl 
tourt, Salt 1/iiUf County, Josrpli (I. .lrppaon, 
J, inltrnl Juditmetit for pliiiiitifT. mid ilo-
fcndant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
t'Mrkett, J . held tlmt where plainllfT was 
frvc to Independently manage her own busi-
ness, fnef Unit she liml Iheitslug agreement 
• Ith foreljrn corporation for UFO of l is nitiiie 
ind methods In teaching of dancing upon 
r.»tnpll;iiH*» with certain requirements and 
»*Hr.Htl.»ll«!, (11(1 llOt P'Md t<» Conclusion t l m t 
•oh rorpnriilluti was doing husliii'ss In Stale 
hj plaintiff as It* agent, hut plalntltT was 
rtnl pnrty In Interest niut entitled to tuMu-
uln gult to enjoin defendant In accordance 
* lib contract of employment previously en-
tered Into In'tween parties l»y whliii defend-
tot lio<l tig reed to refrain from competition 
• ithlii pit en urea for certain period upon 
trrmlniiiioii of employment. 
Judgment nlliriued. 
I. Appeal and Error C^1009(4) 
On appeal in case of equitable cogni-
uncf, couit will l ev iew evidence, hut it 
•ill not distiii h findings of trial court un-
less thry are clearly against weight of evi -
dence.1 
I Corporations «=>6t2(4«/a), 667','j 
Where proprietor of dancing studio 
brought action to enjoin defendant, who 
• i$ formerly employed as dancing instruc-
tor, from teaching of darning and pro-
frietor had licensing agreement with for-
eign corporation which permitted her to 
•se name, and methods of licensor, hut pro-
pietor was free to independently manage 
•er own business, fact that foreign corpo-
ntion compelled proprietor to comply with 
certain requirements and to make payment 
fll percentage of gross receipts as condi-
tion to continuing privilege of license, did 
cit compel conclusion that foreign corpo-
. ration was doing business in state by pro-
EPPBON Utah 7 4 5 
r fit 71s 
prietor as its alter ego or agent and that 
it was consequently real parly in interest. 
3. Contracts C=>330(2) 
Where proprietor of dancing studio 
had licensing agreement with foreign cor-
poration by which proprietor was permit-
ted to use name, dances, instruction books 
and methods of licensor, with certain obli-
gations and limitations as condition of con* 
tinuance of rights given by l icensing agree-
ment, but proprietor was sole owner of 
business and was free to independently 
manage same, fact that licensor might in-
directly benefit from proprietor's enforce-
ment of contract by which employee of 
proprietor was precluded, upon termination 
of employment, from leaching dancing 
within given area for period of two years, 
did not preclude maintenance by propric- «• 
tor of suit to enforce agreement on her 
own behalf. 
4. Contracts <S=»330(2) 
Where there are joint promisees having 
separate or severable rights, promisees may 
enforce, their rights separately unless some 
obvious hardship or injustice is wrought 
by such procedure, and suit by one prom-
isee is permissible even though other prom-
isee may be under disability to sue. U.C.A. 
191.1, 18-8-1 , 18 8 -2 , IS-8-S. 
5. Parties C=»6(l) 
T h e reason that defendant has right 
to have cause of action proscculed by real 
party in interest is so that judgment will 
preclude any action on same demand by 
another, and will permit defendant to as-
sert all defenses or counterclaims available 
against real owner of cause. 
Miner A Jones, Fsqs. , Salt Lake City, 
for appellant. 
Robert M. Ycatcs, and Cheney, Marr, 
Wilkins & Cannon, all of Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 
C R O C K F T T , Justice. 
Plaintiff procured an injunction against 
the defendant from teaching dancing in 
competition with her. T h e controversy on. 
I. Stanley v. Stanley, 07 Utah 520, PI |\2«l IK5. 
?3M\M-I7'4 
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this appeal is over an effort of the defend- Defendant admits that Arthur Murray, 
ant to get another plaintiff in, so she can Inc. is a foreign corporation and that it has 
show it is disqualified from suing her. not qualified to do business in the State of 
Ara M. Dimoud (now Jeppson) was Utah and docs not dispute that if such cor-
hired as a dancing instructor by the plain- I«»ration were Ihc real party in interest and 
tiff, Jlclcnc Shaw. The contract of em- doing business in the State of Utah it 
ployment provided that if she left plaintiff's ctmU^ , , ( ) l maintain this suit. First Nation-
employ she would not teach nor dance for «' , , a " k o f l '"ec v. Parker, 57 Utah 2'W 
hire within a certain area, that is, in Salt ,< ;* *'• ° ° , # l 2 A.L.R. 137J; Dunn v. Utah 
l-akc County, or any county adjacent to it Serum Company, 65 Utah 527, 2.1S P. 215; 
or within 25 miles of any Arthur Murray I'Vauklin Building & l o a n Company v. 
dance studio for a period of two years; Peppard, "7 Utah 48.1, 9.1 l'.2d 1/25. 
if she breached this covenant, she agreed Consideration of the defendant's dial-
f 1) to pay on demand a promissory note in lenge that the plaintiff is not the real party 
Ihc sum of $5(H) as compensation for danc- in interest in the suit requires a brief, fac-
ing instruction and training she would re- tual survey of the relationship h i lwccu the 
cc ive ; and ( 2 ) that she recognized that parties as shown by the contracts between 
it would cause irreparable injury to the them and their methods of operation. The 
plaintiff's business and consented to an in- plaintiff, l l c l c u c Shaw, has a licensing 
junction against her breaching said cove- agreement with Arthur Murray, Inc. of 
•unit. After approximately one and one- N e w York venni t t ing her to use the name, 
half years employment, she quit without dances, instruction tmoks and methods of 
Mating any reason therefore and began the licensor, but she is obliged tu do so 
teaching dancing within the proscribed within certain limitations. For this she 
area. pays 1(1% of her gross receipts, plus 5% 
The plaintiff commenced this action seek- to go into a fund for advertising and ccr-
ing three th ings: (a ) to collect the promis- tain other contingencies, 
sory note, (li) for money damages for vio- The plaintiff is Ihc originator and entrc 
lal ing the covenant, and (c) to enjoin her prencur of the business she is conducting. 
from continuing lo do so. Upon ihc trial, She filed an affidavit that she personally 
the parties stipulated that the defendant
 v v ; ,s doing business under an assumed 
had breached the covenant; the plaintiff
 l l a l l l C | Arthur Murray Studios, and rtgis 
waived any money damages caused prior t,.rrd that name for herself in the (Wf.ce 
to the trial; and also waived any right to „t* the Secretary of St;ite. Slfe procured 
collect on the promissory note. I he only J u r own studio, made all the arrangements 
issue presented was as to plaintiffs right
 a | ,„„t rental, utilities and other incidentals 
to the injunction. The trial court ruled for
 w | , i ch it is her sole responsibility to pay; 
the plaintiff and entered a decree ordering
 s | , c owns all of the assets of the business 
the defendant to discontinue violation of including the furniture, fixtures, tiles, rcc-
thc covenant. Defendant appeals. , m , s a , „ l instruction hooks, the lease, ac 
The defendant makes no claim that the counts receivable and the licensing agree-
restriction is not a reasonable and lawful , , u u t referred lo. T h e hiring of personnel, 
one and necessary to protect the good will l " c payment of their salaries ami all of 
of the plaintiff's business. The only de- | M C expenses of the business is upon her. 
fensc she asserts to the action is based 011 '» ^acl» *»c " a s f"H responsibility for man-
these two propositions: that plaintiff, I le l - aKml» n " p luses of the business, arrange-
cun Shaw, is not the real parly in interest menls for lessons, group dances, and cours-
but that Arthur Murray, Inc., is such in cs. And it is she who gets the benefits uf 
fact; and that it is a foreign c o l o r a t i o n amy profits made or suiters any loss that 
doing business in Utah without complying »»;,y »c incurred in the business, 
with Sections 18-8-1 and 2, U.C.A. 1V>4.1, It is true that in order to protect the 
and is therefore disqualified from suing name and good will of the licensor, the 
herein by Section 18-K-5. l icensing agreement places some rcstric-
SHAW •. JEPPSON Utah 747 
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tions upon the plaintiff in that Arthur Mur- ant could have held Arthur Murray, Inc 
ray, Inc has the right to make certain re responsible for her wages or have imposed 
qmrements with respect to t>pcs of dancing any other obligation upon it 
taught, the character of the studio, salaries f j p o n t n e facts as delineated above the 
paid and not eniplo>mg personnel found to
 c o u r t f0„„,i that the plaintiff was not the 
be objectionable It also requires plaintiff
 a | t c r 0gOf agent, servant or employee of 
to keep records and to make reports of a Arthur Murray, Inc , that such corpora 
general nature showing the lessons taught
 tion was not doing business in the State 
and the gross receipts which is the basis
 ()f u , a n a m j r u | c j that the pi untiff in 
of pa>mcnt for the license I his report
 n c r o w l l r Ig| , t w a s entitled to enforce the 
does not show the wages paid nor the op- covenant against the defendant and upon 
erating expenses in connection with the
 s u c n findings granted the injunction, 
business because the licensor docs not 
share in the profits and is not responsible HI l h c t , l , a s c o f t h l s c a s c u n ( , e r r c " 
for the loss and therefore is not concerned v , e w . that , s ' pertaining to the injunction, 
uhrlher the nl untiff s business is nrofita ' s equitable 1 hcrefore, although the court 
Me or otherwise The contract expressly «•» r<*v , rw t h c evidence, it will not dis-
provides tint the licensor is not responsible t u r , ) l h e "»<"ugs of »hc trial court unless 
for salaries or other debts incurred by the t , , c v * r c c , e a r , v *K*™* *"e " c , & h t o f t h e 
plaintiff The evidence is that the licensor " idu icc Stanlc> v Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 
his never exercised an> of its prerogatives -^ * *( ' "*°5 
of supervisory control over the plaintiff's
 [ 2 ] Where the plaintiff was thus free 
business Actually no representative of
 t 0 ,m i t pendently manage her own bust-
Arthur Murray, Inc has ever been at the
 n e s s > t | )C fact t j l < l t the licensor compelled 
studio The fact is that it has no direct j , c r t o c o i n ,» | y W I t | , CCrtain requirements 
supervisory control over the plaintiff's
 a s a c o n ( | , t ,on to continuing the privilege 
business, the requirements imposed by the
 o f t h c |1 C c n s e > ( i o c s „ o t | e a d to the conclu-
SRreenicnt are conditions under which the
 s l o n t , n t t | , c | , c c l l s o r vvas doing business 
plaintiff can continue to use the name and
 | n t , ) c S t a t e o f U t l h n> t l l c | I c c n S 0 c as its 
methods of Arthur Murray, Inc, a breach
 a , t c r c g o o r a R c n t McMaster, Inc , v. 
of which could only become the basis of Chevrolet Motor Company, D C , 3 F2d 
a cancellation of the license upon certain
 4 6 9 t s , ^ t e x 1 o r < | M o t o r Company, 208 
notice specified in thc contract Only in
 s C 3 ; ^ 3 8 s F 2d 242, which latter case 
this indirect way of cancelling the license, d,st,ng,„shcs between doing business in a 
could licensor interfere with thc manage-
 s t a t e , n s u c h a I I l a i l , i e r a s to require a 
ment and operation of the plaintiff's busi-
 c o r , , o r a t ,on to file its articles, pay fees and 
n e s s
 comply with the statutes to qualify to do 
The defendant Ara M Ditnond Jeppson business therein, as compared with merely 
is not a party to the license agreement and having an agent operating with sufficient 
has no dircet contractual relationship with authority to render the corporation amuu-
Arthur Muirav, Inc 1 be plaintiff hired Me to bcrvicc of process on him such as 
the deftudmt, fixed hrr hours, specified the »n Inttr111t1011.il 1 cxt Hook Company v 
terms ami conditions of employment and P'KK. 217 U S 91, 10 S Ct 481, 54 L Ud 
set and agreed to i>av her salarv The 6 7 8 . c«ted by plaintiff, where a corporation 
defendant's contract with the plaintiff was " a s J u k l t o b e <lo,"S business in Kansas 
one of employment for the plaintiff in con- through its agent who maintained an office, 
nection with which the defendant agreed s o , ( l correspondence courses, collected and 
to thc cov.nant we are concerned with remitted fees, made duly reports, received 
The mutual obligations of the contract run a r c K t , , a r s a , a r > a , u l " , , c r e m a , V I*0P , C 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, were currently taking courses 
and Arthur Murrav, Inc is referred to in Defendant claims that Golden v Amcri-
it as a third pi r t ) , md under its provisions, can Kceiic Cement el Phstcr Company, 98 
there is no theory upon which the defend- Utah 23, 95 1*2(1 755, is a case squarely 
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in point for her Golden attempted to 
foreclose a mortgage which had been tak-
en in his name, it appearing that he was 
in fact merely the alter cgo of California 
Stucco Products Company, a foreign cor-
poration There is a significant and con-
trolling difference* Golden had no per-
sonal interest in thc cause of action what-
soever, such as Mrs Shaw has 111 the in-
stant case. 
There is no necessity for indulging in 
niceties as to whether the plaintiff may 
be an agent of Arthur Murray, Inc for 
some purposes, as that is immaterial to the 
issues in this case. 
f3,4] Insofar as her right to sue is 
concerned, the determination made is am-
ply justified Thc plaintiff as the owner of 
the business exacted this covenant from 
the defendant for the purpose of protecting 
her own interests She is entitled to en-
force it on her own behalf She would not 
be precluded from doing so merely because 
a foreign corporation, disqualified from 
suing, might also have an interest in the 
contract and may incidentally derive an 
indirect benefit from plaintiff's enforcement 
of her own rights 
The situation would be different if Ar-
thur Murray, Inc were suing But it is 
not, and is seeking nothing in this action 
Whether it could or could not enforce this 
covenant, were it qualified to sue, is of no 
instant concern Under modern law there 
is no question but that where there are 
joint promisees, having separate or severa-
ble rights, they ma> enforce their rights 
separately unless some obviems hardship or 
injustice is wrought by such pioccdure, 
see Vol 4 Corbin on Contracts, Sees 939 
and 910 and numerous cases there cited 
under Note 74 1 he author states in Sec 
ov> >* * * * E v c n ,f l t , s a s , „g | e a u t i 
individual performance that is promised to 
two or more promisees, and the promise 
contains no words of 'severance', if breach 
of the promise causes separate and distinct 
injuries to thc promisees, justice and con-
venience may at times be served by per-
mitting them to maintain separate actions 
for damages * * • " 
Suit by one promisee is permissible al-
though the other may be under a disability 
to sue It seems obvious that one who has 
a right violated, should not be prevented 
from redress merely because another, who 
'may be disqualified or unavailable in the 
suit, may share the right In thc case of 
Hoyt v New Hampshire Fire Ins Co, 92 
N i l 242, 29 A 2d 121, 148 A L R 484, 
three owners of undivided interests in 
property were insured against fire by a 
single policy, it was held that two of them 
could recover the amount of their loss ac-
cording to their interest, even though the 
third set the fire himself and could n cover 
nothing See also Satler Lumber Co v 
Exlcr, 239 Pa 135, 86 A 793 
r5J The reason the defendant has the* 
right to have a cause of action prosecuted 
by the real 'party in interest is so that thc 
judgment will preclude airy action on the 
same demand by another and permit the 
defendant to assert all defenses or counter 
claims available against thc real owner of 
thc cause Chickasaw Lumber Co v Kun 
kel, 183 Okl 347, 82 P2d 1003, Meyers v 
Bank of America Nat Trust & Savings 
Ass'n, Cal App, C9 P 2d 868, subsequent 
opinion, 11 Cal 2d 92, 77 P2d 1081 De 
fendant will suffer no difficulty in tin* case 
on tint score Her attempt to make Ar 
thur Murray, Inc the plaintiff in this case 
is not to guard against any such disadvan 
tagc, but such eifort is apparently so she 
could then contend that thc action may not 
be maintained against her It is obvious 
that plaintiff is much more vitally and di 
rcctly affected by defendant teaching danc-
ing in Salt Lake County in violation of the 
covenant than is Arthur Murray, Inc The* 
trial court correctly ruled that she was en-
titled to the 'injunction on her own be-
half 
Judgment affirmed Cost*, to respondent 
WADE, McDONOUGH and HEN-
KIOD, )) , concur. 
VVOLrE, Chief Justice (concurring in 
part—dissenting in part). 
My concurrence is limited to the reason 
stated by the majority opinion that "The 
plaintiff as the owner of the business ex-
acted this covenant from thc defendant for 
the purpose of protecting her own interestt 
BATES• 
Cite us 2? 
She is entitled to enforce it on her own 
bclnlf" In Allen v Rose Park Pharm-
acy, Utah, 1951, 2V P 2 d 823, 826, we held 
"Restrictive coven mts arc generally uphild 
by the courts where the) arc neccssarv 
for the protection of the business * * * 
and no gicater restraint is imposed than is 
reasonably ncccss iry to secure such pro-
tection " 
But I am not prepared to concur in the 
inference stated in the majority opinion 
that Arthur Murray, Inc of N e w \or lc 
City and I lckt ic Shaw, d / h / a Arthur Mur-
ray Dtncc Studio of Salt l a k e O t \ , arc 
joint promisees The contract here being 
sued upon is a contract of cmplovmcnt 
signed by Hclcnc Shaw and Ara M Di -
mond [now Jeppson] It was apparently 
drafted by Aithur Murray, Inc and the 
restrictive covenant here being enforced 
»as obviously included for the protection 
of Artlpir Murray, Inc as well as I lc lenc 
Shaw Arthur Murr ly, Inc may be a third 
party iHiicficiary, but it is not clear to mc 
that it is a primary party to the Shaw-
Jeppson contract To so infer seems un-
necessary to this decision This proposi-
tion is not mentioned in the briefs. 
BATES v. SIMPSON et al. 
No. 7686. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Jan 11, 1002 
Haskell N Hates BUI d .Jluwnle Simpson W 
J Stutmlcis, and tlie 1 tuploveis 1 lability 
Afisurfftue (orporation l t d for looses SUM 
Ulnod by mmon of .liminie Simpsons fail 
ure to p u x u i e title to an automobile he had 
told to plaintiff S i u m h i s H1C<1 a cross 
complaint against HIP rorporitlon, as surety 
on Simpsons bond, for losses "sustained by 
8tumlers when Simpson failed to acquire ti 
Uti to the automobile for plaintiff with the 
SIMPSON Utah 749 
D V 2«1 749 
proceeds of loan procured by Saunders, nt 
Simpson's request, In pledging the atitnmo 
bile to a Hnniue eompanv as security The 
corporation filed a (ross (oiiiplaint against 
Smi ide is basing Its <lalm to indemnification 
upon an nlhgcd joint ad\« uture relationship 
between Simpson and Blunders I h e ' J h l r d 
District Court, Salt l a k e < ounty, Hay Win 
Cott, J r , J , nnarilni judgmi nt against t lie 
surct}, In fa\or of both plaintitT and Saint 
ders, and the surety appealed The Su 
pieme Court, Wolfe C J held lute r alia 
that there waR no h gal theory upon whhli 
Simpsons fraudulent acts could be imputed 
to Saunders hut that the trial (otnt had 
erred in in< hiding the MIMP item of damages 
in both Its aw aid to plaintitT and its award 
to S iuud< rs 
Keinanded with directions 
I Licenses C=>26 
In hirer's action and financier's cross-
action against seller's surety for losses 
sustained v»hcn seller failed to use proceeds 
of loan, procured by fimncier at seller's 
request, to acquire title to automobile for 
bu>er, it w i s error to require surety to 
pay both to bujer ind financier, as item 
of dam qn s, imoiint of c ish deposited by 
bujer with seller to e o \ c r s des tax and fee 
for license plates 
2. Joint Adventures C=H l t I 2 
A joint adventure is in nature of pnrt 
ncrship, and to estiblish joint adventure 
there must be agreement, express or nn 
plied, for sharing of profits * 
3 Joint Adventures C=>l 12 
Seller's profit on s i l e of automobile 
and earnings of indmdi i i l who fin meed 
transaction, which e irniugs took form of 
reserve credited to such individual s ac 
count with finance compan) , were two 
different things, and faet that such* individ 
ual realized profit in form of accumulated 
reserve with fin mcc c o m p i m did iv>t make 
such ind iv idu i l s relationship with seller 
one of joint adventure 
4. Joint Adventures C=>I.I2 
Tact that two independently licensed 
used automobile dealers shared a lot, the 
building thereon and its furnishings, and 
I. Wnsntdi lawnhxlc I^ oim (\> v Lewis Kaiumiiifl v Wluto Star Gua & Oil Co, 
& Sharp, 84 Utuh 347, 35 P2d 835; 02 Utah 24, 03 P 2d 231 
TabO 
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Catherine Deon ALBRECHTSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Ray H. ALBRECHTSEN, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 10468. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 3, 100G 
T h e T h i r d Distr ict Court , Sal t Lake 
County, Marcel lus K Snow, J , entered an 
o rde r quash ing a writ of ga rn i shment , and 
an appeal was taken 1 he Sup reme Cour t , 
W a d e , J , held that proper p rocedure would 
h i v e been for vufc s at torney to in tervene 
in her divorce action to have amount and 
extent of his a t to rney ' s lien de termined and 
lien enforced, and hav ing failed to inter-
vene, he h id no s tanding to appi il from 
action of cour t in garn i shment proceeding 
brought in t i n t case, c \ c n though motion to 
quash writ was supported by wife 's af f i -
davi t tha t i ssu incc of wri t had not been au-
thorized by her and that at torney had been 
paid. 
At tempted appeal dismissed 
Divorce <S=>I78 
Prope r procedure would have been foi 
wife 's a t to rney to intervene in her divorce 
action to have amount and extent of his 
a t torney ' s lien determined and lien enforced, 
and h i v i n g fi l led to intervene, he h i d no 
s tanding to appeal from action of cour t in 
g i r n i s h m t n t proceeding brought in tha t 
c isc, even though motion to quash wr i t was 
supported by wife 's aff idavit tha t issuance 
of writ had not been author ized bv l u r and 
t i n t attorney h i d been paid Rules of Civil 
1 loccdure , rule 73(a ) 
Stephen I Johns ton , Sal t I akc City, for 
appd l au t 
Leon I l a lg rcn , Sa l t L a k e City, for re -
spondent . 
W A D E , Jus t ice 
T h i s is an appeal from an order quash-
ing a wri t of ga rn i shment , issued and se rv-
ed upon the employer of Ray H Albrecht-
scn by the a t to rney w h o had obtained a di-
vorce from h i m . for Ca the r ine Deon Al -
brcchtscn, in which suit she had been 
a w a r d e d a sum of $250 for a t to rney ' s fees 
W e have not been favored with a brief 
from respondent H o w e v e r , from the rec-
ord it appears tha t defendant and respond-
ent here in , Ray H Albrechtsen , filed a mo-
tion to q u i s h the wr i t of ga rn i shmen t T h e 
motion was supported by the aff idavi t of 
his former wife tha t the a t to rney who caus-
ed the wr i t to be issued and served no long-
er represents he r in this c a s e ; tha t the is-
suance of the wr i t was not author ized by 
h e r , and fur ther , t ha t he had been paid the 
full amoun t of a t to rney ' s fees he had agreed 
to accept for his services to obtain the di -
vorce* 
Af t e r a h e a r i n g upon the motion to quash 
the wr i t of ga rn i shmen t the motion w a s 
g ran ted and an o r d e r en te red quash ing the 
wr i t 'Hits appeal is b rough t by the a t to r -
ney who represented Ca the r ine Deon A l -
brechtsen in the above entit led action In 
his brief the a t t o rney denies tha t he h a s 
been fully paid accord ing to the cont rac t 
between himself and h is former client and 
contends that he had the r igh t to have the 
wr i t issued because he bad an a t torney '* 
lien on the judgment T h e record does not 
disclose any proceedings taken or even an 
application to the cour t by this a t torney to 
in tervene in the above entit led action to 
enforce an a t to rney ' s lien for his fees where 
the amount and c<tcnt of his lien, if any, 
could have been de termined Such would 
have been the proper procedure * It is ica-
sonable to assume tha t the plaintiff in the 
above entitled case, who denies tha t she au-
thor ized the ga rn i shmen t proceedings 
I 7 \ m Tur2«1 p 215, S 304; Kourbotis v Nat'l Copper Bank of Salt Lake City, 71 Utnh 232, 
p 2 IS. 204 I* 724. 
aga ins t h e r former husband, ,s not appeal-
ing from the judgmen t of the court quash-
ing those proceedings H c r former a t tor -
ney hav ing failed to in tervene as a par ty 
' " the original action for divorce to enforce 
any hen he may have for services rendered 
' " tha t case, has no s tanding to appeal from 
2. Rule 73(a) U U C P . 
A L B R E C H T S E N v A L B R E C H T S E N 
Cite as 414 T 2d 070 Utah 972 
the action of the cour t in the ga rn i shmen t 
p roceedings* brought in that case. 
T h e at tempted appeal ,s dism.ssed 
C R O C K E T T , and C A L L I S T E R , ]]
 C on-
r u r ' JJ > v v " 
TabP 
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and 2, the written contract was not an 
integration as to this subject Therefore, 
whether the $17,000 was agreed to be re 
payable by Ipsen and thus an "indebted-
ness" for which Stanger would be liable 
l>ecame a question of fact and parol evi 
dence was admissible While the evidence 
was conflicting, Stanger adduced testimony 
that the president and vice president of 
Sentinel stated before the first payment 
was made to Ipsen that it was not repaya-
ble because it was intended to assist him in 
changing employers and to further the de-
velopment of Sentinel s business in Arizona 
There being competent evidence to support 
the jury s finding on this issue, we will not 
disturb it Moreover, tfiere was also testi-
mony that Ipsen was not Stanger's sub-
agent at the time the payments were made 
and therefore the debiting of Stanger's 
account would be improper under the Stan-
ger Contract 
(101 (4) $13,62885, representing Ander 
ton's share of debit created while oj>erating 
under the SMG Contract At the trial the 
president of Sentinel agreed with Stanger 
and Anderson that the repayment of this 
amount was expressly covered by the Modi-
fication Agreement of January 13, 1969, 
and that under the terms thereof only pre-
miums paid on sales of insurance under the 
SMG Contract prior to 1969 would be used 
to reduce and eventually eliminate Ander-
son s debit balance The $13,62886 with-
held from the "001" account represented, 
according to the breakdown provided by 
Sentinel, Anderson's share of debit created 
while a partner under the SMG Contract 
In view of this recognition by Sentinel, the 
trial court could have ruled as a matter of 
law that Sentinel's withholding of this 
amount was improper 
In sum, it was proper to admit parol 
evidence extrinsic to the Stanger Contract 
and the evidence so admitted clearly sup-
ports the factual findings of the jury that 
Sentinel had no contractual rights to with-
hold any of the sums hereinabove referred 
to from Stanger for the reasons we have 
given As to Anderson, Sentinel conceded 
it was not permitted to charge the "001" 
account for funds advanced him during the 
initial four >ear period of his relationship 
with Sentinel The jury observed the wit-
nesses, heard their testimony, and it was 
their exclusive province to weigh the evi 
dence in deciding in favor of one side or the 
other 
We have reviewed Sentinel's contention 
with res[>ect to the jury instruction on Sen-
tinel's first hen right on all commissions for 
debts due and the issues of estoppel and 
waiver Inasmuch as the jury found, and 
we have affirmed their finding, that Senti-
nel had no contractual right to sums with-
held from commissions, that finding is dis-
positive of this appeal and we deem it un-
necessary to address those issues 
[11] One point, however, remains to be 
addressed As noted above, the jury uti-
lized Sentinel's calculation of amounts with-
held from commissions to arrive at an 
award of damages of $27,01640 to each 
Anderson and Stanger, based upon the total 
of $54,032 80 shown in the above letter ex-
hibit In fact, the correct total was $61,-
032 80, which would make a total award of 
$30,516 40 to each of the two plaintiffs 
Under Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court may correct cleri-
cal mistakes in judgments at any time See 
also Bagnall v Suburbia & Co, Utah, 579 
P2d 917 (1978) In explanation of the in-
tent of the identical Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure, the comment has been made 
that "in this broad approach to correctibili-
ty under Rule 60(a), it matters little wheth-
er an error was made by the cour^ clerk, the 
jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge 
himself, so long as it is clearly a formal 
error that should be corrected in the inter-
est of having judgment, order, or other part 
of the record reflect what was done or 
intended" Annot, 13 A L R Fed 794 
(1972) The definition of "clerical mistake" 
thus extends to include the one here discov-
ered "It is a type of mistake or omission 
mechanical in nature which is apparent on 
the record and which does not involve a 
legal decision or judgment by an attorney " 
In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp, 266 
F Supp 605, 607 (1967) Our instruction to 
NELSON v 
Cite as 649 P 2d 
the district court to correct the incorrect 
total amount of judgment, where the mis-
take is clear from the record, reflects no 
more than what plaintiffs are entitled to 
under the verdict Accord Fa} v Harm, 64 
Ari7 10, 164 P2d 860(1945) * 
The judgment on the special verdicts is 
affirmed in all respects The case is re-
manded to the trial court for the limited 
purpose of correcting the amount of dam-
ages to reflect an award of $30,51640 to 
each of the plaintiffs Costs awarded to 
plaintiffs 
HALL, C J , STEWART and OAKS, JJ , 
and DAVID SAM, District Judge, concur 
DURHAM, J , does not participate herein 
DAVID SAM, District Judge, sat 
. JACOBSEN Utah 1 2 0 7 
1207 (Utah 1983) 
to tecover, it uas necessary to establish 
that causal effect of defendant's conduct 
outweigh* d combined effect of all other 
causes, including conduct of plaintiff and 
alienated spouse, (3) punitive damages 
wen1 recoverable as long as plaintiff 
showed circumstances of aggravation in ad-
dition to malice implied by law from con-
duct of defendant in causing separation of 
plaintiff and his spouse, and (4) an award 
of punitive damages could not be entered, 
however, without first adducing evidence or 
making findings of fact with regard to de-
fendant's net worth or income 
Reversed and remanded 
Hall, C J , and Stewart, J , concurred in 
part and dissented in part and filed sepa-
rate opinions 
Durham, J , concurred in result and 
dissented in part and filed opinion 
Brett W NELSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Jeff JACOBSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No 17667. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Aug 31, 1983 
Action was instituted for alleged alien-
ation of wife's affections The Sixth Dis-
trict Court, Sanpete County, Don V Tibbs, 
J , entered judgment for plaintiff, and de-
fendant ap|>ea!ed The Supreme Court, 
Oaks, J , held that (1) notice of trial de-
scribed nature of proceedings against un-
represented defendant in such ambiguous 
terms that it deprived him of adequate time 
to prepare for his defense in violation of his 
right to due process, (2) an action for alien-
ation of affections was still a viable cause 
of action in Utah, but in order for plaintiff 
1 ( onstitutional Law <J=»25I 6 
A party is deprived of due process 
where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to 
inform a party of nature of proceeding 
against him or is not given sufficient^ in 
nhance of proceeding to j>ermit prepara-
tion U S C A Const Amend 14 
2 Constitutional Law <&=>251 6 
To satisfy an essential requisite of pro-
cedural due process, a "hearing' must be 
prefaced by timely notice which adequately 
informs the parties of the sj>ecific issues 
they must prepare to meet U S C A 
Const Amend 14 
3. Constitutional Law «s»251 5 
"Due process" is not a technical concept 
that can IH> reduced to a formula with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and 
circumstances, but is a concept which rests 
uf>on basic fairness and demands a proce-
dure that is appropriate to cise and just to 
parties involved U S C A Const Amend 
14 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
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4 Constitutional Law «=»314 
Notice of trial given an unrepresented 
defendant in form of an oral statement that 
case had been set for "hearing" two weeks 
later was not a clear notice that defendant, 
who was uneducated and inexperienced, 
had to be ready for "trial" on that date and, 
hence, was so ambiguous as to deprive de-
fendant of adequate time to prepare his 
defense in violation of his constitutional 
right to due process U S C A Const 
Amend 14 
5 Attorney and Client «=»62 
A layman is entitled to undertake his 
own representation, but due to his lack of 
technical knowledge of law and procedure, 
he should be accorded every consideration 
that may reasonably be indulged and, 
though this would not include interrupting 
course of proceedings to translate legal 
terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise at-
tempting to redress ongoing consequences 
of layman's decision to function in a capaci-
ty for which he was not trained, it would 
include informing layman of date of trial 
more than two days b< fore it was to lugin 
and advising him of such matters as his 
right to a trial by jury and right to require 
any previously retained counsel to provide 
case file and other documents whose prepa-
ration had been covered by prior represen-
tation U S C A Const Amend 14 
6 Husband and Wife *=»324, 325 
Right to recover for alienation of affec-
tions now extends to both spouses equally 
and, rather than l>eing based on premise 
that either spouse constitutes the "proper-
ty" of the other, is based on the premise 
that each spouse has a valuable interest in 
the marriage relationship, including its inti-
macy, companionship, support, duties, and 
affection 
7 Husband and Wife «=>322 
A suit for alienation of affections does 
not attempt to "preserve" or "protect" a 
marriage from interference, but serves only 
to compensate a spouse who has sustained 
loss and injury to his or her marital rela-
tionship through the intentional interfer-
ence of a third party 
8 Husband and Wife <*=»323 
Even if some alienation actions are mo-
tivated primarily by spite or extortion, 
there is no basis on which to abolish cause 
of action altogether, since a plaintiff who 
institutes a groundless or collusive suit is 
subject to a suit or counterclaim for abuse 
of process or malicious prosecution, and 
there can be no recovery against a defend-
ant whose conduct is blameless or merely 
negligent 
9 Husband and Wife *=>322 
An action for alienation of affections is 
an intentional tort and, if defendant has 
actual notice of marriage, his or her contin-
ued overtures or sexual liaisons can be con-
strued as something akin to an assumption 
of risk that his or her conduct will injure 
the marriage and give rise to an action 
10. Constitutional Law <*=>82(10) 
An action for alienation of affections 
does not unconstitutionally interfere with a 
defendant's right of privacy in area of per-
sonal and sexual relationships between indi-
viduals since sexual relations are not a nec-
essary element of such an action and, as 
between two private individuals, a defend-
ant's claim to sexual and reproductive 
privacy is no greater than the plaintiffs 
U S C A Const Amend 14 
11 Husband and Wife *-334(1) 
Recovery in an action for alienation of 
affections cannot be denied when fact of 
injury or loss can be proved simply because 
there is difficulty in assessing amount of 
that injury or loss 
12. Husband and Wife <*= 334(1) 
Rule affirming availability of a cause 
of action for alienation of affections despite 
uncertainties in assessment of damages is 
implemented in context of appropriate jury 
instructions and court's power to require 
remittitur to restrain or reduce arbitrary or 
excessive jury verd eta Rules Civ Proc, 
Rule 59(a)(5) 
13 Husband and Wife <*=>334(1) 
It would be unjust to refuse to try to 
measure the effect of a third party's intru-
NELSON v 
CJIea*ft69P.2d 
sion in a marriage in an action for ahena 
tion of affections just l>ecause the parties to 
the marriage share some of the res|K>nsibih 
ty for its demise 
14 Husband and Wife <&=»326 
A recovery may not l>e had in action 
for alienation of affections if the acts or 
conduct of the plaintiff himself, or any oth-
er cause than the acts of the defendant, 
constituted the controlling cause of plain-
tiff's loss of affections 
15 Husband and Wife «=>323 
An action for alienation of affections is 
still a viable cause of action in Utah, but in 
order to recover, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant's acts constituted the 
"controlling cause" of the alienation of af-
fections, that is, that the causal effect of 
the defendant's conduct outweighed the 
combined effect of aJJ other causes, includ-
ing the conduct of the plaintiff and the 
alienated spouse 
16 Husband and Wife «=*322 
A defendant sued for alienation of af-
fei tions is proinrly chargtahlt with the ef-
fect of mere acquiescence in the overtures 
of the alienated spouse where the defend-
ant knows or has reason to know that such 
acquiescence will damage the marital rela-
tionship 
17. Husband and Wife *=> 334(1) 
In trying to make the damages "pro-
portionate" to the loss of the injured s|M>use 
in an action for alienation of affections, the 
trier of fact should consider the duration 
and quality of the marriage relation, includ-
ing the extent to which genuine feelings of 
love and affection existed between the 
spouses prior to the intervention of the 
defendant 
18. Husband and Wife <*=>332 
Fact of marriage, plus assertion that 
defendant willfully and intentionally alien-
ated affections of plaintiff's sjwuse, result-
ing in loss of comfort, society and consorti-
um of wife, are essential allegations of a 
cause of action for alienation of affections 
and, if punitive damages are sought, malice 
must also l>e alleged 
JACOBSEN Utah 1209 
1207 (Utah 1983) 
19 Husband and Wife «=»334(2) 
In order to recover punitive damages 
for the tort of alienation of affections, the 
plaintiff must show circumstances of aggra-
vation in addition to the malice implied by 
law from the conduct of the defendant in 
causing the separation of the plaintiff and 
his or her spouse which was necessan to 
sustain a recovery of compensatory dam-
ages 
20. Damages «=>171 
An award of punitive damages requires 
consideration of man> factors, but since it is 
primarily intended to punisn defendant and 
thereby deter others similarly situated from 
imitating his conduct, defendant's net 
worth and income must be considered in 
determining amount of punitive damages 
21 Husband and Wife ®=»334(2) 
An award of punitive dam iges should" 
not !>c entered in an action for alienation of 
affections without adducing evidence or 
making findings of fact with regard to de-
fendant's net worth or income 
Craig M Snyder, IVovo, for defendant 
and appellant 
K L M< Iff, Richfield for plaintiff and 
res|M>ndcnt 
OAKS, Justice 
In a bench trial of this action for alicna 
ti >n of a wife's affections, the plaintiff 
husband obtained a judgment of $84,601) 
against a defendant who was unrepresented 
bv, counsel On appeal, defendant seeks 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a 
new trial 
Plaintiff and Brenda Nelson were mar-
ried July 15, W 8 He was 21 >ears old, 
she was 18 They lived in Sahna From 
the l>eginning, their marriage was charac-
terized by turmoil ind violence Brenda 
testified that plaintiff frequently came 
home drunk and abused her physically and 
verbaffy His heavy drinking fed to numer-
ous confrontations with the police, including 
two arrests for drunk driving She also 
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drank Within two months of marriage, 
and long l>efore either party knew defend-
ant, plaintiff told Rrenda he wanted a di 
vorce 
Rrenda Nelson first met defendant in the 
fall of 1978 in the Safari Motel and Cafe, 
which defendant managed for his parents 
Defendant, who had been divorced, was 
then 31 Plaintiff met defendant in Janu-
ary 1979 The three became friends 
Brenda initiated most of the contact be-
tween herself and defendant She first 
made sexual advances toward him at a par-
ty in January 1979, hut they were unreci-
procated at that time In the next six 
months, she frequently visited defendant at 
his home in Axtell, "depending] on (plain 
tiffs] work schedule," and she and defend 
ant sometimes drove around together in her 
truck 
Plaintiff first Inname aware of Brenda's 
involvement with defendant m early June 
1979 1wue he came home early from his 
night shift at the coal mine and discovered 
the m tog« ther The second discovery gave 
rise to a discussion that ultimately involved 
both siwnises' parents, during which Br< nda 
admitted seeing dcfcnelant and promised to 
stop In late June, she talked with defend 
ant at a beer party Seeing this, plaintiff 
dragged her behind his truck and began 
heating her When defendant intervened, a 
fight ensued between plaintiff and defend-
ant in which plaintiff was injured 
Plaintiff quit the coal mine in July and 
took a job with a trucking company in order 
to spend more time with Brenda About 
three weeks later, Brenda asked him to give 
her 17 year old friend a ride home to Rich-
field on his way to work the night shift 
Rather than driving the girl home, plaintiff 
bought four six packs of l>eer, which the 
two drank as they drove around in his com-
pany truck Plaintiff made sexual ad-
vances toward her The two were seen 
together, and when plaintiff arrived at 
work he was summarily fired for drinking 
and having an underage passenger in his 
truck Returning home late that night, still 
very drunk, he awakened Brenda with his 
shouting and cursing While repeatedly 
lagging his hunting knife into the floor, he 
threatened to break every bone in her body 
if she didn't call her father to come for her 
Brenda went to stay with her parents for a 
week When the couple reconciled, Bren-
da's father counseled them both to stop 
drinking if they wanted to save their mar-
riage 
Plaintiff's parents testified that plaintiff 
became despondent and withdrawn after he 
discovered Brenda's involvement with de-
fendant, and that his drinking also in-
creased After being fired, plaintiff 
worked irregularly driving trucks for vari-
ous construction companies, but he was un-
employed for lengthy periods, and his in-
come fell to half of its prior level 
In August 1979, Brenda told plaintiff she 
wanted time to think about their marital 
problems She persuaded defendant to take 
her with him to Las Vegas, where they 
stayed overnight Defendant testified that 
Brenda slept in a motel while he gambled 
all night in a casino (Defendant testified 
that his relationship with Brenda did not 
become romantic until several months after 
plaintiff and Brenda were divorced, October 
31, 1979) 
U|>on her return, Brenda told plaintiff 
she thought they could make their marriage 
work, and they continued to live together 
In late August, in response to plaintiff's 
questioning, Brenda admitted that she and 
defendant had had sexual intercourse 
"probably around" eight to twelve times 
Enraged, plaintiff gave her an especially 
vicious beating Injured and .suffering, 
Brenda went to defendant's home for a few 
days and then to her parents' 
Within a week, Brenda returned to plain-
tiff and agreed to try again to make the 
marriage work on condition that the drink-
ing and beating stop However, she testi-
fied, plaintiff's promises were not kept and 
after many attempts to mend her marriage 
she finally left plaintiff because of his 
drinking and his physical abuse of her 
Plaintiff testified that although Brenda 
came back to him in September, she seemed 
"as if she had given up" on the marriage 
NELSON v 
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In October 1979, the couple fought at a 
party when Brenda discovered plaintiff in 
the kitchen with another woman Later 
that month, Brenda moved out for the last 
time and went to live with defendant 
They were married Octobei 1, 1980 
Plaintiff commenced this action on Sep 
tember 27, 1979 Defendant had only a 
limited education and no prior ex|>erience in 
legal proceedings On the recommendation 
of a friend, he retained a Salt Lake City 
attorney to represent him Defendant paid 
this attorney a retainer of $500 and an 
additional $6,500, which the attorney said 
he would hold in trust to pay additional 
attorney fees and to negotiate a settlement 
The remainder was to be refunded to de-
fendant Between March and July 1980, 
the case was set for trial then changed to a 
pretrial hearing, which was twice vacated 
and rescheduled while the parties attempt 
ed to negotiate a settlement After reach 
ing a tentative settlcme nt, the parties stip 
ulated on July 29, 1980, to a dismissal of 
plaintiff's complaint with pre judice This 
dismissal was entered Defendant's attor 
ncy advised that the settlement amount 
was $5,000 and asked defendant to send the 
money When asked why he did not pay 
this amount out of the trust fund, the attor-
ney replied that his legal fees had depleted 
almost the entire $7,000 previously paid 
Defendant protested that he did not have 
an additional $5,000 The attorney told him 
he would not continue to represent him 
without payment of additional attorney 
fees to cover the cost of trial, but that if 
defendant would discharge him he would 
refund $1,300 from the trust fund The 
attorney also advised that defendant could 
settle the case himself either by giving 
plaintiff a promissory note for the $5,000 
settlement amount or by negotiating his 
own settlement 
Defendant dismissed his attorney and de-
manded delivery of his file in the case, 
including copies of all correspondence and 
pleadings and the depositions of l>oth plain-
I Defendant also urges error in plaintiffs fail 
ure to gi\e him the statutory notice either to 
appoint another atlorne> or appear in person 
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tiff and defendant Defendant represents 
that his attorney never sent him the case 
file and that the attorney did not advise 
him concerning his rights as a litigant, the 
risks of representing himself, or the possible 
consequences of the attorney's withdrawal 
The atte>rney withelrew with court approval 
in early September 1980 and refunded 
$1,300 to defendant 
No further proceedings were initiated by 
either part} for a j>criod of four months, 
during which elefendant neither executed a 
note ne>r paid plaintiff any money toward 
the settlement Thereafter, the settlement 
agreement hating failed, plaintiff peti-
tionee! the district court to set aside its 
earlier oreler of dismissal, reinstate the ac-
tion, and set it for nonjury trial Having 
l>een duly notified, defendant attended the 
hearing without counsel The |>ctition was 
granted, and the case was set for nonjury 
trial two weeks later 
The case was tricel on January 21, 1981 
Defendant attempted to represent himself 
at trial The tot il judgment taken against 
him w »s $81,600 $59 000 f«>r past anel fu-
ture loss of consortium and $25,000 in puni 
live elamages Defendant's timely motions 
for a new trial mel foi pielgment notwith 
standing the ve relict were both elenied, and 
this ap)>eal follow eel 
I FAIRNESS OF TRIAL 
Defenelant contends that his motion for a 
new trial should have Ijcen granted because 
he was denied due process of law in the 
proceedings b> not l>eing given adecjuate 
and timely notice of trial* 
[1] Timol) anel aeleejuate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful 
way are the very he art of procedural fair 
ness Worm 11 v Ogilcn Cit\ Fire Depart-
ment, Utah, 616 P2d r>98. 601 02 (1980). 
Goss i Lo/wz, 419 U S 565, 579, 95 SCt 
729, 738. 42 L E I 2<l 725 (1975) The much-
citeel case of Mullnne \ Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Cn, 339 U S 306, 314, 70 
U C A IQTi $ 78 51 "to In the view we take 
of this case we need not reach thai contention 
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S Ct 652, 657, 94 L Ed 865 (1950), sets out 
the classic requirements of adequate notice 
An elementary and fundamental require-
ment of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties 
of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their ob-
jections The notice must be of such 
nature as reasonably to convey the re-
quired information, and it must afford a 
reasonable time for those interested to 
make their apircamiKe [Citations omit-
t ed ] 
Many cases have held that where notice is 
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party 
of the nature of the proceedings against 
him or not given sufficiently in advance of 
the proceeding to permit preparation, a par-
ty is deprived of due process Graham v 
Sawaya, Utah, 632 P 2d 851 (1981). Vhler 
v Secretary of Health & Mental Hygiene, 
45 MdApp 2S2, 412 A2*\ 1287 (1980), 
Myers v Moreno, Mo App , 564 S W 2d 83 
(1978) 
Applying these standards to the record in 
this case, we conclude that the notice of 
trial was constitutionally deficient as to this 
unrepresented defendant l>ecause it describ-
ed the nature of the proceedings against 
him in such ambiguous terms that it de-
prived him of adequate time to prepare his 
defense 
Plaintiff's petition to set aside the earlier 
dismissal and reinstate the lawsuit was filed 
on December 26, 1980 The petition was 
heard on January 7, 1981 Defendant was 
present in the courtroom without counsel, 
plaintiff's counsel was temporarily absent 
The record of the hearing reads as follows 
2 Approximately twenty minutes later plain 
tiffs counsel entered the courtroom and the 
following transpired 
(Plaintiffs counsel] Your Honor I was out 
side Did you set 7928 Nelson v Jacobsen? 
Ilie Court Did I set that one Carole' 
The Clerk > es Your Honor You set it for 
January 21st 
{Plaintiffs counsel) Well I wasn t here so I 
didn t know 
The Court We are now on Civil 7928, 
Nehon i s Jacobsen Is [plaintiff's 
counsel] here7 
The Clerk No, Your Honor 
The Court Well, I'm going to set this 
case for hearing on January 21st at 
10 00 a m , following the Law and Mo-
tion matters You notify [plaintiff's 
counsel] accordingly [Emphasis add-
ed ] 
The district court then proceeded to other 
cases, and defendant left the courtroom* 
The minute entry, dated January 8, 1981, 
state'* that "[jijlaintiff's motion is granted 
and this matter is set for hearing on Jan 
21st, 1981, to follow the Law and Motion 
Calendar as a non-jury trial " But there is 
no indication in the record that defendant 
ever saw or received a copy of the minute 
order Hence, we must assume that the 
on\y notice defendant received at this time 
was the district court's oral statement that 
the case had been set for "hearing" two 
weeks later 
The order of reinstatement scheduling 
the case for trial on January 21 was exe-
cuted January 14 and mailed to defendant 
Januar) 15, 1981 On that same day, the 
court clerk sent defendant a separate notice 
that the matter was set for trial six days 
later Defendant received the order and 
the notice on January 19, just two days 
before trial The record indicates that the 
receipt of these documents constituted de-
fendant's first notice that the January 21 
event was to be a full scale "trial," rather 
than a "hearing " Exactly two weeks after 
the lawsuit was reinstated and two days 
after he received notice of the date of trial, 
the case went to trial Defendant repre-
sented himself The court awarded a judg-
ment against defendant for $84,600 
The Court I set the matter for January 21st 
at 10 00 a m to follow the Law and Motion 
matters |To the clerkj fWJill vou please 
notify the Defendar of this hearing so he 
wilt know that the matter is set 
The Clerk I think his counsel has been dls 
missed 
The Court Well then notify him at his ad 
dress in Salina or wherever he lives 
NELSON 
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[2] "To satisfy an essential requisite of 
procedural due process, a 'hearing' must be 
prefaced by timely notice which adequately 
inform* the parties of the specific issues 
they must prepare to meet" State v 
Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 914, 500 P2d 209, 215 
(1972) In casts where the notice is ambig-
uous or misleading, courts have found a 
denial of due process In Watson v Wash-
ington Preferred Life Insurance Co, 81 
Wash 2d 403, 502 P 2d 1016 (1972) (en banc), 
notice of a shareholders' meeting "[t]o con-
sider and vote upon a plan and agreement 
of merger [and to] transact other 
hijQi n«W WAO hpld constitutionally inade-
quate and violative of due process !>ecause 
it failed to inform shareholders that those 
not receiving the mailed notice would be 
treated as "missing shareholders" and that, 
should they fail to ap|>car at the sharehold-
ers' meeting, the court would appoint, ex 
parte, a representative to vole their shares 
502 P2d at 1020 Similarly, in City and 
Count) of Denver v Eggert, Colo , 647 P2d 
216 (1982) (en banc), the Colorado Supreme 
Court held violative of due process notice of 
a "hearing to allow information regard-
ing [a] landfill o|>eration to be made public 
in the interests of the health, safety, and 
welfare of [the county's] citi/ens" where it 
was clear from the record that the plaintiff-
city and its contractors "had no idea that 
the result of the hearing would be a cease 
and desist order effective almost immedi-
ately" against them 647 P 2d at 223 24 
Finally, in State v Gibbs, supra, the court 
held that an order waiving juvenile jurisdic-
tion and binding the juvenile over for trial 
as an adult violated the juvenile's due proc-
ess rights where it resulted from notice 
which contained only allegations of the ju-
venile's unlawful acts and made no mention 
that a primary purjnrae of the "interviews" 
with a magistrate was to determine wheth-
er juvenile jurisdiction should be waived 
[3] "Due process" is not a technical con-
cept that can be reduced to a formula with 
a fixed content unrelated to time, place, 
and circumstances Rather, "the demands 
of due process rest on the concept of basic 
fairness of procedure and demand a proce-
dure appropriate to the case and just to the 
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parties invoked " Rupp v Grants rile Cit), 
Utah, 610 P2d 338, 341 (1980) 
14J To a member of the bar or even to a 
layj>erson ex|>ericnced with trial proceed-
ings, setting a case for "hearing" could 
have been understwnl as setting a case for 
"trial " But to this uneducated and inex|>e 
nenced defendant, a setting for "hearing" 
was not a clear notice that the defendant 
had to be ready for trial on that date 
Indeed, defendant had earlier attended one 
"hearing" in which plaintiffs petition to 
reinstate was granted without evidence or 
discussion, without requiring that plaintiff 
or his counsel be present and without re-
quiring any participation by defendant 
Based on his experience at this earlier hear-
ing, defendant could reasonably have con 
eluded that the "hearing" set for January 
21 would also l>e routine 
[5J Defendant was entitled to undertake 
his own representation U C A, 1953 
§ 78 51 25, Henthman \ Hatch, 13 Utah 
2d 266 208. 372 P2d 990, 991 (1962) As a 
general ruU, a part\ who represents him-
self will be lu Id to the same standard of 
knowledge and practice as an> qualified 
mem!>er of the bar, Manka v Martin, 200 
Colo 260, 614 P2d 875, 880 (1980) (en bane), 
cert denied, 450 U S 913 101 S Ct 1354, 67 
h Ed 2d 338 (1981), Johnson \ Aetna Casu-
alty & SureU Co, Wyo, 630 P2d 514, 517, 
cert denied, 454 U S 1118, 102 SCt 961, 71 
L Ed 2d 105 (1981). Smith \ Rabb, 95 Ariz 
49, 53, 386 P2d 649, 652 (1963) 
At the same time, we have also cautioned 
that "because of his lack of technical knowl-
edge of law and procedure [a layman acting 
as his own attorney] should be accorded 
every consideration that may reasonably l>e 
indulged ' Htathmdn \ Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 
at 268, 372 P 2d at 991 Reasonable consid-
eration for a layman acting as his own 
attorney does not require the court to inter-
rupt the course of proceedings to translate 
legal terms, explain legal rules, or other-
wise attempt to redress the ongoing conse-
quences of the party's decision to function 
in a capacity for which he is not trained 
Judges cannot l>e exacted to perform that 
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function In this case, the trial judge was 
as considerate and helpful as he could be 
expected to be during the course of the 
trial. 
The deficiency in this case concerns what 
happened before the trial. The vulnerabili-
ty of a layman who is unrepresented as he 
approaches a trial of the legal and factual 
complexity of this case requires more judi-
cial consideration than was extended here. 
Most importantly, defendant was not clear-
ly informed of the date of trial until two 
days before it was to begin. That deficien-
cy jeopardized one of the most important 
ingredients of due process: time to prepare 
a defense. In addition, in view of the na-
ture of this action the court should have 
advised the defendant prior to trial of his 
right to a trial by jury. And, in view of the 
fact that defendant had previously been 
represented by retained counsel whom he 
had discharged, the court might also have 
taken steps to assure that defendant was 
advised of his right to require that counsel 
to provide the case file and other documents 
whose preparation had been covered by the 
prior representation In this case, plain-
tiff's counsel repeatedly used defendant's 
deposition to impeach him during trial. De-
fendant apparently had no copy of that 
deposition or of his former counsel's dejwsi-
tion of plaintiff for study prior to the trial. 
In all the circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that it was fundamentally unfair 
to put defendant to trial on January 21 
without counsel and without the other pre-
3. Am Rev Stat Ann §25 341 (Supp 1982 
1983), Cal Civ Code § 43 5 (West 1982). Colo 
Rev Stat § 13 20 202 (1973), Conn Gen Stat 
§ 52 572b (1983), Del Code Ann tit 10, 
§ 3924 (1974), DC Code § 16-923 (Supp 
1978). GaCode Ann § 30 109 1 (1980), Ind 
Code Ann § 34 4 + J (Burns Supp 1982). Mc 
Rev Stat Ann tit 19. § 167(1964). Md Cts & 
JudProcCode Ann § 5 301(a) (1980), Mich 
CompLaws Ann. §600 2901 (1968), Minn 
Stat § 553 02(1982), Mont Code Ann § 27 1 
601 (1981). Nev Rev Stat § 41380(1979). Or 
Rev Stat § 30840(1981). Va Code § 801 220 
(1950). WVaCode § 56 3 2A (Supp 1983). 
Wis Stat Ann § 768 01 (West 1980), WyoStat 
Ann § 1-23 101 (1977) 
4. Fundermann v Mickelson, Iowa. 304 N W 2d 
790 (1981). Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash 2d 99. 
105. 615 P2d 452. 455 (1980). 
trial advice described here. The judgment 
must therefore be reversed and the cause 
remanded J"or a new trial. 
II. CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ALIENA-
TION OF AFFECTIONS 
Most of the briefing on this appeal con-
cerns the issue posed by the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. De-
fendant urges us to abolish the cause of 
action for alienation of affections. We rule 
on this issue for the guidance of the district 
court on remand. Notwithstanding the 
public policy grounds defendant advances, 
we choose to retain this cause of action for 
the reasons and with the limitations out-
lined below. 
We have had no occasion for an in-depth 
consideration of the common-law cause of 
action for alienation o( affections (or nearly 
thirty years. During that time, as defend-
ant notes, this cause of action has fallen 
from favor and has been abolished or re-
stricted in a majority of jurisdictions. 
Eighteen states and the District of Colum-
bia have alM)lished this cause of action by 
statute3 Two other states have abolished 
it by judicial decision.4 Six jurisdictions 
have statutes abolishing the cause of action 
for money damages at law, but permitting 
suits for injunctive relief in equity.5 The 
statutes of two additional states have abol-
ished the cause of action for alienation of 
affections with only insignificant excep-
tions.* The appellate courts of three other 
5. Ala Code § 6 5 331 (1975) (injunction per-
mitted, see Logan v Davidson, 282 Ala 327, 
330, 211 So 2d 461, 463 (1968)), Fla Stat. 
§77101 (1981); N J Stat Ann §2A23-I 
(West 1952). NY Civ Rights Law § 80-a 
(McKinney 1976). Ohio Rev Code Ann 
§2305 29 (Page 1981). Vt Stat Ann. tit. 15. 
§ 1001 (Supp 1983) 
6. Okla Stat Ann tit 76, § 8 1 (West Supp 
1982-1983) (action permitted only if spouse 
was incompetent or minor at time of alleged 
alienation). Pa Stat Am tit 48, § l70(Purdon 
1965) (action permitted if defendant is blood 
relative of plaintiff) 
NELSON v. 
CHeasM9P.2d 
states have voiced their dissatisfaction with 
the cause of action,' and three others have 
enacted legislation shortening their statutes 
of limitation to one year.* Louisiana has 
never recognized this cause of action.* We 
note that with but two exceptions, when 
this cause of action has been alwlished it 
has been by legislative rather than judicial 
action. 
[6] Defendant argues that a cause of 
action for alienation of affections is based 
on the obsolete and fictitious assumptions 
that "the wife is one of the husband's chat-
tels, and that her companionship, her serv-
ices and her affections are his property." 
Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 175, 115 
So. 447, 450 (1927). While the archaic no-
tion of "wife as chattel" may have served 
as the historical foundation for this cause of 
action, its modern content bears little re-
semblance to that notion. The right to 
recover for alienation of affections now ex-
tends to both spouses equally. See, e.g, 
Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C.App. 521, 265 S E.2d 
434 (1980); Burch v. Goodson, 85 Kan. 86, 
116 P. 216 (1911). Moreover, an action for 
alienation of affections is no longer based 
on the premise that either spouse consti-
tutes the "property" of the other, but on 
the premise that each spouse has a valuable 
interest in the marriage relationship, in-
cluding its intimacy, companionship, sup-
port, duties, and affection. Note, "The 
Case for Retention of Causes of Action for 
Intentional Interference with the Marital 
Relationship," 48 Notre Dame Law. 426, 
430-31 (1972). 
7. Femter v Daniel O'ConnelVs Sons. Inc. 381 
Mass 507, 1980 Mass Adv Sh 2075, 413 N E.2d 
690. 694 (1980) (action disfavored). Dube v 
Rochette, 110 N H 129. 130. 262 A 2d 288, 289 
(1970) (susceptible to abuse but legislative 
judgment to allow action respected). TTiomp-
son v Chapman, 93 N M 356. 358, 600 P 2d 
302, 304 (N M Ct App 1979) (court would abol-
ish tort if it had authority to do so) 
8. Ark Stat Ann § 37 201 (Supp 1983), Ky 
Rev Stat § 413.140(l)(c) (Supp 1982) (includes 
alienation action, see Skaggs v Stanton, Ky.Ct. 
App, 532 SW.2d 442, 443 (1975)); R.I Gen 
Laws § 9-1-14 (Supp 1982). 
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The law protects many relational inter-
ests. L. Green, "Basic Concepts: Persons, 
Proj>erty, Relations" in The Litigation Proc-
ess in Tort Law 413, 418-24 (1965). We 
have recently recognized a plaintiff's right 
to recover for the loss of prospective eco-
nomic relations. Leigh Furniture & Carpet 
Co. v. Jsom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982). We 
recognize a cause of action against a de-
fendant who intentionally interferes with a 
contractual relation. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 
Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597, 602 (1962) 
(inducing breach); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 766 (1977). Our wrongful death 
statutes have long recognized the value of a 
plaintiff's interest in his or her relationships 
with family members. U C.A., 1953, §§ 78-
11-6, 7&-11-7. We have repeatedly sus-
tained a plaintiff's right to recover for "the 
loss of society, love, companionship, protec-
tion and affection which usually constitute 
the heart of the action " Jones v. Carvell, 
Utah, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (1982). Accord, In 
re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 159-60, 213 
P.2d 657, 661 (1950).'° The marital relation-
ship is entitled to as much protection as 
these. 
[7] Second, defendant contends that 
there is no proof that an action for aliena-
tion of affections achieves its intended pur-
pose of protecting and preserving the mar-
riage. In contrast, he argues, "the very 
nature of the action serves as a destructive 
influence on the marriage." This argument 
misperceives the purpose of the action. It 
makes little sense to speak of actions grow-
ing out of injuries to relations as intended 
to "preserve" or "protect" those relations. 
9. Moulin v Monteleone. 165 La 169. 115 So 
447 (1927). Ohlhausen v Brown. LaCtApp, 
372 So 2d 787, 788(1979). 
10. The value of affection in such familial rela-
tionships was even recognized implicitly b> a 
court that abolished a cause of action for alien-
ation of affections between spouses Despite 
its strident language on the abolition, the court 
expressly retained a cause of action for aliena-
ting the affections of a child Wyjnan v Wal-
lace, 15 Wash App 395. 400 & n 4, 549 P2d 
71, 74 & n 4 (1976). affd, 94 Wash 2d 99, 615 
P2d 452 (1980) (after initially reversing in 91 
Wash 2d 317, 588 P.2d 1133 (1979)) 
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Actions for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations or for induc-
ing breaches of contract are not intended to 
reestablish those relations or reinstate those 
contracts but to compensate plaintiffs for 
their loss. Actions for wrongful death obvi-
ously do not restore the plaintiffs' relation-
ships with the deceased; the law seeks only 
to com|>ensate for losses. Similarly, a suit 
for alienation of affections does not at-
tempt to "preserve" or "protect" a mar-
riage from interference, but only to com-
|>ensate a spouse who has suffered loss and 
injury to his or her marital relationship 
through the intentional interference of a 
third party. 
Third, defendant contends that the threat 
of an action for alienation of affections is a 
powerful tool of extortion since "there ex-
ists such potential to damage reputations" 
that at least one court and one commenta-
tor have characterized alienation actions as 
"legalized blackmail " Wyman v. Wallace, 
15 Wash.App 395, 397, 549 P.2d 71, 72 
(1976), aff'd, 94 Wash.2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 
(1980); M. Grossman, The New York Law 
of Domestic Relations § 313 (1947). While 
it cannot l>e gainsaid that many types of 
litigation place private facts in a public 
light, an action for alienation of affections 
is no more "extortive" in this sense than an 
action for criminal conversation, which has 
adultery as its operative element, Cahoon v. 
^ Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 231, 342 P.2d 94, 
98-99 (1959), or a suit to change the custody 
of children on the basis of the parental 
deficiencies of the custodian, or a defama-
tion action in which the defense of truth 
puts the plaintiff's reputation in question. 
See, eg., Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 
247 P.2d 264 (1952). If, as defendant 
claims, it is "[glreed, revenge, spite and a 
desire to humiliate others" that encourages 
a plaintiff to sue for alienation of affec-
tions, the plaintiff must surely be dissuaded 
to some extent by the knowledge that his or 
her own foibles, failures, and inadequacies 
as a marital partner may be given public 
exposure by a defendant seeking to dis-
prove causation or to mitigate damages. 
[8] In any case, even if some alienation 
actions are motivated primarily by spite or 
extortion, that is no basis on which to abol-
ish the cause of action altogether. 
First, the very purpose of courts is to 
separate the just from the unjust causes; 
second, if the courts are to be closed 
against actions for . . alienation of af-
fections on the ground that some suits 
may be brought in bad faith, the same 
reason would close the door against liti-
gants in all kinds of suits, for in every 
kind of litigation some suits are brought 
in bad faith; the very purpose of courts 
is to defeat unjust prosecutions and to 
secure the rights of parties in just prose-
cutions . . . 
Wilder v. Reno, 43 F.Supp. 727, 729 (D.Pa. 
1942). It is noteworthy that our research 
has disclosed only one case in which there 
was evidence that the plaintiff and the 
"alienated" s"pouse colluded for purposes of 
extortion, and in that case recovery was 
denied. Wilson v. Aylward, 207 Kan. 254, 
484 P.2d 1003 (1971). 
In truth, "procedural limitations and judi-
cial discretion have been deemed adequate 
safeguards against abuse in other areas of 
the law vulnerable to bogus claims," and 
"[t]here is no reason to assume that they 
cannot be used to similar advantage in this 
area." Note, 48 Notre Dame Law., supra, 
at 430. Moreover, the courts will not toler-
ate waste or abuse of judicial resources, and 
a plaintiff who institutes a groundless or 
collusive suit is subject to a suit or counter-
claim for abuse of process or malicious pros-
ecution. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, 657 P.2d at 308-09; W. Prosser, 
Handlyook of the Law of TorU §§ 120, 121 
(4th ed. 1971). Finally, abolishing a cause 
of action for alienation of affections will 
not eliminate or even reduce extortion 
(which can still be accomplished by threat-
ening to expose a person to his family or 
colleagues or publicize his indiscretions in 
other ways), but it will surely close the 
courthouse doors to at least some deserving 
plaintiffs. 
[91 Defendant's contention that an ac-
tion for alienation can be used to victimize 
NELSON v. 
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innocent and unsuspecting defendant* is an-
swered by the fact that this is an intention-
al tort. There can be no recovery against a 
defendant whose conduct is blameless or 
merely negligent (such as a person who is 
not aware that the object of his or her 
attentions is married). On the other hand, 
the element of intent can be proved where 
the defendant's actions are the product of 
choice. See Note, 48 Notre Dame Law., 
supra, at 431. In fact, where a defendant 
has actual notice of the marriage, his or her 
continued overtures or sexual liaisons can 
be construed as something akin to assump-
tion of the risk that this conduct will injure 
the marriage and give rise to an action. 
[10] Fourth, relying on Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct 1678, 14 
L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Bairtl, 
405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 
(1972), defendant contends that "an aliena-
tion of affections action unreasonably, and 
perhaps unconstitutionally, interferes with 
and impinges u|K>n [a] defendant's right of 
privacy . . . in the area of personal and 
sexual relationships between individuals." 
This argument is misplaced for two reasons. 
Griswold and Eisenstadt are inap|K>site l>e-
cause sexual relations are not a necessary 
element of alienation of affections. Cahoon 
v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d at 231, 342 P.2d at 
98-99; Trainor v. Deters, 22 Ohio App.2d 
135, 139-40, 259 N.E2d 131, 135 (1969). 
Second, while both Griswold and Eisenstadt 
were said to involve "unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion" into sexual relations and 
reproductive choices, Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 
453, 92 S.Ct. at 1038 (emphasis added), a 
cause of action for alienation of affections 
involves interference by a private individu-
al. As between two private individuals, 
defendant's claim to sexual and reproduc-
tive privacy can be no greater than plain-
tiff's, and neither can claim constitutional 
immunity to use his or her own "rights" to 
invade the "privacy" of the other. 
Fifth, defendant urges us to abolish all 
actions for alienation because it is difficult 
to determine the intangible injuries in-
volved. Since there is no standard of meas-
urement for the trier of fact, defendant 
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argues, judgments in this area of the law 
are frequently arbitrary and excessive. 
But the injury in this action seems no more 
"intangible" and no more difficult to value 
than pain and suffering in a personal injury 
action or the loss of comfort, society, and 
companionship in an action for wrongful 
death. The emerging law of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress attests to the 
law's willingness to have juries and judges 
put monetary values on psychic and emo-
tional harm. See, e.g., State Rubbish Col-
lectors Association v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 
330. 337-39. 240 P.2d 282. 286 (1952) (en 
banc) (Traynor, J.). 
[11,12] It would be anomalous and un-
just to deny recovery where the fact of 
injury or loss can be proved simply because 
there is difficulty in assessing its amount 
Cf. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 
664 P.2d 1161, 1165-66 (1983) (lost profits 
from new business venture). In Jones v. 
Carvell, Utah, 641 P.2d 105 (1982), we dis-
cussed the application of this principle to 
the recovery of damages for wrongful 
death, concluding as follows: 
To be sure, the making of such judgments 
is not easy and requires great under-
standing of those human values which 
can make interpersonal relationships so 
precious. Yet, the process, difficult as it 
is, must be tempered and confined so as 
to strike a just balance. The process is 
not unique to wrongful death cases. 
Id. at 108. The rule that affirms the avail-
ability of a cause of action despite uncer-
tainties in the assessment of damages is of 
course implemented in the context of appro-
priate jury instructions and the court's pow-
er to require remittitur to restrain or re-
duce arbitrary or excessive jury verdicts. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5); Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 
ULih 2d at 227, 342 P.2d at 95; Ruf v. 
Association for World Travel Exchange, 10 
Utah 2d 249, 351 P.2d 623 (1960); Tice v. 
Mandel, N.D., 76 N.W.2d 124 (1956). 
Defendant's final argument is both more 
subtle and more persuasive. He contends 
that the only marriages which are vulnera-
ble to the depradations of a third party are 
those in which there is already discord from 
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other causes He cites the difficulty of 
proving causation in actions for alienation 
of affections He then concludes that 
where the alienation is attributable to any 
significant degree to the plaintiff's own 
conduct or to the conduct of the alienated 
spouse, it would be unjust to permit the 
recovery of damages from a third party 
[13] While conceding the difficulty of 
proving causation, we conclude that it 
would be unjust to refuse to try to measure 
the effect of a third party's intrusion in a 
marnage ju«*t because the parties to the 
marriage share some of the responsibility 
for its demise Even relatively "good" mar-
riages have intermittent difficulties upon 
which a predatory defendant might capital-
ize And even where sjwuses are es-
tranged, there is merit to the argument 
that "each has a right to seek a rapproche-
ment that should be protected against those 
who would cut it off" Note, 48 Notre 
Dame Law , supra, at 432 We are unwill-
ing to adopt a rule of law that would fore 
close all remedies on the questionable as-
sumption that any plaintiff whose marriage 
has gone agTound "must have deserved i t " 
We prefer to consider the state of the mar 
nage and the actions of !>oth spouses as 
relating to causation and damages 
(141 We outlined such an approach in 
the leading case of Wilson v Oldroyd, 1 
Utah 2d 362, 267 P 2d 759 (1954) There, in 
discussing the element of causation, we 
stated 
If the acts or conduct of the plaintiff 
himself, or any other cause than the acts 
of the defendant constituted the control-
ling cause of plaintiff's loss of affec-
tions, then he could not recover, and 
the same would be true "if the plaintiff's 
wife fell in love with defendant without 
any affirmative inducement or encour-
agement from the defendant " 
[Emphasis added ] 
II Kansas and Hawaii have gone even further 
Building on a well developed body of case law 
\t\ ih* ai*a of ahenation Long v Fischer 210 
Kan 21 25 26 499 P 2d 1063. 1067 (1972) 
redefined the element of causation to make it 
Id at 374, 267 P 2d at 768 On the issue of 
damages, we stated "It is true that there 
may l>e great or little affection and that the 
damages should be pro|>ortionate to that 
which is taken away from the [injured 
spouse]" Id 
In an apparent effort to improve the 
fairness of this cause of action, recent cases 
in other jurisdictions have raised the plain-
tiff's burden of proof on the issue of causa-
tion and redefined the factors bearing on 
damages For example, Heist v Heist, 46 
N C App 521, 265 S E2d 434 (1980), which 
affirmed the plaintiff wife's recovery for 
alienation of affections, specifies the follow-
ing considerations as bearing on those is-
sues 
In order to sustain a cause of action for 
alienation of affections, the plaintiff 
must show the following facts 
(1) that she and her husband were happi-
ly married and that a genuine love and 
affection existed between them, 
(2) that the love and affection so existing 
was alienated and destroyed, 
(3) that the wrongful and malicious acts 
of defendant produced and brought 
about the loss and alienation of such 
love and affection 
The wrongful and malicious conduct of 
the defendant need not be the sole cause 
of the alienation of affections It suffic-
es, according to the rule in a large major-
ity of the cases, if the wrongful and 
malicious conduct of the defendant is the 
controlling or effective cause of the alien-
ation, even though there were other caus-
es, which might have contributed to the 
alienation [Citations omitted, emphasis 
added ] 
46 N C App at 523, 265 S E 2d at 436 Ac-
cord, Thomson v Chapman, 93 N M 356, 
357 58, 600 P 2d 302, 303 -04 (N M Ct App ), 
cert denied, 92 N M 675, 593 P2d 1078 
(1979)" 
practically impossible for a plaintiff to sustain 
the necessary burden of proof This Kansas 
rule was adopted verbatim in Hunt v Chang 
60 Hawaii 608 594 P2d 118 (1979) 
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[15,16] After considering the various 
definitions enunciated in other states since 
our decision in Wilson v Oldroyd, we are 
content to reaffirm the rules we established 
in that case, subject to the two following 
clarifications and elal>oralions 
First, the requirement that the do 
fendant's acts must have constituted the 
"controlling cause" of the alienation of af-
fections means that the causal effect of the 
defendant's conduct must have outweighed 
the combined effect of all other causes, 
including the conduct of the plaintiff spouse 
and the alienated spouse For this purpose, 
a defendant is properly chargeable with the 
effect of mere acquiescence in the overtures 
of the alienated spouse where the defend-
ant knows or has reason to know that such 
acquiescence will damage the marital rela-
tionship 
[17] Second, in trying to make the dam-
ages "proportionate" to the loss of the in-
jured sjwuse, the trier of fact should con-
sider the duration and quality of the mar-
riage relation, including the extent to which 
genuine feelings of love and affection exist-
ed between the spouses prior to the inter-
vention of the defendant 
III PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
For the further guidance of the district 
court on remand, we add two rulings on the 
law of punitive damages as applied to this 
case and this cause of action 
[18-19] First, punitive damages can be 
recovered for the tort of alienation of affec-
tions Wilson v Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d at 370, 
267 P 2d at 765 As a general rule, punitive 
damages are available where the defend-
ant's conduct was "wilful and malicious" 
Kesler v Rogers, Utah, 542 P 2d 354, 359 
(1975) However, our commitment to "cau-
tion" in the application of punitive dam-
ages, First Security Bank of Utah v JBJ 
Feedyards, Inc, Utah, 653 P 2d 591, 598 
(1982), and the fact that the elements of 
12 The tort of alienation of affections requires 
proof that the defendant * wilfully and Inten 
tionally alienated the spouse s affections Wil 
son v Oldroyd 1 Utah 2d at 367 267 P 2d at 
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willfulness and maliciousness are, in effect 
part of the cause of action for alienation of 
affections,'2 persuade us to require some-
thing more with respect to this tort To 
avoid a circumstance in which punitive 
damages are automatically available in ev 
ery such cause of action, we hold that in 
order to recover punitive damages for the 
tort of alienation of affections the plaintiff 
must show "circumstances of aggravation 
in addition to the malice implied by law 
from the conduct of defendant in causing 
the separation of plaintiff and [his or her 
spouse] which was necessary to sustain a 
recovery of compensatory damages " Hejst 
v Heist. 46 N C App at 527, 265 S E 2d at 
438, 41 AmJur2d Husband and Wife 
§ 485 (1968) 
[20,21] Second, the award of $25,000 in 
punitive damages in this case could not be 
sustained in any event because it was en-
tered without adducing any evidence or 
making any findings of fact regarding de-
fendant's net worth or income While an 
award of punitive damages requires consid-
eration of many factors, it is primarily in-
tended to punish the defendant and thereby 
deter others similarly situated from imitat-
ing his conduct Leigh Furniture & Carpet 
Co \ Isom, 657 P 2d at 312, First Security 
Bank of Utah v J BJ Feedyards, lnc, 653 
J P2d at 598 99 Thus, the defendant's net 
worth and income are always relevant in 
determining the amount of punitive dam-
ages that would be appropriate for punish-
ment We have expressl} held "that it is 
pioper to receive evidence and consider the 
wealth of the defendant as bearing upon 
the issue of punitive damages" both in ac-
tions for alienation of affections, Wilson v 
Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d at 372, 267 P2d at 766, 
and criminal conversation, Cahoon \ Pel-
ton, 9 Utah 2d at 232, 342 P 2d at 99 To 
the contrary, where a trial record contained 
no evidence of the defendant's net worth or 
income, we have, or our own motion, re-
duced a judgment of punitive damages to 
763 and the nature of the wrong inflicted is 
such that malice is in effect a necessary 
ingredient of the tort Birch field \ Birch field 
29 NM 19 24 217 P 616,619(1923) 
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permit an award of no more than $6,000 
Cru7 x Montoya Utah, 660 P2d 723, 727 
(1983) 
The judgment is reversed, and the case JS 
remanded for a new trial in accordance 
with this opinion Costs to appellant 
HOWE, J , concurs 
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dis-
senting) 
I concur in the opinion of the Court inso-
far as it retains alienation of affections as a 
viable cause of action in the state of Utah, 
and insofar as it refuses to sustain the 
award of punitive damages (Parts II and 
III) However, I dissent from that portion 
of the opinion which remands the case for a 
new trial based on the conclusion that the 
defendant was denied due process of law 
Defendant claims that he was denied a 
fair trial because he was not afforded time-
ly notice dm\ was thus denied an op|K>rtum 
t) to be heard in a meaningful way His 
contention that he did not realize until two 
days before the trial tx.gan that he was to 
be prepared for trial and not merely for a 
4
 hearing, is simpl) not borne out by the 
record On the contrary, it is clear that his 
alleged lack of knowledge stems not from 
an absence of notice and opportunity to be 
heard, but from his voluntary choice not to 
retain a new attorney and to represent him-
self 
On January 7 1981, the trial judge set 
aside the earlier order of dismissal of the 
complaint, reinstated the action and set the 
case for trial on January 21, 1981 Defend-
ant porsonall> appeared at that time, with-
out counsel, and heard the date being set 
Defendant claims that he was misled by the 
use of the word "hearing" rather than "tri-
al" and therefore was not given actual no-
tice that he must face trial on January 21 
This is a SJK?CIOUS argument Defendant's 
brief acknowledges that had defendant had 
1 See aho Heathman \ Hatch 13 Utah 2d 266 
268 372 P2d 990 991 (1962) 
2 See eft Manka v Martin 200 Colo 260 614 
P2d 875 880 (1980) (en banc) Mai in v lid 
die 102 Idaho 705 619 P 2d 3 4 (1981) John 
an attorney representing him, the attorney 
would have understood that he was facing a 
trial ami not merely a hearing Therefore, 
the resolution of this question hinges not on 
what defendant did know, but on what he 
should have known 
Article I, § 11 of the Utah Constitution 
and U C A , 1953, § 78 51 25 guarantee a 
party to a civil action the right to represent 
himself' However, as the main opinion 
points out, the general rule is that a party 
appearing pro se is held to the same stan-
dards of knowledge, rules and procedures as 
would l>e a qualified attorney * In fact, if a 
litigant, for whatever reason, sees fit to 
rely on himself as counsel, he must be pre-
pared to accept the consequences of his 
mistakes and errors3 
Defendant voluntarily chose to appear at 
the January 7 hearing without an attorney, 
he did not question the judge as to exactly 
what would happen on January 21, as was 
his right ami his duty if he was going to 
represent himself, and he did not thereaft-
er consult an attorney as to the proper steps 
to l>e taken He merely showed up at trial 
on January 21 and acknowledged that he 
intended to represent himself 
That the defendant had made the deci-
sion to represent himself in the trial l>efore 
the court and that he was prepared to pro-
ceed without a continuance are clearly re-
flected in the record 
THE COURT Mr Jacobsen7 
MR JACOBSEN Yes, Your Honor 
1 HE COURT Are you representee! by 
an attorney Mr Jacobsen7 
MR JACOBSEN No, Your Honor 
I'd like to offer a brief explanation of my 
ajK)logy for that I was unable to 
acquire legal counsel localise of financial 
difficulties, so I spoke to Mr Brown, the 
Prosecuting Attorney of Sanpete County, 
and he went over everything with me and 
advised me that because of my financial 
son i Aetna Casualty & Surety Co of Hart 
ford Wyo 630 P 2d 514 517(1981) 
3 Minka v Martin supra n 2 at 880 
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situation, I'd better defend myself, so I'm 
prepared to do that 
THE COURT You understand, of 
course, that it's the Court's obligation to 
hear the evidence and make a ruling 
based upon the evidence and be fair to 
both parties under the law, do you un-
derstand that7 
MR JACOBSEN Yes, I do, Your Hon-
or I hope you'll bear with me in the fact 
that I'm not versed in any Court proce-
dures or anything like that but— 
THE COURT You have a right to 
represent yourself and likewise I have to 
rule and make certain rulings that you 
might not understand 
MR JACOBSEN I understand The 
terminology and everything will probably 
be— 
THE COURT Alright, are you prepar-
ed to go forward, Mr Jacobsen7 
MR JACOBSEN Yes, I am 
At this point, it would have l>een but a 
simple matter for defendant to protest to 
the trial judge that he needed more time to 
prepare or to retain a new attorney, that 
his files and depositions were still in the 
possession of his former attorney and thus 
not available to him in preparation of his 
defense, or that he wanted a jury trial 
Had he but raised any of these questions to 
the trial court, we might have a different 
case here 
But he did not raise these questions and 
went forward with the trial In so doing, 
he accepted the consequences of that action, 
ignorance of the law notwithstanding 
The main opinion points out that this 
Court has said that a layperson acting as his 
own attorney "should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be in-
dulged " # The record shows that the trial 
judge did make every effort to accommo-
date defendant's lack of legal knowledge 
during the trial Preceding the trial, the 
4 Supra n 1, 372 P 2d at 991 
5 Faretta v California 422 U S 806 95 SCt 
2525 45 LEd2d 562 (J975) State v Donvn 
guez. Utah, 564 P2d 768 (1977) 
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judge carefully explained the procedures to 
be followed during the trial As the trial 
went on, he further explained ptocedures, 
the bases for objections and the way to cure 
those objections The judge also raised ob-
jections himself when plaintiffs counsel 
was pursuing an improper line of question-
ing And finally, he occasionally overruled 
objections of plaintiff's counsel, explaining 
THE COURT I know but he isn't a 
lawyer so I've got to be liberal with him, 
Mr Mclff, so your objection's overruled 
I realize it's not proper but I feel like I've 
got to give latitude 
The mam "p:n ,rtn, however, suggests that 
this is not enough and requires the trial 
court to caution the pro se litigant as to the 
risks of representing himself and to apprise 
the litigant of his available legal options 
Heretofore there has been no require-
ment, in either the federal courts or the 
state courts, that a party appearing pro se 
in a civil trial must be cautioned as to the 
dangers and disadvantages of self represen-
tation, nor must he be given a laundry list 
of all of his available legal options While 
it is true that this caution must be given to 
pro se defendants in criminal trials,5 the 
standard in civil trials is not nearlv so strin-
gent In fact, the federal courts have held 
that there is no constitutional right to coun-
sel at all in civil trials * 
Thus, the main opinion im|>oses an entire-
ly new and rigid procedure on trial judges 
who are faced with pro se litigants I be-
lieve that this stricture is neither necessary 
nor pro|>cr in civil trials 
The instant case is a good case in point 
Having seen fit to retain counsel initially, 
defendant was obviously aware of the bene-
fits to be derived from representation by 
counsel Conversely, he had to have been 
aware of the hazards of going it alone 
Having seen fit to discharge his former 
counsel, for whatever reason, and to pro-
6 Boulware \ Battagha 344 F Sopp 889 affd 
478 F2d 1398 (D Del 1972) US ex rel Stuart 
v Yeager 293 F Supp 1079 (D N J 1968) aWd 
419 F2d 126 (3rd Cir I960) cert denied 197 
U S 1055, 90 S Ct 1400 25 L Ed 2d 673 (1970) 
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ceed with the trial acting as his own attor-
ney, he cannot l>e heard to complain now 
that he was deprived of due process of law 
because of results directly attributable to 
his own actions 
I believe that the trial judge exercised 
sound discretion in permitting the trial to 
go forward and that the defendant was not 
deprived of any constitutional protections 
STEWART, Justice (concurring and dis 
senting) 
I concur in Parts I and III of the majon 
ty opinion However, I dissent from Part 
II for the reason that the majority fixes the 
limitations of the tort of alienation of affec-
tions more broadly than I think justifiable 
When defined broadly the tort of aliena-
tion of affections largely ignores the almost 
invariable contributing influences of both 
the plaintiff and the plaintiff s estranged 
spouse in contributing to, if not creating in 
the first instance, a disharmonious relation 
ship, which sometimes results in one or both 
of the unhappy spouses seeking other inti-
mate relations with another |>crson, how-
ever unjustifiable that may be The deli 
cate and often fragile bonds that unite a 
husband and wife can only flourish in an 
atmosphere of reciprocal tenderness Yet 
marriage l>onds are constantly subject to 
innumerable tensions and threatening 
forces that can never be measured junsti-
call) in any realistic way The power of 
such forces is demonstrated in the fact that 
some 40% of the marriages in this country 
end in divorce And it is not often that full 
responsibility for the breakdown of a mar-
riage can be attributed with any great de 
gree of assurance to one or the other of the 
parties, let alone solely to the conduct of a 
third person 
We do not live in a day, if ever there 
were one when male or female Casanovas 
cast a spell that all but nullifies the will 
power of a member of the opposite sex 
Persons who have been married do not gen-
erally fall prey to overwhelmingly seductive 
powers of another like some inert piece of 
iron drawn inexorably into the ever-strong-
er field of power of a magnet The affec-
tion of married |>ersons for each other is 
usually alienated by their own conduct or 
misconduct 
Nevertheless, the tort of alienation of 
affections may provide a projier remedy for 
certain conduct that interferes with the 
marital relationship Sex is a powerful 
force There are those in social positions 
of power, status, or authority who may 
illicitly use sex to satisfy their own passions 
or for otherwise improper ends There are 
any number of such relationships, i e , pro-
fessors and students, physicians and pa-
tients, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, or psy-
chologists and clients, and employers ami 
employees Those who use positions of 
|>ower or authority for the purpose of ob-
taining sexual favors and produce an alien-
ation of affections between the one in an 
inferior position and his or her spouse, 
abuse and o\erreach any legitimate power 
Ihty nmy have In <*uch CHSC% the conie-
qui nee may IK. not only the breakup of one 
or |>erh ips two marriages, but also unfore-
seeable consequences in the future lives of 
the children from such marriages 
In other cases, where there is no abuse of 
power or authority, I think the tort of alien-
ation of affections will cause much more 
harm than any good it may do The judi-
cial invitation to often vindictive persons, 
who usuall) have not perceived the mote in 
their own eyes, to use the courts to lash 
back at paramours of their spouses, Home-
times simply as a means of blackmail, will 
provide little protection to the marriage 
relationship, and never be a force for rees-
tablishing that relationship The ugliness 
of the inevitable disputes over fault m di-
vorce cases will only be magnified in most 
alienation of affection cases and will not be 
offset by any countervailing good I see 
little reason to promote such unseemly dis-
putes when so little is likely to lie gained, 
except in those types of cases where one 
person abuses his or her power or authority 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring in result 
and dissenting) 
I join in the reversal of this judgment, 
but dissent from Part II of the majority 
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opinion because I believe that the cause of 
action for alienation of affections should be 
abolished It is an anachronistic holdover 
from a bygone era which modern rational! 
zations have failed to justify The majority 
opinion identifies and addresses in turn six 
arguments presented by the appellant for 
abolition of the cause of action Although 
the majority opinion rejects each of the 
appellant's arguments separately, it fails to 
set forth any affirmative reasons in policy 
or precedent for the retention of this cause 
of action in Utah The majority opinion 
goes on to make the requirements for re-
covery so difficult that it is unlikely anyone 
will ever pursue this cause of action in 
court again By this approach, I believe the 
majority acknowledges that the cause of 
action is defective in its weak theoretical 
basis and the numerous opportunities it of-
fers for abuse However instead of elimi-
nattng the cauie of action in a forthright 
manner, the majority opinion preserves the 
cause of action in a way that insures that 
its most likely use will be outside of the 
courtroom, as a tool to extort "settlements" 
from prospective defendants The cause of 
action for alienation of affections should be 
abolished t>ecause there is no longer any 
legal basis for its retention It protects no 
interest and furthers no policy not better 
served by other means A brief review of 
the history of alienation of affections re-
veals why this is so 
In the early days of the common law, 
marriages were entered into for economic, 
diplomatic or dynastic reasons and were, 
indeed, bargains with specific terms set by 
the families of the bride and groom See, 
eg, Schultz, "Contractual Ordering of Mar-
riage A New Model for State Policy," 70 
CalLRev 211,224 25(1982) Considera-
tion was offered by each party the groom 
agreed to protect and support the bride and 
her children, and the bride agreed to bear 
heirs for the groom, educate them and ad-
minister the household Individual mar-
riage contracts and the rights of marriage 
were valuable incidents in feudal tenure 
both economically and imhtanly See, eg, 
3 Holdsworth, History of English IMW, 61 
(3d ed 1923) In addition, the identification 
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of legitimate offspring was of crucial im-
portance to inheritance laws See, eg, 
Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 
30 Colum L Rev 651, 655 (1930), Comment, 
"Piracy on the Matrimonial High Seas—The 
Law and the Marital Interloper," 25 Sw L J 
594 (1971) 
However, although the marriage relation-
ship "was founded on contract [in the mid-
dle ages], the rights and duties involved 
in the relationship were fixed to a large 
extent by law and not by the agreement of 
the parties, and the consequences of creat-
ing the relationship might affect third per-
sons " 2 Holdsworth, supra, at 463 
The marriage created a newjstatusjfojMiajch 
of the parties The importance of status in 
medieval society can scarcely be overem-
phasized 
That there were different classes of 
society which should be governed by dif-
ferent laws would have apj>cared a 
truism to the mediaeval legislature 
The king, the |»eer, the knight all 
occupied definite and legally fixed places 
in the hierarchy of society [I]n the 
Middle Ages the difference in legal rules 
was conceived of as depending upon the 
necessary and natural differences in the 
structure of society 
Id at 464 Individuality, as we now value 
that concept, would have !>een regarded as 
akin to anarchy, placing a person outside of 
the benefits and protection of the law and 
denying him or her a position from which to 
interact with society As far as the law 
was concerned, a person's status and a per-
son's identity were the same individual 
characteristics were irrelevant 
A wife in this system occupied a particu-
lar status as a female and as a married 
person Bracton described three categories 
of human beings "There is also another 
division of human beings, that some are 
male and other female, and others herma-
phrodites And fenmles differ from males 
in many respects, because their condition is 
worse than that of males" 1 Bracton, 
IJSHS ami Customs of England * 36 (Twiss 
ed 1879) Thus, as a female, the wife was 
considered her husband's inferior by her 
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nature Canon law im|M>sed the view that a 
husband and wife were one flesh and one 
person in the law and that the pei-son was 
the husband Therefore, during coverture, 
even the woman's separate status as an 
inferior female was subsumed in the conju 
gal unit In this setting, a cause of action 
for the abduction of the wife, the ancestor 
of the cause of action for alienation of 
affections, recognized a challenge to the 
status of both husband and wife and vindi-
cated real damage to contractual and feudal 
rights Because of the wife's legal disabili-
ty, her actual consent or lack of consent 
was not considered The action was 
brought by the husband against the third 
party, regardless of the issue of the wife's 
consent Under the feudal system, society 
at large had an economic, military and JK> 
litical interest in the enforcement of the 
marriage contract and the status of the 
married parties 
In the feudal era l>ccausc of the intercon 
nections between interests in property and 
virtually all other as|>ects of society, "the 
law of proj)erty, and the remedies for the 
infringement of proprietary rights, were 
then much more highly developed than the 
law of contract, and the remedies for 
breach of contract" 8 Holdsworth, supra, 
at 427 The "law of crime and tort was 
narrow" and "permeated by the idea of 
trespass—by the idea, that is, of forcible 
damage to |>erson or pro|>crty " Id at 421 
In this era, taking into consideration the 
emphasis and development in the law, the 
highly structured nature of society, the ac-
cepted concept of the conjugal unit, and the 
inferior status of women, it is understanda-
ble that the husband's interest in his wife 
and their relationship was expressed as a 
proprietary interest and that it therefore 
sup|>orted an action in trespass against a 
third party 
Although the "bargamed-for" contractual 
aspects of marriage declined and the Ren-
aissance concept of individuality eventually 
replaced the feudal concept of societal sta 
tus, the common law forms of pleading 
preserved the husband's action for damage 
to his marital rights as an action in tres-
pass The husband was said to have the 
exclusive and legally enforceable right to 
his wife's services and company The ac-
tion was brought in trespass by the husband 
with a "per quod consortium amifit," i e , 
'whereby he lost the company [of his 
wife]," and was for "the loss and damage of 
the husband " not for damage suffered by 
the wife or the conjugal unit See Hyde v 
Sc) ssor. 79 Eng Rep 462 (1620) The action 
was likened to the action "brought by the 
master for the battery of his servant, per 
quod servitium amisit," i e , "whereby he 
lost the service [of his servant]" Id By 
Blackstonc's time, the husband's legal 
rights with respect to his wife were describ-
ed by the term "consortium" and included 
her society and services See Feinsinger, 
"legislative Attack on 'Heart Balm,'" 33 
Mich LRcv 970, Q89 (1935) The husband 
had a cause of action for an intentional 
interference with those rights Under the 
title Injuries Affecting a Husband," Black-
stone desenlnid abduction of the wife as 
follows "[Allnluction or taking her away 
may either l>e by fraud and persuasion, or 
o|>en violence though the law in both cases 
sup|K>ses force and constraint, the wife hav-
ing no power to convent " 3 Black-
stone, Commentaries *139 (1768) (emphasis 
added) This action was exclusively the 
husband's to compensate him for his inju-
ries The wife had no similar cause of 
action, as traditionally she had no right to 
her husband's "services" but rather a right 
to his protection and support—unenforcea-
ble because of her legal disability This 
disability was not viewed as an injustice in 
mid eighteenth century England Black-
stone commented that "we may observe, 
that even the disabilities, which the wife 
lies under, are for the most part intended 
for her protection and benefit So great a 
favorite is the female sex of the laws of 
England" See 1 Blackstone, wpra, at 
•445 Thus, the proprietary cause of action 
originally reflected widely accepted views 
of status and legal rights in a society where 
contractual and legal obligations incident to 
marriages were part of a system of politi-
cal, military and property obligations The 
remedy provided by the law for violation of 
NELSON v, 
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those rights and obligations addressed inju-
ry to the society's interest in those obliga-
tions Moral infractions were separate 
matters left to the ecclesiastical courts 
This cause of action for abduction gradually 
evolved into a personal tort action vindicat-
ing the husband's legal, not contractual, 
rights to his wife's services and society, 
called consortium Parallel to this evolu-
tion, it may be seen that the rationale for 
the procedural disability of the married 
woman had broadened from the canonical 
"one flesh" to include the Blackstonian 
"protect"*" and bcnef.t" rationale 
The more modern form of the action for 
abduction apj>eared in England in 1745 
when the court recognized a husband's right 
to recover for the "enticement" of his wife 
away from their home See Wmsmore v 
Grecnhank, Willes r»77, 125 Eng Rep 1330 
(1745) In the United States, the common 
law action for abduction or enticement of 
the wife was adopted in every state but 
Louisiana See Feinsinger, supra, 33 Mich 
L Rev at 992jjnd n 17, Note, "The Suit of 
Alienation of Affections Can Its Existence 
Be Justified Today?" 56 N D L Rev 239, 
241 (1980) The definition of consortium, 
originally the husband's right to his wife's 
services and company, was gradually broad-
ened to include love, affection and in gener-
al, good relationships in the family For 
example, in Jacohwn v Siddnl, 12 Or 280, 7 
P 108 (1885), the court declared that "[tjhe 
injury done the husband consists in the 
dishonor of his marriage bed, the loss of his 
wife's affection, and the comfort of her 
society, as u ell as an) i)ccuntary injury for 
/oss of services" Id at 285, 7 P at 111 
(emphasis added) 
The growing unpopularity of the hus-
band's proprietary rights in his wife's serv-
ices was probably accelerated by the advent 
of the Married Women's Acts in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, which re-
moved the married woman's inability to sue 
and be sued See, eg, Comment, supra, 25 
Sw L J at 59&-97 Courts were forced to 
re-examine the basis for the cause of action 
in order to decide whether the husband's 
cause of action was now extinguished, or 
whether the cause of action could IKJ ex-
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tended to wives The resulting discussions 
are notable for their variety "While 
agreeing that the action was based primari-
ly on loss of consortium, courts have 
defined the consequences variously as an 
injury to projKjrty, to the person, to person-
al rights, or to feelings " Feinsinger, supra, 
33 Mich L Rev at 993 Some courts found 
that the wife had no right to sue for crimi-
nal conversation or alienation of affections 
In Knoessin v Keller, 60 Minn 372, 62 N W 
438 (1895), the Minnesota court refused to 
find a wife's right to bring an action for 
criminal conversation, stating that the gist 
of the action was the possibility of illegiti-
mate children and jiouUing out that ' the 
wife whose husband commits adultery suf-
fers no 'disgrace' and that in any event a 
woman [defendant} charged vuth adultery 
in all probability was not the seducer ' Id 
at 991 In DufficH v Duffies 76 Wis 374, 
45 NW 522 (1890), the Wisconsin court 
refused to find an iction for alienation of a 
husband's affections The court explained 
that such a ciuse of action would lead to a 
multitude of actions because a husband may 
be expected to jield to worldly temptations 
to which he is daily exposed, whereas a 
wife, with her purer nature, is occupied at 
home and not subject to such enticements 
Id at 993 See also Prosser, Law of Torts 
§ 124, at 881 (4th ed 1971) 
The great majority of the states, how 
ever, sustained the right of the wife to 
maintain an action for criminal conversa-
tion and alienation of affections Ste, eg, 
Feinsinger supra, 33 Mich L Rev at 99 J 
In order to do this, courts were forced to 
define consortium to include more than the 
husband's well established right to services, 
and to declare that the wife now had an 
equal right to consortium See, eg OpfM.ii 
heim v Kridel, 230 N Y 156, 140 N E 227 
(1923) Man> opinions, finding the proprie-
tary interest distasteful, denied the clear 
historical basis of the husband's action in 
trespass, holding that the wife had an equal 
right to maintain the action because the 
enabling statutes removed the only barrier 
to her action, l e , her legal disability to sue 
or be sued See, e g, Clow v Chapman, 125 
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Mo 101, 28 SW 328 (1894) The wife's 
legal disability was not, of course, the only 
reason she had possessed no cause of action 
in the common law In the common law, 
she had no legally recognized right to her 
husband s services the basis for the action 
was the injur} to the husband's legal right 
to his wife's services Ironically, it is this 
very proprietary interest, rejected by the 
courts as "archaic," which was granted to 
the wife 
By force of the marriage contract, hus-
band and wife are each entitled to the 
society and comfort of the other,—the 
one to as great an extent as the other 
As a wife is now placed on an equality 
with her husband in respect of her prop-
erty and personal rights, and as a hus-
band may have his action, as against a 
third person, for enticing away his wife, 
the wife has her action against third |>er 
sons for enticing away her husband 
Id at 107, 28 S W at 330 Thus, while the 
courts of the era criticized the idea of a 
proprietor} interest in the wife, the deci-
sions gave the concept new life by granting 
to the wife the same propnetar) right to 
sue for the loss of consortium See 
Lippman, supra, 30 Colum L Rev at 664 
In spite of the broadened definitions of 
consortium, it is clear that the term contin-
ued to denote a property interest In Tink-
er \ Coin ell, 193 U S 473, 24 SCt 505, 48 
LEd 754 (1904) the United States Su-
preme Court addressed the question of 
u hether a judgment for criminal conversa-
tion against the appellant had been dis-
charged in bankruptcy Under the bank 
ruptcy act, a judgment could be discharged 
unless it had l>een recovered in an action 
"for wilful and malicious injuries to the 
person or property of another " The appel-
lant argued that the judgment had been 
discharged because criminal conversation 
was not an injur) to the r e s i d e n t ' s "|>er-
son" and that the gravamen of the action 
was loss of consortium, not injury to the 
property of the respondent The Court 
held 
We think it is made clear by these 
n ferences to a few of the many cases on 
this subject that the cause of action by 
the husband is based upon the idea that 
the act of the defendant is a violation of 
the marital rights of the husband in the 
person of his wife, to the exclusion of all 
others, and so the act of the defendant is 
an injury to the person and also to the 
pro/Krty rights of the husband 
Id at 485, 24 S Ct at 508 (emphasis added) 
The same result was reached on the same 
question by the Kansas Supreme Court, 
where the judgment for alienation of affec-
tions was obtained by a wife See Leicester 
v Hoadley, 66 Kan 172, 71 P 318 (1903) 
In Sullivan v Valiquette, 66 Colo 170, 180 
P 91 (1919), the Colorado Supreme Court 
recognized "the right of the plaintiff to the 
body of his wife, and to her mind, 
undiluted " Id at 172, 180 P at 91 In a 
suit brought by a wife against her fathcr-
in law, tht Connecticut Supreme Court de-
clared that the "gist" of the action was loss 
of consortium described by the court as "a 
property right growing out of the marriage 
relation " Hudima v Hudyma, 131 
Conn 281, 283 84, 39 A 2d 890, 891 (1944) 
Another irony in the cases of this era lies 
in the fact that although the wife's legal 
disabilities were statutorily removed, the 
law continued to treat the wife as incapable 
of initiating or consenting to her own 
change of affections or seduction 
For the purpose of maintaining the ac-
tion, it is regarded as an actual trespass 
upon the marital rights of the husband 
although the consequent injury is really 
to the husband on account of the corrup-
tion of the body and mmd of* the wife, 
and it is in this view (that it is a trespass 
upon the rights of the husband) that it is 
held that the consent of the wife makes 
no difference, that she is incapable of 
giving a consent to an injury to the hus-
band 
Tinker v Coin ell, supra, 193 U S at 483, 24 
SCt at 507 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added) Thus, the alienated wife's active 
participation in a relationship with the de-
fendant is considered to be irrelevant in 
most cases The defendant bears the entire 
burden of having alienated the wife's affec-
NELSON v 
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tions, even where the facts reveal her will-
ing, if not eager, cooperation Wilson \ 
Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P 2d 759 (1954), 
cited by the majority opinion as Utah's 
leading case, and the instant case t>oth illus-
trate this judicial tendency to ignore the 
wife's volitional capacity 
The de facto retention of the assumption 
that a wife is unable to consent to an injury 
to her husband is an anomaly not present in 
those cases where the wife is the plaintiff 
To the contrary, in actions brought by 
wives, it was commonly held that it was a 
good defense to show that the alienated 
husband was the enticer and that the de-
fendant had merely yielded to his "seduc-
tive arts " Romatne v Decker, 11 App Div 
20, 43 N Y S 79 (1896) "The law imputes 
to (the defendant] no fault liecause of her 
attractiveness, nor liecause she may have 
been pleased with the admiration of plain-
tiff's husband" Whitman v Egbert, 27 
App Div 374, 50 N Y S 3 (1898) In a 
peculiar Vermont case, the court com-
mented that a wife could have no recovery 
against a prostitute for alienating the af-
fections of her husband "A single instance 
of adultery, had by a man accustomed to 
marital infidelities, with a common prosti-
tute, who serves his purpose on a chance 
occasion, does not constitute the enticement 
and alienation essential to a recovery" 
Nieberg v Cohen, 88 Vt 281,287,92 A 214, 
217 (1914) Thus, when the defendant was 
a woman, she was frequently excused from 
liability by reason of a remnant of the old 
procedural disability in the form of judicial 
stereotyping which viewed men as aggres-
sive and women as passive 
During the 1930s, there was widespread 
discussion regarding the so called "heart 
balm" actions, which included breach of 
promise to marry, alienation of affections, 
seduction and criminal conversation The 
abolition of these actions became a "cause 
celebre" in many states As noted in the 
majority opinion, a majority of jurisdictions 
has eliminated the actions by statute or 
judicial decision It was widely felt that 
such suits served no constructive purpose 
and, in fact, were vehicles for blackmail, 
extortion or coerced marriages Although 
JACOBSEN Utah 1227 
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the majontv opinion finds it "noteworthy" 
that research uncovers only one case in 
which there was evidence of collusion and 
extortion, one would not realistically expect 
rejKjrted cases to reveal this sort of abuse 
Frequentlv, the threat of filing such a suit 
would suffice to extract payment from a 
potential defendant The instant case 
would not be before us now if the defend-
ant had paid the proposed $5,000 "settle-
ment" to this plaintiff, whose wife, often 
beaten and abused, left him by her own 
free will and choice It is no answer to 
claim that groundless or collusive suits may 
be countered by actions for abuse of process 
or malicious prosecution Even setting 
aside the burden and difficulty of bringing 
such suits successfully, that argument sug-
gests that th( re is some {Hunt in locking the 
barn door aftir the horses are out It is 
true, as the majont> opinion points out 
that there arc other tauses of action where 
the parties' private lives are displajed for 
public Mew, dnd that this asjwtt of such 
aetions alone is not a sufficient basis for 
their demise However, in child custody 
cases, the best interests of children are felt 
to counterbalance the sacrifice of parental 
privacy and dignity, and in defamation 
cases it is the plaintiff himself who puts his 
reputation on the line in order to defend it 
In a cause of action for alienation of affec-
tions, the plaintiff assaults the privacy and 
reputation of the defendant for no justici-
a r y defendable purjK>se 
It is for this reason that I strongly urge 
the abolition of the cause of action for 
alienation of affections this is an action 
without legal content, signifying nothing 
but the desire to wring money and revenge 
from the pain of a failed relationship The 
old common law cause of action had real 
content in the days when the husband had a 
legally recognized right to his wife's serv-
ices Although we now find the concept 
repugnant, in the past those legal rights 
accurately reflected the order and concen-
sus of society regarding the status of mar-
ried persons In that society, it was logical 
that a court could find a third party respon-
sible for damage to the husband's man til 
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rights l>ecause the wife had no legally rec-
ognised existence apart from her husband, 
and was generally considered more passive 
and persuadable by nature Those days and 
those rights have passed and this cause of 
action should be gone with them 
The modern action for alienation of af-
fections has become an action for interfer-
ence with the mental and emotional atti-
tude of one spouse toward the other See, 
eg, Wyman v Wallace, 94 Wash 2d 99, 615 
P 2d 462 (1980), Prosser, supra, at 876 
The majority opinion posits no basis in stat-
ute or common law to support such an 
action The argument is made that "[t]he 
marital relationship is entitled to no less 
protection than" other relational interests, 
referring to causes of action for loss of 
prospective economic relations, interference 
with a contractual relation and wrongful 
death However, this analogy fails to rec-
ognize inherent differences between the 
marital relationship and other types of rela-
tionships The relationship between mar-
ried people does not resemble that between 
parties who undertake a commercial trans-
action based on pecuniary interests In the 
usual contractual setting, the times at 
which the contract will begin and end and 
expectations for performance are identified 
and limited by the parties themselves If 
the parties have dealt at arm's length, and 
there have been consideration and a meet-
ing of minds, the law will both enforce the 
contract and protect its performance from 
third party interference Our legal system 
is capable of this task because the obliga-
tions and the adequacy of their perform-
ance may be ascertained with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy Therefore, if A is dam-
aged in his contractual relationship with B, 
A has a cause of action against B if B has 
breached, or against C if C has wrongfully 
interfered with A's or B's performance, or 
against B and C if together they have dam-
aged A See, eg, Bunnell v Bills, 13 Utah 
2d 83 368 P 2d 597 (1962) It should be 
noted that if C interferes with the perform-
ance of the contract between A and B with 
out their cooperation, either A or B could 
have a cause of action against C 
The relationship between a husband and 
wife bears no resemblance to the contractu-
al paradigm which is the legal basis for loss 
of prospective economic relations and inter-
ference with a contractual relationship Al-
though we speak of the marriage "con 
tract," it has been centuries since marriage 
has involved true contract principles in 
Western cultures The purposes of mar-
riage are not pecuniary In our society, it 
is now widely accepted that men and wom-
en enter marriage to seek personal JujfiII-
ment and happiness See eg, Schultz, su-
pra, 70 Cal L Rev at 250 51 Furthermore, 
unlike the parties to a contract, parties who 
wish to marry do not make their own law 
The state, not the parties, controls who may 
marry, what procedure must be followed, 
and how and why the marriage may be 
terminated In Utah, each S|>ouse is re-
quired to support the other financially 
when necessary, see U C A , 1953, §§ 78 
45 3 & 4, and neither may recover for loss 
of consortium when the spouse is injured by 
another Sie U C A , 1953, § 30 2 4, Tjas 
v Proctor, Utah, 591 P 2d 438 (1979) How-
ever, the statutes are silent regarding addi-
tional legal obligations of one spouse to the 
other Our legislature has not seen fit to 
bestow a legal right on either partner to 
any quantum of love, devotion, companion-
ship or commitment from the other Nei-
ther has our legislature prescribed how long 
a neglected spouse must hope, how long a 
bored spouse must be patient, or how long 
an abused s|>ouse must endure Possibly, 
our legislature recognizes that commitment 
to the married state must be generated by 
the individual and cannot be enforced by 
law Therefore, a person has no action 
against his spouse in law or equity for in-
sufficient love and affection, for emotional 
neglect or even for abuse, apart from the 
criminal law Where the State has mandat-
ed no condition which the married parties 
must satisfy, the law will give no cause of 
action for "breach" but only specific 
grounds for divorce This is in accord with 
the longstanding "hands-off" policy in the 
law regarding interference with matters be-
tween husband and wife See, eg, Schultz, 
supra, 70 Cal L Rev at 232 34 
Therefore, in our society, 
nizes husbands and wives as separate indi-
viduals, which recogni7es that devotion and 
commitment are personal and perhaps mor-
al obligations but not legal obligations, 
which refuses to recognize a cause of action 
by one spouse against the other for failure 
to love, there is no ground in law or logic 
for recognizing a cause of action by one 
spouse against a third party to whom the 
other spouse has voluntarily transferred his 
affections The comparison of the action 
for alienation of affections to actions pro 
tecting contractual relationships is superfi-
cial and misleading 
A similar point was made by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in a suit brought 
by some children for alienation of the affec-
tion of their mother The court noted that 
the mother's love and devotion were "mil 
ters within her keeping The measure of 
their contribution is controlled by htr will-
ingness and capacity " Htnwm v Thomas 
231 N C 173, 175, 56 S E2d 4*2, 414 (1949) 
The court continued 
Since the mother, who is a free agent, 
committed no legal wrong for which re-
dress may be had in a court of law, it 
cannot be said that the defendant, who 
allegedly induced her to l>e remiss in her 
domestic duties, incurred any greater lia-
bility than the law attaches to her act 
To hold otherwise would mean that ev-
ery time a person persuades or induces a 
mother to engage in other activities to 
such an extent as to cause her to neglect 
her children, he commits a tort for which 
he may be compelled to respond in darn-
ages 
Id (emphasis added) The majority opinion 
declares that "a defendant is properly 
chargeable with the effect of mere acquies-
cence in the overtures of the alienated 
spouse where the defendant knows or has 
reason to know that such acquiescence will 
damage the marital relationship " This will 
surely be construed to mean that any per-
son who acquiesces in the advances of an-
other, whom he knows to be married at the 
time, may be held accountable at law for 
the subsequent failure of the marriage 
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which recog- There is no basis in law for our courts to 
make such a judgment Accountability for 
this t>|>e of relationship is better left to 
courts competent to render moral, rather 
than l( gal, judgments If the law is to give 
a remedy against third parties who thus 
'intrude ' into a marriage with harmful ef 
feet, we mav next sec a caust of action 
against demanding employers distributors 
of lascivious movies and books, or even the 
producers of Monday night football, all of 
which damage many marriage relationships 
It should l)c noted that the comparison of 
the action foi alienation of affections with 
r e n«/ry for loss of consortium in a wrong 
ful death action is equally superficial In a 
wrongful death action, the loss of consort! 
urn, i e , loss of lo\t, affection and society is 
simpl\ one way to measure the immeisun 
bit ont valut oi a lift is the ihility to form 
relationships ind to give and rteeive afft e 
lion 1 litre is ample b isis in statutory and 
common law for the protection of life In 
an iction for alienation of affection the 
loss of love AIU\ affection lb the loss of the 
rel itionship itself As already discussed, 
neither statutory nor common law imposes 
any obligation on married persons to main-
tain love or affection for each other There 
is no legal basis for one spouse to sue the 
other or a third party for the failure of the 
relationship The comparison with a 
wrongful death action is invalid 
No one can seriously argue that a hus 
band or wife, even in a troubled marriage, 
is helpless in the face of temptation If a 
spoiise is pursued by an aggressive third 
party, as postulated by the majority opin-
ion, and rejects those advances to no avail, 
he or she can obtain an injunction against 
harassment, as did the husband in Wthlxsr 
v Gray, 228 Ark 289, 307 S W 2d 80 (1957) 
The action lies with the pursued or annoyed 
husband or wife, however, not with the 
spouse for an injury to a legal right If the 
husband or wife does not reject those ad-
vances, the betrayal is by the participating 
spouse against whom the law grants no 
remedy based on the marital relationship, 
save divorce Perhaps the individual whose 
s{>ouse has left him may have an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress 
1 2 3 0 Utah 669 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
against that spouse or against the spouse 
and the third party See Stoker v Stoker, 
Utah, 616 P 2d 590 (1980) (confirming wife's 
right to an action against her hustmnd for 
the intentional infliction of personal mju 
nes) If the husband and wife have con 
tracted with each other regarding specific 
marital obligations in addition to those im-
posed by law, perha|>s a remedy for breach 
of that agreement may be sought by the 
party wronged In either case, such an 
action would be brought as any tort or 
contract action and would not be derived 
from the marriage relationship itself as 
alienation of affections purports to be 
Devoid of any real basis in law, the action 
for alienation of affections is frequently 
upheld instead by moralizing 
The injury for which it was recovered is 
one of the grossest which can l>e inflicted 
upon the husband, and the |)erson who 
perpetuates it knows it is an offense of 
the most aggravated character, 
Tinker v Col*ell. supra, 193 U S at 489 90, 
24 S Ct at 509 10 
Three thousand dollars is a small sum for 
such a case A confessed adulterer who 
has enticed away his neighbor's wife is in 
no position to say much about excessive 
damages 
Su//ivan v Vahquette, supra 66 Colo at 172, 
180 P at 92 
The grievance is one of a social character, 
of course The incidence is too deep, 
however, to be left to the non curial 
efforts of society itself to correct the 
antisocial tendencies and activities of its 
members, the slow-curing and festering 
wounds which leave cicatricial marks in 
the wake of the marauder 
Henson v Thomas, supra, 231 N C at 178, 
56 S E 2 d at 436 (Seawell, J , dissenting) 
Often, the moralizing or prejudice operates 
more subtly The majority opinion quotes 
from Heist v Heist, 46 N C App 521, 265 
S E 2 d 434 (1980) In North Carolina, a 
plaintiff must show that the s|>ouses ' were 
happily married and that a genuine love 
and affection existed " Id at 523, 265 
S E 2d at 436 The court in tfe/st found the 
defendant liable for the failure of the mar-
riage on the flimsiest of evidence of genu-
ine love and affection, disregarding evi-
dence of longstanding disaffection and min-
imal tolerance between the husband and 
wife As illustrated in Heitt and in the 
instant case, and in every case predicated 
on alienation of affections, there is an in-
herent danger that a verdict will rest on the 
subjective judgment of the factfinder, rath-
er than law In the present case, the trial 
judge apparently ignored evidence of the 
plaintiff's violent treatment of his wife, and 
her independent decision to seek out the 
company of the defendant At the close of 
trial, the judge declared 
The Court finds that marriage and fami-
ly—that marriage is a sacred institution 
and that anyone who interferes with that 
should suffer the full consequences of the 
law and I'm just telling you, Mr Jacob-
sen, at this time that this Court nearly 
every week is having criminal trials 
when. |>eople steal money from other peo-
ple and in my opinion you've stolen some-
thing far more than money, you have 
interfered with the whole basic fabric of 
society and when you tell me it's a [pla-
tonicj relationship, I just say it's non-
sense I don't buy it at all and I don't 
want you to think I do I don't know 
how they're going to collect any money 
judgments that I give against you but 
they're certainly going to get one against 
\ou and I hope this gets well publicized 
because I d like everyone to know that if 
a case like this comes into my Court, that 
they can expect to suffer 
The people of the State of Utah do not 
need this cause of action It surely falls 
among those which do not "necessarily of-
fer effective or efficient means of achieving 
the public good" Bok, "A Flawed Sys-
tem," Harv Mag 38, 40 (May-June, 1983) 
Advocating the reduction of volume and 
cost of litigation, the author of that article 
points out that "[b]y complicating the rules 
and insisting on an adversary process con-
ducted by the parties, judges can under-
mine justice " hi at 42 That is 
precisely what the majority opinion promis-
es to do the final deaththrows of a broken 
JARAMILLO v FARMERS INS GROUP 
Cifeas6«9PJ2dl23l (Utah l«83) 
Utah 1231 
marriage are to be preserved with a more 
ngorous and technical set of requirements 
for recovery Innocent parties must defend 
themselves, and then assert their right to IKJ 
free of such actions b) suing in separate 
actions for malicious prosecution or abuse 
of process Nowhere does the majority 
point to a basis in law or a benefit to 
society to justify such a cost to the parties 
or to our judicial system 
As the court stated in Henson v Thomas, 
supra, "The mutual rights and privileges of 
home life grow out of the marital status 
Such obligations are not legal in nature 
and may not be made the subject of com-
merce and bartered at the counter" hi 
231 N C at 175, 56 S E 2d at 433 It is time 
that we acknowledge the operation of the 
process spoken of by Justice Holmes where-
by the customs and needs which give rise to 
a rule disappear but the rule remains, justi-
fied by some new |M>licy based on new IK? 
Iiefs and customs Holmes, Ihe Common 
La* 5 (1881) This old "rule" does not have 
a basis in todiiy's beliefs and customs Its 
existence now testifies only to the |>ersist-
ence of an old form of action in our com-
mon law system and to the understandable 
but regretable human desire for revenge 
and a greenback poultice This was a judi-
cially instituted cause of action and should 
be judicially extinguished, especially since 
our legislature has never provided a statu-
tory basis for it See Wjman v Wallace, 
wpra It should not IHJ said of Utah that it 
is a place 
Where juries cast up what a wife is 
worth, 
By laying whate'er sum, in mulct they 
please on 
The lover, who must pay a handsome 
price, 
Because it is a marketable vice 
(Byron, Don Juan, Canto I, Ixiv ) 
MTNUMBfRSrSllirS 
Jerry R JARAMILLO, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, a cor-
poration, and State Farm Insurance Co., 
a corporation. Defendants and Appel-
lant 
No 18019 
Supreme Court of Utih 
Sept 1, 1983 
Tort victim brought action to recover 
balance claimed due under terms of settle-
ment agreement reached in compromise of 
!>ersonal injury action The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Count), Jay E Banks, J , 
entered judgment in favor of tort victim, 
and tort feasor's insurer appealed The Su-
preme Court, Hall C J , held that settle-
ment agreement, by which tort-feasor's in-
surer agtced to pa) tort victim and tort 
victim's insurer for its payment to tort vic-
tim of no fault lienefits, was valid and bind-
ing on tort victim, therefore, tort victim 
was not entitled to amount tort-feasors 
insurer intended to pay tort victim's insur-
er 
Reversed and remanded 
Stewart, J , dissented and filed opinion, 
in which Durham, J , concurred 
1. Insurance «=>579 
Fro|Misition that Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act does not confer a no-fault 
insurer right of subrogation to funds re-
ceived by its insured in subsequent action 
against tort-feasor does not preclude habili 
ty insurer from negotiating settlement with 
tort victim which compromises both its own 
liability and that of its insured U C A 
1953, 31 41 1 et seq 
2 Contracts <s=»14 
Unexpressed intentions do not affect 
validity of contract 
TabQ 
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opinion that if those interests are weighed 
in their proper relationship to each other, 
and to the evidence in this case, considera-
tions of justice and equity lead to the con-
clusion that what happened to Ms. Alsop 
was the result of other factors involved in 
her employment and her relationship to it, 
hut was not attributable to her employer 
unlawfully discriminating against her on 
account of sex; and that therefore that 
finding and the judgment thereon should 
not l>e permitted to stand. 
O ! Hit HUMBIR$»$![*> 
Emmame GR1BBLE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Michael CRIBBLE. Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 15453. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 21, 1978. 
Wife brought divorce action against 
husband, and husband counterclaimed that 
he was entitled to reasonable visitation 
rights with his wife's child by a previous 
marriage, i. e., his stepchild. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David K. 
Winder, J., held that stepfather was not 
entitled to hearing on issue of visitation, 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court, El-
lett, C. J., held that stepfather was entitled 
to hearing to determine whether he stood in 
loco parentis to his stepchild and if so 
whether it was in child's best interest to 
grant him right of visitation, and further, 
whether that right was to be conditioned by 
his agreement to pay proper share for child 
support. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Divorce «=»299 
Statute providing guidelines regarding 
visitation in divorce actions, as amended in 
1975, codified traditional common-law rules 
permitting an equitable investigation into 
whether it was in welfare of child that 
parents, grandparents or other relatives be 
accorded visitation rights and indicated leg-
islative intent to protect relationships which 
affect child whose parents are being divorc-
ed and to be sensitive to fact that relation-
ships beyond those of parent-child may be 
important enough to protect vis-a-vis visita-
tion. U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5. 
2. Divorce «=> 298(1), 299 
In proceedings to determine custody 
and/or visitation, welfare of a minor child 
is of paramount importance, and divorce 
courts have broad equitable powers in safe-
guarding this interest. U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5. 
3. Divorce «=»299 
For stepfather to assert visitation 
rights with respect to his ex-wife's child, he 
had to stand in relationship of parent, 
grandparent or other relative to child, keep-
ing in mind paramount concern of child's 
welfare. U.C.A.1953, 3f> 3 5. 
4. Parent and Child «=>14 
At common law, stepparent and step-
child relationship conferred no rights and 
imposed no obligations. 
5. Parent and Child *»15 
Term "in loco parentis" means in place 
of a parent, and a "person in loco parentis" 
is one who has assumed status and obliga-
tions of a parent without formal adoption. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Parent and Child *=»15 
Whether or not one assumes status of 
"person in loco parentis" depends on wheth-
er person intends to assume that obligation. 
7. Parent and Child *=*15 
Whore one stands in loco parentis to 
another, rights and liabilities arising out of 
that relation are, as words imply, exactly 
the same as between parent and child. 
8. Constitutional Law <3=»251.6 
Implicit in due process clause of State 
Constitution is that jwrsons be afforded a 
hearing to determine their rights under the 
law. Const, art. 1, § 7. 
9. Parent and Child «=»15 
Common law concerning termination of 
loco parentis status is that only surrogate 
parent or child is able to terminate status at 
will, ami rights, duties and obligations con-
tinue as long as they choose to continue 
relationship. 
10. Parent and Child -8=2(8) 
There is a presumption that best inter-
est of child is for him to IK? reared by his 
natural parent, although this presumption 
is one of fact and not of law and may be 
overcome by sufficient evidence, and wel-
fare of child is controlling. 
11. Divorce «=»299 
Statute providing guidelines regarding 
visitation in divorce actions conceivably al-
lows visitation where custodial rights would 
not exist; for example, where two natural 
parents divorce, with custody of their child 
granted to mother and visitation rights 
granted to father, and mother then dies, 
custody would go to father absent evidence 
of his unfitness, incapacity, etc., as against 
child's maternal grandparents, hut mater-
nal grandparents would have visitation 
rights which they previously did not have, 
assuming that court found it was in child's 
l>est interest. U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5. 
12. Divorce «3=>299 
Stepfather was entitled in divorce pro-
ceeding to hearing to determine whether he 
stood in loco parentis to his wife's child ami 
if so whether it was in child's best interest 
to grant him right of visitation, and fur-
ther, whether that ri#ht should he atmli-
tioned upon his agreement to pay a proper 
GRIBBLE v. (HUBBLE 
Cite as 583 P.2d «4 
share for child support 
U.C.A.1953, 30 3 5. 
Utah f,5 
Const art. 1, § 7; 
Jonathan H. King, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant 
J. Douglas Kinateder, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: 
This cusv arises out of a divorce action 
filed by the respondent against the appel-
lant Respondent has a minor child, her 
offspring by a previous marriage, l>orn 
alM)ut two months l>cfore his mother's mar-
riage to the appellant. Although four chil-
dren were born to the resj>ondent and the 
appellant during the time they were togeth-
er, all four died either at birth or in their 
infancy. Because of this and because the 
appellant, the child's stepfather, had imvvr 
formally adopted him. respondent did not 
seek child sup|M>rt in her divorce complaint 
Appellant counter-claims that he should be 
entitled to reasonable visitation rights with 
res|>ondenfs son. He claimed that he has 
treated the child as his own son, feels wry 
close to him, and is concerned about his 
future welfare. Appellant further offered 
to pay fifty dollars a month into a trust 
account for the child's l>enefit until he 
reaches eighteen years of age. Appellant 
lived with the child from the time he was 
two months old until the respondent and 
the ap|»ellaiit separated, roughly four years 
later, and it is uncontested that the child 
has had no contact with his biological fa-
ther. 
Respondent objected to visitation rights 
being awarded to the appellant The trial 
court held as a matter of law that the 
appellant (stepparent) was not entitled to a 
hearing on the issue of visitation. The sole 
issue raised on appeal, therefore, is whether 
the appellant stepfather is entitled to a 
hearing on the issue of visitation rights. 
/J-3j Utah CWe Ann., Sec 30 3 5 
(1953), as amended, provides guidelines re-
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garding custody and visitation in divorce 
actions: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and 
the maintenance of the parties and chil-
dren, as may l>e equitable. The court 
shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to the support and mainte-
nance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support and mainte-
nance, or the distribution of the property 
as shall lie reasonable and necessary. 
Visitation rights of parents, grandparents 
ami other relatives shall lake into consid-
eration the welfare of the child. I Em-
phasis added.) 
The 1975 Legislature amended Sec. 30 3 5 
to include the last sentence, thereby codify-
ing traditional common law rules permit-
ting an equitable investigation into whether 
it is in the welfare of the child that parents, 
grandparents, or other relatives be accorded 
visitation rights. In proceedings to deter-
mine custody and/or visitation, the welfare 
of a minor child is of paramount impor-
tance,1 and divorce courts have broad equi-
table powers in safeguarding this interest.1 
The last sentence of Sec. 30 3 5 indicates 
the legislative intent to protect the relation-
ships which affect the child whose parents 
are being divorced, and to be sensitive to 
the fact that relationships beyond those of 
parent-child may be important enough to 
protect vis-a-vis visitation. For the appel-
lant to assert visitation rights, he must, 
therefore, stand in the relationship of par-
ent, grandparent, or other relative to this 
1. Arends v Arends. 30 Utah 2d 32ft. 517 P 2d 
1019 (1974). Robinson v Robinson. 15 Utah 2d 
293. 391 P2d 434 (1964) 
2. Dehm v Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525 (1976); 
Mecham \ Mecham. Utah. 544 P.2d 479 (1975). 
3. Estate of Smith v. Nicholson. 49 Wash.2d 
229. 299 P2d 550 (1956). 
4. Estate of Gntfen v Haugland. 86 Wash.2d 
223. 543 P2d 245 (1975); State v Gillaspie. 8 
Wash App. 560. 507 P 2d 1223 (1973). 
child, keeping in mind the paramount con-
cern of the child's welfare. 
| 4 | At common law, the stepparent and 
stepchild relationship conferred no rights 
and imposed no obligations.* In some 
states this rule has been statutorily amend-
ed to require stepparents to provide for 
their ste|>children so long as the relation-
ship continues.4 The Colorado Supreme 
Court in In re Estate of latino* went so far 
as to conclude that the word "stepchild" in 
an inheritance tax statute included the for-
mer ste|)children of a marriage that ended 
in divorce prior to the stepparent's death. 
15,6] Utah has no statutory provision 
obligating stepparent support, however; 
and if nothing more existed in the relation-
ship between the appellant and respon-
dent's child, the apjiellant would not have 
standing to assert his claims. However, it 
appears that the ap|)ellant may have as-
sumed the status of one in loco parentis to 
the child which would put him in a differ-
ent position. The term "in loco parentis" 
means in the place of a parent, and a "|>er-
son in loco parentis" is one who has as-
sumed the status and obligations of a par-
ent without formal adoption.* Whether or 
not one assumes this status depends on 
whether that person intends to assume that 
obligation.7 
[7] "Where one stands in loco parentis 
to another, the rights and liabilities arising 
out of that relation are, as the words imply, 
exactly the same as between^ parent and 
child."8 The Washington Supreme Court 
in l/i re Hudson,9 discussed the rights of 
parental custody and control and classified 
6. Workman v Workman. 498 P.2d 1384 (Okl. 
1972); Sturrup v. Mahan. 261 Ind. 463, 305 
N.E.2d 877 (1974). 
7. Fevig v. Fevig. 90 N.M. 51, 559 P.2d 839 
(1977). See also 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent & Child, 
§ 88. 
8. Sparks v. Hinckley. 78 Utah 502, 5 P 2d 570 
(1931). see also In re Tanner, Utah. 549 P.2d 
703 (1976). 
9. 13 Wash 2d 673. 126 P.2d 765 (1942). 
5. 542 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1975). 
(HUBBLE v. (JRIBBLE 
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parental rights and those of |>ersons in loco 
parentis together as having apparent equiv-
alent status: 
Parents or those standing in 
loco parentis to minor children primarily 
have the constitutional right to the custo-
dy and control of such minor children and 
may give to those children such attention 
and training as in the judgment of such 
parents or guardians may seem best for 
the welfare of the child or children and 
for the good of society.'• [Emphasis add-
ed.l 
In the instant case, the 
"•Pi-
claims to have lived with his stepson since 
the child was two months old, treated him 
"as his own son," and feels concerned al>out 
his future. Ff these claims are true and if 
they indicate his desire to stand in the place 
of a parent, then appellant's relationship 
may entitle him to the same rights accorded 
to natural parents. Implicit in the due 
process clause of our state Constitution " is 
that persons IK? afforded a hearing to deter-
mine their rights under the law. If we are 
to find that the status of loco parentis 
confers the same rights U|Kin a stepparent 
as those enjoyed by a natural parent, then a 
fortiori, the rights of the stepparent cannot 
lie terminated without an opportunity to IK? 
heard on the matter. 
19] The loco parentis status has lieen 
terminated, however, by divorce,12 although 
termination by divorce has l»een determined 
only in the context of the |>erson in loco 
10. Id.. 126 P2d at 775. 
11. Utah Constitution. Art. I. SPC. 7. 
12. Franklin v. Franklin. 75 Ariz 151. 253 P 2d 
337 (1953). 
13. Taylor v. Taylor. 58 Wash 2d 510. 364 P.2d 
444 (1961); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 247 S.C. 332. 
147 S.E.2d 269 (1966). 
14. See the discussion re stepparents as stand-
ing in loco parentis in 59 Am Jur 2d, Parent and 
Child. Sec. 91. 
15. Walton v Coffman. 110 Utah I. 169 P.2d 97 
(1946); Baldwin v. Nielson. 110 Utah 172. 170 
P.2d 179(1946). 
parentis making the choice to terminate the 
status; and not, as here, in the context of 
the one in loco parentis wishing to continue 
the status against the wishes of the natural 
parent. The common law concerning termi-
nation of the loco parentis status is that 
only the surrogate parent or the child is 
able to terminate the status l3 at will, ami 
the rights, duties, and obligations continue 
as long as they choose to continue the rela-
tionship.14 
(10,111 This is an unusual case. Re-
spondent even admits that the appellant 
loves the chiid. There is a presumption 
that the l>est interest of a child is for it to 
l>e reared by its natural parent, although 
this presumption is one of fact and not of 
law and may be overcome by sufficient 
evidence; l5 and, as stated previously, the 
welfare of the child is controlling. Impor-
tant also is that the appellant does not seek 
custody; he wishes only to exercise visita-
tion privileges. Because Sec. 30 3 5 con-
ceivably allows visitation where custodial 
rights would not exist,1* this Court feels 
that there is greater flexibility in determin-
ing visitation than there is in determining 
custody. 
A case in point is that of S/x'/As v. 
Sjtells,l7 a Pennsylvania decision concerning 
the right of a stepfather to seek visitation 
rights with his ex-wife's children. The 
court there said: 
It is our l>elief that a stepfa-
ther may not be denied the right to visit 
16. For example, two natural parents divorce, 
with custody of their child granted to the moth-
er and visitation rights granted to the father. 
The mother then dies. Custody would go to 
the father absent evidence of his unfitness, 
incapacity, etc. as against the child's maternal 
grandparents Fven though the maternal 
grandparents would not have a custodial right 
as against the father, they would have visita-
tion rights which they previously did not have, 
assuming the court found it in the child's best 
interest to give visitation rights to the grand-
parents. 
17. 250 Pa.Super. 168. 378 A.2d 879 (1977). 
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his stt|>children merely because of his 
lack of a blood relationship to them 
( learly, a stepfather and his young step-
ihildn n who live in a family environment 
may dew lop deep and lasting mutual 
bonds of affection Courts must ac 
knowltdgc the faet that a stepfathir (or 
stepmother) may be the only parent that 
tin child has truly known and loved dur-
ing its minority A stepparent may be as 
devoted and eoncerned al>out the welfare 
of a supthiM as a natural parent would 
be Rtji < tion of \ isitation prmhges can 
not /*> grounded in the mere status as a 
stepparent I Emphasis added ) 
Case law is ckar that 'the guiding star 
for the court in coming to a conclusion (in 
a child custody case) is the welfare of the 
child To this the rights of parents and 
all other considerations are subordinate' 
Thus it is clear that visitation 
rights of a parent not in custody must l>e 
ciri fully guard! d Aecording-
ly, whin a sttppirent is 4in loeo parentis 
with his stepehildren, eourts must jeal 
ouslv guard his rights to visitation 
The Pennsylvania court remanded the case 
to tlu trial court in ordi r to determine 
whether or not the stepfather actually 
stood in loco parentis to his stepchildren, 
and if so to permit the stepfather to dem-
onstrate that his interest in visitation 
should be prott < ted 
Wi Mieve this is a sound view and one 
which we should adopt 
| I 2 | In view of the foregoing, it ap|>ears 
that the appellant may !>e in loeo parentis 
to rcsponde nt s child and that only he or the 
child and not the respondent, can terminate 
th i t relationship If appellant is in loco 
parentis he should IK considered a parent 
for purposes of Sec 30 3 5 It is consist-
ent with both the statutory intent and with 
the requirements of due process that he, 
like a natural pirent, grandparent, or any 
other relative, have a hearing to determine 
his rights to visitation 
The appellant made no offer to pay child 
supjmrt, and certainly he has no legal duty 
to do so He did offer to set up a trust 
fund on behalf of the child and to make 
monthly contributions to that fund It may 
be that if a stepfather standing in the sta-
tus of loco parentis is given the opj>ortunity 
to seek visitation rights as a right afforded 
a natural parent, that he should not be 
|>ermitted to eseape the duties and obliga-
tions of the loco parentis status as long as 
that relationship remains intact A hearing 
eould determine not only the right to visita-
tion, but could determine whether that 
right should l>e conditioned on a require-
ment that the stepfather accept an obliga-
tion to assist in the support of the child 
This is not only consistent with the concept 
of loco parentis but may well be necessary 
to the child's welfare Loco parentis does 
not envision that a stepparent be permitted 
to enjoy the rights of a natural parent 
without also accepting the responsibilities 
that are ineurred 
The case is reversed and remanded to the 
trial court for a hearing to determine 
whether the appellant stands in loco paren-
tis to his stepchild and if so, whether it is in 
the child s best interest to grant the appel-
lant a right of visitation, and, further, 
whether that right should l>e conditioned by 
appellant's agreement to pay a pro|>er share 
for child support No costs are awarded 
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, 
and HALL, J J , concur 
WILKINS 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
STATE v PIERREN Utah 6 9 
Cite »s 583 P 2d 69 
I Obscenity «&=»2 
Statute proscribing distribution of i>or-
nographic material is constitutional U C 
A 1953, 76 10 1204 
Kenneth E PIERREN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v 
EAGLE BOOK, IN( and Arthur Adalid, 
Defendants and Appellants 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v 
EAGLE ROOK, INC and Luana Hall 
Haig, Defendants and Appellants 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
EAGLE BOOK, INC and Willie Williams, 
Defendants and Appellants 
Nos 14912, 15108, lr>l09 and 15114 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Jul> 2b, 1978 
Defendants wire eonvuted in the 
Seeond Distnet Court, Weber Count), John 
P Wahlquist, J , of distribution of porno-
graphie mat!rial, and they appealed The 
Supreme Court, Hall, J , held that (1) stat-
ute prosenbing distribution of pornographic 
material is constitutional, (2) defendants 
were not deprived of effeetive assistance of 
counsel, (3) courts did not err in fading to 
define geographieal limitation of "commu-
nity standard" (4) court did not abuse its 
diseretion in refusing to grant ehange of 
venue, ami (5) persons aged 18 to 20 are not 
An identifiable group the exclusion of whieh 
renders jury list nonrepresentative of com-
munity ami violati\e of Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments 
Affirmed 
Wilkms, J , eoncurred and dissented 
and filed statement in which Maughan, J , 
concurred 
2 Obscenity «=»5 
In order for material to be found |>or-
nographic it must be found to be appealing 
to prurient interest, depicting sexual con-
duct in a patently offensive way and lack-
ing in serious literary, artistic, political, or 
seientific value U C A 1953, 76 10 1204 
3 Criminal Law <s=*64l 13(1) 
Counsel has substantia! latitude in se-
lecting trial strategy 
4 Criminal I*w «=>641 13(1) 
To show inadequate or ineffective 
counsel, record must establish that counsel 
was ignorant of facts or law, resulting in 
withdrawal of crucial defense, reducing tri-
al to a farce and sham 
5 Criminal U w «=»641 13(2) 
In prosecution for distribution of |>or 
nographie material, closing remarks made 
by defense eounsel admitting that alleged 
tomographic material depicted sexual con-
duct in patently offensive wav and was 
lacking m serious literar\, artistic, pohtieal 
and scientific value and basing defense on 
argument that material was not appealing 
to thej prurient interest did not deprive tie 
fendants of effective assistance of counsel 
U C A 1953, 7(> 10 1204 
6 Obscenity «*=»18 
For purposes of prosecution for distri-
bution or |>ornographic material, jury is ex 
elusive judge of what contcm|M>rary com-
munity standards of intended anil probable 
recipient group is, and in determining con-
temporary community standard of said 
group jurv, may consider divergent ages 
educated and uneducated, religious and 
irreligious men and women, and anv other 
charaetensties which go to make up an av-
erage j>erson of intended and probable re-
cipient group U C A 1953 76 10 1204 
TabR 
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%1 130 A 2d 6 (1957) cited m the main 
opinion 
In the instant case however valuation at 
fair nnrket value is mandated by article 
XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitu 
tion and its requirements cannot be re 
laxed in an effort to obtain uniformity and 
equality also mandated by section 3 In 
the context of this case, the principle can 
have no application 
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dis 
senting) 
I join the ( ourt in declaring the roll back 
provisions of U C A , 1953, § 59-5-109 
(Supp 1981) unconstitutional on their face 
However, for the same reasons I also view 
as unconstitutional on their face the provi 
sions of U C A , 1953, § 59-5-4 5 (Supp 
1981) which reduce the value of taxable 
real property assessed by the counties by 
209? 
Article XIII sections 2 and 3 of the 
Constitution of Utah in unequivocal Ian 
guage require that all non exempt tangible 
property both real and personal be as 
sessed at a ' uniform and equal rate " and 
that it be assessed and taxed according to 
its \alue in money " 
1 his Court has long heretofore interpret 
ed the term according to its value in mon 
ev as the full cash value of the property ' 
Also the term 'full cash value ' has been 
determined to be synonymous with the 
terms actual cash value, ' mirket value " 
' reasonable fair cash value and value in 
money 2 
It is thus to be seen that § 59-5-4 5 is 
unconstitutional on its face in that it directs 
the county assessor to assess and tax coun 
ty assessed property at 80% of its "reason 
able fair cash value ' rather than at 100% 
of its value This is precisely the sort of 
inequality and lack of uniformity that vio 
lates the express provisions of article XIII 
sections 2 and 3 supra 
I State i Thomas 16 Ulah 86 SOP 61S (1897) 
The defendants recite the legislative his 
tory of the subject statute, which reflects 
that a disparity was found to exist in the 
valuation of county assessed and state as 
sessed property The disparity was appar 
ently octasioned by the different valuation 
methods employed by the state and the 
counties The counties generally utilized a 
comparable sales method that readily re 
fleeted the effect of inflation upon market 
value However, the state continued to 
inflexibly follow its usual cost, income, 
stock and debt approaches to market value 
and failed to in any way compensate for 
the effects of inflation This caused con 
siderable consternation on the part of coun 
ty assessors who were compelled to assess 
the property of their constituents at sharp-
ly increasing values while state assess 
ments lagged far behind It was to relieve 
this iniquity in assessment that the Legis 
lature enacted the subject statutes How 
ever well intentioned the legislative enact 
ments were, they nevertheless do not meet 
constitutional muster 
Article XIII, section 3, supra, confers 
upon the Legislature the obligation and 
duty to * provide by law a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxation" and 
to prescribe by law such regulations as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of 
such property ' However, that authority 
must be read in light of the overriding 
concept espoused by the constitution i e , 
that all property be assessed at a "uniform 
and equal rate," and that it be taxed "ac 
cording to its value in money " The case 
of United States Smelting, Refining & 
Mmt?ig Co v Haunes,3 relied upon by the 
defendants does not hold to the contrary 
Rather, it is supportive of this basic propo 
sition This is to be seen in that no matter 
which method or yardstick the legislature 
chooses to determine the valuation of prop 
erty in money the end result that must be 
achieved is just that, i e , "according to its 
value in money " 
3 111 Utah 172 176 P2d 622 (1947) 
2 kenttecott Copper Corp \ Salt Lake Count), 
122 Ulah 431 250 P 2d 938 (1952) 
WELLS v. CHILDREN 
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Viewed in light of what has just been 
said, the subject legislation causes state as 
sessed and county assessed property to be 
assessed at unequal rates and at \alues 
other than actual market talue Further 
more, the legislation tends to compound 
rather than alleviate the problem of dispari 
ty in assessed valuation This it does by 
leaving in place and thereby sanctioning 
the erroneous assessment practices of the 
state that fail to assess property according 
to its actual value Rather than legislating 
so as to insure that the assessment prac 
tices of the state be revamped so as to 
bring them in conformity with constitution 
al mandate the legislation directs the coun 
ty assessor to also violate the constitution 
by assessing property at a rate 20% less 
than actual value 
I would reverse the decision of the trial 
court in its entirety 
Gladys Fay WELLS, Guardian ad litem 
for Dennis Edgar Wells, J r . a minor 
over the age of 14 years, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v 
CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OF UTAH 
Successor in Custody of K B , Mother 
of Infant H , and K I I , Defendants and 
Appellants, 
v 
John DOE and Mary Doe and Robert D 
Maack, Esq , Guardian ad litem for In-
fant B , Intervenors and Appellants 
No 18537 
Supreme Court of Utah 
March Z3, 1984 
Unwed minor father brought action 
through guardian ad litem seeking custody 
of newborn child that had been released to 
state adoption agency and subsequently to 
adoptive parents, after father failed to 
make timely filing of his acknowledgment 
of paternity as required by statute The 
Seventh District Court, Grand County 
S AID SOC OF UTAH Utah 1 9 9 
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Boyd Bunnell J , granted custody of child 
to father on grounds that statute could not 
constitutionally be applied to him and 
mother, agency and adoptive parents ap-
pealed The Supreme Court, Oaks J held 
that (1) statute specifying procedure for 
terminating parental rights of unwed fa 
ther is constitutional under due process 
clause of United States Constitution, (2) 
such procedure is consistent with due pro 
cess requirements of Utah Constitution, 
and (3) agency correctly applied statute on 
facts of case and did not violate father s 
federal or state due process rights 
Judgment reversed, case remanded 
with directions 
1 Children Out-of-Wedlock <S»20 
Parent and Child *=»2< 1) 
The relationship between parent and 
child is protected by Federal and State Con 
stitutions, these protections include the fa 
thcr of an illegitimate child 
2 Infants «=»I55. Ir>6, 157 
Constitutionally protected parental 
rights can be lost the) tan be surrendeml 
pursuant to statute they c tn be lost 
through abandonment of the child by mac 
tion or course of (onduct for which partnt 
is personally responsible, such rights can 
also be tcrmin ited through pirental unfit 
ness or substantnl neglect UCA19 r>i 
78-10-4(1 2) 78-30-5 
3 Adoption <s=ll 
To serve its purpose for welfare of 
child determination t int newborn ehild ( in 
hi adopt* d must In final as we 11 as imnudi 
ate 
1 Adoption <s=*7 2H) 
The state s strong interest in immedi 
ate secure adoptions for eligible newborns 
provides a sufficient justification for signif 
icant variations m parental rights of unwed 
fathers who in contrast to mothers are 
not automatically identified by virtue of 
their role in the process of birth 
r> ( onstitutionnl I aw c=>242 1(l) 
Infants <3=»1J2 
Statute specifying procedure for tenni 
nating parental rights of unwed father 
requiring father to file acknowledgment of 
patcrmt\ prior to elate child is released to 
2 0 0 Utah 681 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
state adoption agency does not violate 
equal protection clause as there is rational 
basis for distinguishing between unwed 
mothers and fathers and between fathers 
who file and fathers who do not, classifica 
tions are reasonably calculated to serve 
proper governmental objective II C A 
1953, 78-30-4(3), U S C A Const Amend 
M 
6 Constitutional Law <3=>I7 
In sustaining constitutionality of a 
statute under due process clause, the Su 
preme Court must consider both possibility 
that statute is invalid on its face and possi 
bility that statute is invalid as applied 
U S C A Const Amends 5, 14, Const Art 
1 § 7 
7. Constitutional Law «=>2«»i 6 
The test of procedural due process con 
cerning validity of rules regarding notice 
and opportunity to be heard is fairness 
U S C A Const Amends 5, 14, Const Art 
1. § 7 
8 Constitutional Law <s=>252 5 
Substantive due process concerns con 
tent of rules specifying when a right can be 
lost or impaired, this question can arise in 
context of a hearing where procedural for 
mahties were observed U S C A Const 
Amends 5, 14, Const Art 1, § 7 
9 Constitutional Law e=>252 5 
A due process question can arise when 
a statute provides that a particular right is 
automatically lost or impaired in specific 
circumstance, without any notice or hear 
ing, except insofar as may be involved in 
an after the fact declaration that circum 
stances have occurred and right has been 
lost or impaired U S C A Const Amends 
5, 14, Const Art 1, § 7 
10 Constitutional Law «=»274('5) 
A ternrnation of parental rights must 
be tested against a more stringent stan 
dard than that used to determine the vahdi 
ty of economic regulation under substan 
tive due process U S C A Const Amends 
5, 14, Const Art 1, § 7 
11 Children Out of-Wedlock «=»20 
Constitutional Law «=»274(5) 
Statute specifying procedure for termi 
nating parental rights of unwed father, 
requiring father to file acknowledgement 
of paternity prior to date child is released 
to state adoption agency, was not arbitrary 
under rule of Lehr v Robertson, thus, 
statute was constitutional under due pro 
cess clause of United States Constitution 
U S C A Const Amends 5, 14 
12 Constitutional Law <3=>274<5) 
To avoid unwarranted intrusion on fun-
damental rights of parenthood, state's due 
process clause requires higher level of 
scrutiny than is exercised to determine va-
lidity of economic regulation, the propo-
nent of legislation infringing parental 
rights must show a compelling state inter-
est in the result to be achieved and that the 
means adopted are narrowly tailored to 
achieve basic statutory purpose U l A 
1953, 78-30-4(3), Const Art 1, § 7 
13 Constitutional Law «=>271(5) 
In determining validity under State 
Constitution, pursuant to substantive due 
process analysis, of statute providing that 
an unwed male parent could lose his paren 
tal rights in a newborn infant for failing to 
file timely notice of his claim to paternity, 
the Supreme Court measured the statutory 
specification for termination against tests 
of compelling state interest and narrowly 
tailored means U C A 1953, 78-30-4(3), 
Const Art 1, § 7 
14. Constitutional Law «=274(5) 
Due process does not require that the 
father of an illegitimate child be identified 
and personally notified before his parental 
right can be terminated, as such a require 
ment would frustrate compelling state in 
terest in speedy determination of those per 
sons who will assume a parental role over 
newborn illegitimate children and would 
threaten privacy interests of unwed moth 
ers U C A 1953, 78-30-4(3), Const Art 1, 
§ 7 
15 Children Out-of-Wedlock «=>20 
Constitutional Law «=>274(5) 
In light of compelling hiate interest in 
summary determination prescribed in stat 
ute and of fact that statutory terms were 
narrowly tailored to achieve basic statutory 
purpose, statutory provisions for terminat 
ing parental right of unwed father of new 
WELLS v CHILDREN'S AID SOC OF UTAH Utah 2 0 1 
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born infant requiring father to file ac six days earlier, she had traveled from 
knowledgement of paternity prior to date Moab to Ogden, where the child was born 
child is released to state adoption agency, September 23, 1981 She had previously 
were facially valid under due process arranged with appellant Children's Aid So-
clause of State Constitution U C A 1953, ciety, a licensed agency, to receive the child 
78-30-4(3), Const Art 1, § 7 for adoption immediately after its birth 
16 Constitutional Law «=*271<5) On September 24, K B signed the con 
Where birth of child occurred in same sent and release that placed the child in the 
state as unwed father's residence, neither custody of Children's Aid On September 
child's mother nor state adoption agency 23, 24, 25, and 28, representatives of Chil 
was involved in any effort to prevent him dren's Aid contacted the office of the regis 
from learning of birth or from asserting trar of Vital Statistics in the Department of 
his parental rights, neither mother nor Health by telephone to determine whether 
agency knew at time child was relinquished an acknowledgment of paternity form had 
that father was seeking to or intending to been filed regarding the child They were 
assert his parental rights, all father needed informed each time that no form had been 
to do to assert his rights was to file claim received On September 25 Children's Aid 
of paternity prior to date mother rehn placed the child Infant B , in the home of 
quished child, and father had sufficient op mtervenors John and Mary Doe for pur 
portunity to do so and had advice of coun poses of adoption On September 28, the 
sel on filing required form, agency, in ap Department of Health issued its official 
plying statute allowing such procedures, certificate of search verifying that no ac 
did not violate father's federal or state due knowledgment of paternity had been filed 
process rights U C A 1953, 78-30-4(3), This certificate assured both Children's Aid 
Const Art 1, § 7, U S C A Const Amends and the adoptive parents that the child 
5, 14 could be adopted without notice to the nat 
ural father ' 
Jane A Marquardt, Salt kike City, for 
K B & Children's Aid 
Tim W Healy, Ogden, for John & Mary 
Doe 
Robert D Maack, pro se 
Paul Gotay, Midvale, for plaintiffs and 
respondents 
OAKS, Justice 
This appeal involves the constitutionality 
of U C A , 1953, § 78-30-4(3), which ternu 
nates the parental rights of the father of 
an illegitimate child if he fails to give the 
required timely notice of his claim of pater 
nity The district court concluded that the 
notice requirement could not constitutional 
ly be applied to this father because he was 
denied a reasonable opportunity to comply 
We reverse 
K B , a 16 year old unmarried girl resid 
ing in Moab, gave birth to a child About 
t The certificate of search is requirtd before a 
court can grant a final decree of adoption it is 
On September 30, the Department of 
Health notified the Children s Aid Society 
that they had received an acknowledgment 
of paternity form signed by Dennis E 
Wells, J r , the plaintiff in this case The 
form arrived by mail at the Department's 
office in Salt Lake City on September 30 in 
an envelope post marked Moab, Utah, Sep 
tember 23 Children's Aid took no action 
to alter the child's placement for adoption 
Dennis filed this action, through his 
guardian ad litem, on October fi, 1981, seek 
ing custody of the child The complaint 
alleged that Children's Aid and K B had 
fraudulently concealed the facts surround 
ing the infant's birth to deprive him of his 
parental rights 
The evidence at trial showed that Dennis 
and K B , who were both sophomores in 
high school, had sexual relations in the fall 
of 1980, the last occurring on December 23, 
not a prerequisite to the phtement of a child in 
an adoptive home § 78 30-4(3)(d) 
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1980 In January of 1981, K B informed 
Dennis that she thought she was pregnant 
Thereafter he refused to speak to her and 
they ceased dating K B did not begin 
dating anyone else until approximately one 
month later K B ' s pregnancy was not 
medically confirmed until August At that 
time K B ' s boyfriend informed Dennis of 
the pregnancy, and Dennis discussed it 
with his parents He never discussed the 
pregnancy or had any other communica 
tions with K B 
Gladys Fay Wells, Dennis s mother, 
learned about the pregnancy on September 
2 She immediately contacted the physi 
cian who had confirmed the pregnancy and 
he advised her that the probable date of 
birth was September 22 or 21 Mrs Wells 
was very concerned about the child On 
September 4 she contacted K B and of 
fered financial support and help with the 
child s upbringing When K B expressed a 
desire to put the child up for adoption, Mrs 
Wells attempted to dissuade her In mid 
September, Mrs Wells also contacted an 
attorney in Moab to determine what steps 
were required to obtain the child if Dennis 
decided to assert his parental rightsA She 
and Dennis were informed about the need 
for filing an acknowledgment of paternity 
certificate and were instructed to obtain 
forms from the Department of Social Ser 
vices On September 15 Mrs Wells met 
with Walter Miller, a social worker with 
that department and they discussed the 
need for filing the certificate Miller ob 
tamed the forms and gave them to Mrs 
Wells on September 17 On September 14, 
Mrs Wells and Dennis had met in Moab 
with ( olleen Burnham of C hildren s Aid 
Socittv Mrs Wills expressed a desire to 
raise the child if K B decided to relinquish 
it but Dennis who remained mostly silent 
at this meeting was equivocal never indi 
eating positively whether or not he desired 
to assert his paternal rights 
On September 17 Mrs Wells learned 
that K B had gone to Ogden to have the 
baby The baby was born on September 
23 and Mrs Wells and Dennis learned of 
the birth that same day Although Dennis 
had signed the form on September 18, he 
did not mail it until September 23, the day 
before K B relinquished custody to Chil 
dren's Aid Dennis claimed that he waited 
to ensure that the baby was his, since if the 
baby had been born any later he believed 
that someone else would have been the 
father 
After a nonjury trial, the court granted 
custody of the child to Dennis Although 
Dennis did not make a timely filing of his 
acknowledgment of paternity as required 
by § 78-30-4(3)(b), the court held that this 
statute could not constitutionally be applied 
to him because he was "denied a reason 
able opportunity to file his acknowledg 
ment of paternity prior to placement of the 
child by Children's Aid Society " However, 
judgment for Dennis was stayed pending 
appeal, and the infant remained with the 
adoptive parents 
I THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
OF THE FATHER 
[t | The relationship between parent and 
child is protected by the federal and state 
constitutions In ie JP, Utah, 648 P 2d 
1364 (1982) These protections include the 
father of an illegitimate child Id at 1374-
75, Stanley v Illinois, 405 U S 645, 92 
S Ct 1208, 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972) Miller v 
Miller, 504 F 2d 1067 (9th Cir 1974) Inso-
far as it suggests otherwise, Thomas v 
Children s Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 
2d 235, 239, 364 P 2d 1029, 1031-32 (1961), 
has now been overruled Also see State tn 
Interest of M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 107, 476 
P2d 1013, 1016-17 (1970) (first recognition 
of a "statutory parent child relationship m 
unwed father who acknowledges paterili 
ty) 
(2J Although parental rights have their 
origin in biological relationships, those rela 
tionships do not guarantee the permanency 
of parental rights Constitutionally pro-
tected parental rights can be lost They 
can be surrendered pursuant to statute 
U C A , 1953, § 78-30-4(1), (2) They can 
be lost through abandonment of the child 
by "inaction or a course of conduct for 
which the parent is personally responsible " 
WELLS v CHILDREN 
CHe as M I P 2d 
In re J Children Utah, 664 P2d 1158, 
1159 (1983), § 78-30-5 Parental rights 
can also be terminated through parental 
unfitness or substantial neglect Eg, In 
re Castillo, Utah, 632 P 2d 855 (1981) 
II THE STATE'S INTEREST 
There are special problems in defining 
parental rights over newborns who are ille 
gitimate The identity of the father may 
be unknown The mother ma> desire to 
give the child up for adoption The state 
has a strong interest in speedily identifying 
those persons who will assume the parental 
role over such children, not just to assure 
immediate and continued physical care but 
also to facilitate early and uninterrupted 
bonding of a child to its parents The state 
must therefore have legal means to ascer 
tain within a very short time of birth 
whether the biological parents (or either of 
them) are going to assert their constitution 
al rights and fulfill their corresponding re 
sponsibilities or whether adoptive parents 
must be substituted 
131 To serve its purpose for the welfare 
of the child, a determination that a child 
can be adopted must be final as well as 
immediate Thus, in rejecting a mothers 
attempt to recover her child about eight 
months after she had given it up for adop 
tion, this Court declared 
It is and should be the policy of the law 
to so operate as to encourage the finding 
of suitable homes and parents for chil 
dren in that need It is obvious that 
persons who might be willing to accept a 
child for adoption will be more reluctant 
to do so if a consenting parent is permit 
ted to arbitrarily charge (change] her 
mind and revoke the consent, and thus 
desolate the plan of the adoptive parents 
and bring to naught all of their time, 
effort, expense and emotional involve 
ment A moment's reflection will 
reveal that to the degree that such com 
mitments are given respect and solidan 
ty, so they can be relied upon, persons 
desiring children will be willing to accept 
and give them homes Conversely, to 
the degree that such commitments can 
S All) SOC OF UTAH Utah 2 0 3 
199 (Uuh 1984) 
easily be withdrawn and the adoptive 
plan thus destroyed, such persons will 
tend to be discouraged from doing so 
In re Adoption of F—, 26 Utah 2d 255, 
262 488 P 2d 130 134 (1971) Acroid Mat 
ter ofS, Utah, 572 P 2d 1370 (1977) These 
considerations obviously set limits to the 
rights of fathers as well as mothers 
141 The state s strong interest in imme 
diate and secure adoptions for eligible new 
bonis provides a sufficient justification for 
significant variations in the parental rights 
of unwed fathers, who, in contrast to moth 
ers, are not automatically identified by vir 
tue of their role in the process of birth 
Relying on leading decisions in the United 
States Supreme Court, we have said that 
fathers who have "fulfilled a parental role 
over a considerable period of time are enti 
tied to a high degree of protection,' where 
as unwed fathers "whose relationships to 
their children are merely biological or very 
attc nuated" are entitled to a lesser degree 
of protection In re J P 648 P 2d at 1175 
1 he United Stites Supreme Court applied 
a rationale of variable parental rights in 
Leln i Robertson — U S l O J S C t 
2985, 2991, 77 I Ed 2d 614 (198 J) where it 
referred to the fact that "the rights of the 
parents are a counterpart of the responsi 
bihties they ha\e assumed" I*Uer in its 
opinion the Court elaborated this idea and 
applied it to an unwed father who had no 
custodial, personal or financial relationship 
with the infant involved in that case 
When an unwed father demonstrates a 
full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to par 
ticipate in the rearing of his child," his 
interest in personal contact with his child 
acquires substantial protection under the 
due process clause Rut the mete 
existence of a biological link does not 
merit cqunalent constitutional protec 
tion 
Id 103 SCt at 2993 (Emphasis added, 
citation omitted ) While Lihr involved a 
two year old rather than a i wborn it is 
the closest United States Supreme Court 
case on its facts and its reasoning is per 
suasive on the issue before us 
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III. THE STATUTE 
In § 78-30-4(3), our Legislature has un-
dertaken to resolve the competing interests 
of the newborn illegitimate child and the 
man who claims to be its father. This 
statute provides a means (1) of promptly 
determining whether there is a man who 
will acknowledge paternity and assume the 
responsibilities of parenthood and, if not, 
(2) of speedily making the child available 
for adoption. Subsection (a) provides: 
A person who is the father or claims to 
be the father of an illegitimate child may 
^ claim rights pertaining to his paternity of 
the child by registering with the regis-
trar of vital statistics in the department 
of health, a notice of his claim of paterni-
ty of an illegitimate child and of his 
willingness and intent to support the 
child to the best of his ability. 
Subsection (b) provides that the notice 
"may be registered prior to the birth of the 
child but must be registered prior to the 
date the illegitimate child is relinquished 
or placed with an agency licensed to pro-
vide adoption services . . . . " (Emphasis 
added.) Subsection (c) then provides as 
follows: 
Any father of such child who fails to 
file and register his notice of claim to 
paternity and his agreement to support 
the child shall be barred from thereafter 
bringing or maintaining any action to 
establish his paternity of the child. 
Such failure shall further constitute an 
abandonment of said child and a waiver 
and surrender of any right to notice of or 
to a hearing in any judicial proceeding 
for the adoption of said child, and the 
consent of such father to the adoption 
of such child shall not be required. 
(Emphasis added.) 
On appeal from the district court's deci-
sion not to apply the foregoing statute in 
this case, the parties have joined issue on 
the constitutionality of § 78-30-4(3), on its 
face and as applied to the circumstances of 
this case. 
151 In Ellis v. Social Services Depart-
ment, Utah. 615 P.2d 1250 (1980), we sus-
tained § 78-30-4(3) against a claim that it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Im-
plicit in that decision was the holding that 
there are reasonable bases for the classifi-
cations in the statute (between unwed 
mothers and fathers and between fathers 
who file and fathers who do not) and that 
these classifications are reasonably calcu-
lated to serve a proper government objec-
tive. 
[6] The claim that this statute was fa-
cially invalid under the Due Process Clause 
of the federal or state constitutions was 
not resolved in Ellis, because the Court 
found that in any event the statute violated 
due process as applied to terminate the 
father's parental rights on the facts of that 
case. In this case, where we sustain the 
statute in its termination of the father's 
rights, we must face both possibilities of 
unconstitutionality under due process: in-
valid on its face and invalid as applied. 
IV. DUE PROCESS 
A. In General 
(7 | Most due process cases concern 
procedural requirements, notably notice 
and opportunity to be heard, which must be 
observed in order to have a valid proceed-
ing affecting life, liberty, or property. 
E.g., Nelson v. Jacobsen, Utah, 669 P.2d 
1207 (1983); State v. Casarez, Utah, 656 
P.2d 1005 (1982); Concerned Parents of 
Stepchildren v. Mitchell, Utah, 645 P.2d 
629, 636 (1982); Lindon City v. Engineers 
Construction Co., Utah, 636 P.2d 1070 
(1981). The general test for the validity of 
such rules, the test'of procedural due pro-
cess, is fairness. 
I8J Substantive due process concerns 
the content of the rules specifying when a 
right can be lost or impaired. This ques-
tion can arise in the context of a hearing 
where the procedural formalities were ob-
served. Thus, in In re J.P., supra, the 
statute was unconstitutional on its face 
because it provided that a judge could de-
prive parents of their parental rights "with-
out a showing of unfitness, abandonment, 
or substantial neglect " 648 P.2d at 
1375. That holding assumed that the 
WELLS v. CHILDREN 
ClleanMI P 2d 
judge's hearing met all the requirements of 
procedural due process, but concluded that 
the statute wa6 invalid in its substantive 
content. 
191 A due process question can also 
arise when a statute provides that a partic-
ular right is automatically lost or impaired 
in a specific circumstance (without any no-
tice or hearing, except insofar as may be 
involved in an after-the-fact declaration 
that the circumstances have occurred and 
the right has been lost or impaired).1 Sec-
tion 78-30-4(3). challenged in this case, is 
such a statute. Whether a due process 
challenge to this common type of legisla-
tion is procedural because the statute omits 
notice and hearing or substantive because 
it specifies a particular substantive rule is 
comparatively unimportant. 
The almost universal opinion that sub-
stantive due process was abused in invali-
dating economic regulations in the first 
third of this century has culminated in a 
rational basis test so tolerant that the sub-
stantive content of economic statutes rare-
ly violates due process. See generally 
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and 
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and 
Reburial, 1962 Sup.Ct.Rev. 34, 39; R. Lee, 
A Lawyer Looks at the Constitution, 164-
67 (1981). Our own decisions illustrate this 
conclusion. E.g., Committee of Consumer 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 
Utah, 638 P.2d 533, 536 (1981); Banberry 
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 
Utah, 631 P.2d 899 (1981); Redwood Gym 
v. Salt Lake County Commission, Utah, 
624 P.2d 1138, 1142-43 (1981); Baker v. 
Matheson, Utah, 607 P.2d 233, 244 (1979); 
Magleby v. State Department of Business 
Regulations, Utah, 564 P.2d 1109, 1110 
(1977). The presumption of constitutionali-
ty applied in these cases is further assur-
ance that economic regulations will rarely 
be upset as violative of substantive due 
process. 
2. For example, in Freeman v. Centervitle City, 
Uiah, 600 P.2d 1003 (1979). we rejected a prop-
erly owner's contention that our annexation 
statutes violated the due process clause in Art. 1, 
§ 7 of the Utah Constitution because they did 
S AID SOC. OF UTAH UUih 2 0 5 
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110| In contrast to the test used to deter-
mine the validity of the economic regula-
tions involved in the foregoing cases, a 
termination of parental rights must be test-
ed against a more stringent standard, as 
discussed below. See generally Develop-
ments in the Law—the Constitution and 
the Family, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1157, 1167 
(1980). 
B. United States Constitution 
In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 
S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the Su-
preme Court held that a statute terminat-
ing parental rights of ail unwed fathers 
without a hearing violated due process. 
Statutes like § 78-30-4(3) are responses to 
that decision, attempting to specify proce-
dures by which the parental rights of 
unwed fathers can be terminated and the 
rights of adoptive parents can he assured 
in a manner consistent with due process. 
In Lchr v. Robertson, — U.S. , 103 
S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court had its most 
recent opportunity to review such a stat-
ute. Under New York law, as the trial 
court had held, the rights of natural par-
ents are terminated by a final decree of 
adoption. In re Adoption of Martz, 102 
Misc.2d 102, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979), affd 
sub nom. Lehr v. Robertson, supra. On 
appeal, the unwed father attacked a decree 
granting adoption of his two-year-old 
daughter. The father argued that he had 
received no notice of the adoption proceed-
ing. The statute provided for notice to an 
unwed father, but only if he had filed a 
notice of intent to claim paternity with the 
putative father registry of the Department 
of Social Services, which this appellant had 
not done. Rejecting appellant's claim that 
the statute was a procedurally inadequate 
means to terminate parental rights of this 
character, the Supreme Court held the stat-
ute constitutional. 
not require that affected property owners be 
given notice of the proceedings and an opportu-
nity to elect whether their property should be 
made subject to taxation and other burdens in 
the annexing city. 
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The New York legislature concluded that 
a more open-ended notice requirement 
•would merely complicate the adoption 
process, threaten the privacy interests of 
unwed mothers, create the risk of unnec-
essary controversy, and impair the de-
sired finality of adoption decrees. Re-
gardless of whether we would have done 
likewise if we were legislators instead of 
judges, we surety cannof characterize 
the state's conclusion as arbitrary. 
Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2995 (emphasis added). 
(11) Measuring § 78-30-^(3) against 
the precedent and standard established in 
Lehr v. Robertson, we hold that the proce-
dure it specifies for terminating the paren-
tal rights of an unwed father is not "arbi-
trary" and is therefore constitutional under 
the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
C. Utah Constitution 
We likewise hold that § 78-30-4(3) is 
consistent with the due process require-
ments of Art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
(12) In this instance we apply a more 
stringent standard of review than "arbi-
trariness" or the rational basis test applica-
ble to economic regulation challenged as 
violative of due process. In re J.P., supra, 
identified parental rights as "fundamental" 
for purposes of due process. 648 P.2d at 
1372-74. In the context of alleged vague-
ness in statutory language, we have held 
that "[wjhen state action impinges on fun-
damental rights, due process requires stan-
dards which clearly define the scope of 
permissible conduct so as to avoid unwar-
ranted intrusion on those rights." In re 
Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1981). 
Similarly, "to avoid unwarranted intrusion" 
on the fundamental rights of parenthood 
we hold that Utah's Due Process Clause 
requires a higher level of scrutiny than is 
exercised to determine the validity of eco-
nomic regulation. By analogy to the tests 
employed in judging the validity of alleged 
infringements on other fundamental rights, 
we hold that the proponent of legislation 
infringing parental rights must show (1) a 
compelling state interest in the result to be 
achieved and (2) that the means adopted 
are "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic 
statutory purpose." Id. at 1090. 
In re J.P., supra, established a general 
rule against the termination of parental 
rights, except for designated causes. We 
explained the basis for exceptions to this 
fundamental right as follows: 
The principle that "the welfare of the 
child is the paramount consideration" 
means that parental rights, though inher-
ent and retained, are not absolute; that 
the state, as parens patriae, has the 
authority and obligation to assume a pa-
rental role after the natural parent has 
been shown to be unfit or dysfunctional; 
and that parental prerogatives cannot, at 
that extreme point, frustrate the state in 
discharging its duty. 
648 P.2d at 1377. 
1131 The question in this case is wheth-
er the constitutional right we recognized in 
In re J.P. permits the exception inherent in 
§ 78-30-4(3)'s provision that an unwed 
male parent will lose his parental rights in 
a newborn infant for failing to file a timely 
notice of his claim to paternity. We treat 
/ that question in light of our earlier holding 
| that an unwed father's right to his relation-
j ship with his newborn is a provisional right 
I by comparison with the vested right of a 
\ parent who has fulfilled a parental role 
! over a considerable period of time. In re 
, J.P., 648 P.2d at 1374-75. We measure the 
I statutory specifications for the termination 
of that provisional right against the tests 
of compelling state interest and narrowly 
tailored means. 
For the reasons already reviewed in Part 
II, the state has a compelling interest in 
speedily identifying those persons who will 
assume a parental role over newborn ille-
gitimate children. Speedy identification is 
important to immediate and continued 
physical care and it is essential to early and 
uninterrupted bonding between child and 
parents. If infants are to be spared the 
injury and pain of being torn from parents 
with whom they have begun the process of 
WELLS v. CHILDREN 
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bonding and if prospective parents are to 
rely on the process in making themselves 
available for adoptions, such determina-
tions must also be final and irrevocable. 
I l l ) Section 78-3(M(3) is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the purposes identified 
above. No infringement of the unwed fa-
ther's rights not essential to the statute's 
purposes has been identified. Due process 
does not require that the father of an ille-
gitimate child be identified and personally 
notified before his parental right can be 
terminated. In the common cases of 
unwed fathers without desires to assume 
the responsibilities and to claim the rights 
of parenthood, such a requirement would 
frustrate the compelling state interest in 
the speedy determination described above. 
It would also threaten the privacy interests 
of unwed mothers and frustrate the other 
interests the United States Supreme Court 
cited in Lehr v. Robertson, supra, quoted 
in Part IVK. 
|l.ri| In view of the compiling state in-
terest in the summary determination pre-
scribed in the statute and of the fact that 
the statutory terms are narrowly tailored 
to achieve the basic statutory purpose, we 
hold that 5 78-30-4(3)'s provisions for ter-
minating the parental right of the unwed 
father of a newborn infant are facially 
valid under the Due Process Clause in Art. 
1, s 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
D. Constitutionality as Applied 
Finally, we inquire whether the statute 
was constitutionally applied in the circum-
stances of this case. 
At the outset, it is clear that the excep-
tion defined in Ellis v. Social Services De-
partment, supra, is inapplicable. In that 
case, the parents of the illegitimate child 
both lived in California. A few days before 
she was to give birth, the mother left Cali-
fornia without the father's knowledge and 
came to Utah. In this state, she gave 
birth, declared the father to be unknown, 
and relinquished the child to an agency for 
adoption. Immediately upon learning of 
her whereabouts and within six days of the 
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child's birth, the father notified the agency 
by phone that he intended to assert his 
parental rights. Within two weeks there-
after, he filed the statutory notice in Utah 
and filed suit to secure his rights. This 
Court held that the statute could not be 
applied to deprive this father of his paren-
tal rights without a hearing at which he 
would have "an opportunity to present evi-
dence to show as a factual matter that he 
could not reasonably have expected his 
baby to be born in Utah." 615 P.2d at 
1256. The Court explained the limits of its 
ruling as follows: 
In the usual case, the putative father 
would either know or reasonably should 
know approximately when and where his 
child was horn. It is conceivable, how-
ever, that a situation may arise when it is 
impossible for the father to file the re-
quired notice of paternity prior to the 
statutory bar, through no fault of his 
own. In such a case, due process re-
quires that he be permitted to show that 
he was not afforded a reasonable op-
portunity to comply with the statute. 
Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). 
(16) In sharp contrast to Ellis, this case 
does not involve circumstances where 
through no fault of his own it was 
"impossible" for the father to file the re-
quired notice. Here the birth occurred in 
the same state as the father's residence, 
and neither the child's mother nor the 
agency was involved in any effort to pre-
vent him from learning of the birth or from 
asserting his parental rights. Neither the 
mother nor the agency knew at the time 
the child was relinquished that the father 
was seeking to or intending to assert his 
parental rights. All the father needed to 
do to assert his rights was file his claim of 
paternity with the Utah Department any-
time prior to September 24, the date the 
mother relinquished the child to the agen-
cy. He had sufficient opportunity to do so 
in this case, including ample advance notice 
of the expected time of birth and the fact 
that the mother intended to relinquish the 
child for adoption, advice of counsel on 
filing the required form, and a copy of the 
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form provided hy a social worker for the 
department These opportunities exceed 
what is necessary to contradict either one 
of the two essential elements of the Ellis 
exception it was (1) "impossible" for the 
father to make a timely filing of the re 
quired notice (2) "through no fault of his 
own ' 
In apparent reliance on the Ellts state 
ment that due process requires that the 
father be allowed to show "he was not 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to com 
ply with the statute," the district court held 
mai s 7n-ju~4*3i could not be applied to 
terminate the father's parental right in this 
case Such an interpretation overlooks the 
fact that the "reasonable opportunity" re 
ferred to in the quoted sentence only ap 
plies "in such a case," i e , when it is first 
shown that it was "impossible" for the 
father to file "through no fault of his 
own ' Otherwise, the need to prove in 
each adoption case that the unwed father— 
whoever he may be—had a "reasonable 
opportunity" to file the required notice of 
paternity would frustrate the statute's pur 
pose to facilitate secure adoptions by early 
clarification of status 
In Lehr i Robertson, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court rejected a similar 
argument that the unwed father should 
ha\ e received special notice of the adoption 
proceeding because, on the facts of that 
case, the trial court and the parties knew 
that he had filed a separate proceeding to 
establish his parental rights The Supreme 
Court declared 
This argument amounts to nothing more 
than an indirect attack on the notice pro 
visions of the New York statute The 
legitimate state interests in facilitating 
the adoption of young children and hav 
ing the adoption proceeding completed 
expeditiously that underlie the entire 
statutory scheme also justify a trial 
judge's determination to requite all in 
feres ted parties to adhere precisely to 
the procedural requirements of the 
statute Since the New York stat 
utes adequately protected appellant's in 
choate interest in establishing a relation 
ship with Jessica, we find no merit in 
the claim that his constitutional rights 
were ofjended because the family court 
strictly complied with the provisions of 
the statute 
103 SCt at 2995 (emphasis added) In 
applying that reasoning, the Court also not 
ed that the right to receive notice of the 
adoption proceeding "was completely with 
in appellant's control " Id 
We agree with the reasoning in Lehr v 
Robertson, and we therefore hold that the 
agency correctly applied § 78-30-4(3) on 
the facts of th»s case and did "ot violate 
federal or state due process rights 
The judgment is reversed, and the case is 
remanded with directions to enter judg 
ment for the defendants Each party to 
bear own costs 
HALL, C J , and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ , concur 
(o i«YNUMMMVSIIM> 
Nolan W. MARSHALL. Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Emery Mining C o , 
(Employer), and/or the State Insurance 
Fund of Utah, and the Second Injury 
Fund, Defendants. 
No 19153. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
April 5, 1984 
Mine employee denied permanent total 
disability benefits after work related acci 
dent when he was 67 years old sought 
review of decision of the Industrial Com-
mission denying him such benefits The 
Supreme Court, Durham, J , held that (1) 
total disability for workers' compensation 
MARSHALL v. INDUS COMN OF STATE OF UTAH Utah 2 0 9 
CHe • • 6*1 P 2d 208 (Utah 1984) 
rely on sympathy of friends or his own 
superhuman efforts 
6 Workers' Compensation «=>1377 
Once an employee who has suffered a 
work related accident has presented evi 
dence that he can no longer perform the 
duties required in his occupation and that 
he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden 
shifts to the employer to prove the exist 
ence of regular, steady work that the em 
ployee can perform, taking into account the 
employee's education, mental capacity, and 
age to avoid finding that the employee is 
total'y a r ' ' per r nanen t 'y d«sahl*»d under the 
odd lot doctrine U C A 1953, 35-1-67 
7 Workers' Compensation «=»1947 
Supreme Court may set aside an In 
dustnal Commission's award in a workers' 
compensation case if the Commission's 
findings of fact do not support the award 
U C A 19r>3, 35-1-84 
8. Workers' Compensation «=»1653 
Mine employee who injured his back in 
work related accident at age 67, after a 
40 year history of heavy labor in the mines, 
who had less than a high school education, 
and who presented uncontroverted evi 
dence of his impairment and his inability to 
perform work required by his job, along 
with an opinion of the division of vocational 
rehabilitation that he could not be rehabili 
tated, presented a prima facie case that he 
fell into the odd lot category for an award 
of workers' compensation, even though his 
combined impairment totaled only 267<-
U C A 1953, 35-1-67 
9 Workers' Compensation <S=»1639 
Where Industrial Commission's denial 
of permanent disability benefits to 67 year 
old mine worker injured in a work related 
accident appeared to rest almost entirely on 
si/e of employee's percentage of impair 
ment and on fact that employee was ehgi 
ble to retire, rather than on evidence of 
employee s wage earning capacity, such de 
nial of permanent total disability benefits 
was unsupported by findings of fact U C 
A 1953, 35-1-67, 35-1-84 
purposes does not mean total physical mi 
pairment, and (2) denial of permanent total 
disability benefits to mine employee, based 
almost entirely on size of employee's per 
centage of impairment and fact that em 
ployee was eligible to retire, rather than on 
evidence of employee's wage earning ca 
pacity, was unsupported by the Commis 
sion's findings of fact, and would be set 
aside 
Reversed and remanded 
Hall C J , dissented and filed an opm 
ion in which Howe, J , joined 
1. Workers' Compensation $=»803 
' Disabilitv " under the worker s com 
pensation laws, is loss of ability to earn 
U C A 1953, 35-1-67 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
2 Workers' C ompensation «=»836 
An undisputed physical impairment 
may not always result in a disability for 
worker's compensation purposes 
3 Workers' Compensation <S=»803 
In assessing loss of earning capacity 
from an injury for workers' compensation 
purposes, a constellation of factors must be 
considered, only one of which is physical 
impairment of the worker, other factors 
are age education, training and mental ca 
pacity 
4 Workers* Compensation «=>817 
Total disability for workers' compen 
sation purposes does not mean total physi 
cal impairment U C A 1953, 35-1-67 
5. Workers' Compensation «=»847 
Whether an employee falls into the 
odd lot category, under which total disabili 
ty for workers' compensation purposes 
may be found in the u s e of workers who, 
while not altogether incapacitated for 
work, are so handicapped that they will not 
be employed regularly in any well known 
branch of the labor market, depends on 
whether there is regular, dependable work 
available for the employee, who does not 
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Rule 17 UTAH RLLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur 2d. — 62A \m Jur 2d Pretrial issues not fixed for trial m pretrial order 11 
Conference and Procedure * 1 et ^eq A L R Fed 736 
C.J S — $8 C J S Trial * 17t2) Validitv and effect of local district court 
A.L.R. — Failure of partv or his attorney to rules providing tor use of alternative dispute 
appear at pretrial conference 55 A L R 3d 303 resolution procedures as pretrial settlement 
Propriety of allowing state court civil hti- mechanisms 8b A L R Fed 211 
gant to call nonexpert witness whose name or Imposition ot sanctions under Rule 16(0 
address was not disclosed during pretrial dis- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for tailing: to 
coverv proceedings 63 A L R 4th 712 obev scheduling or pretrial order 90 A L R 
Consideration or submission at trial under Fed 157 
Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of Key Numbers. — Trial s» 9<1) 
PART IV. 
PARTIES. 
Rule 17, Parties plaintiff and defendant 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted m the name of 
the real party in interest An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may 
sue in that person s name without joining the party for whose benefit the 
action is brought and when a statute so provides an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah No action 
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection 
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
the real party in interest, and such ratification, joinder or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent 
person who is a party must appear either b\ a general guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it 
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expe-
dient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or 
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian 
and may have appeared by the guardian In an action in rem it shall not be 
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might 
be a minor or an incompetent person 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by 
a court must be appointed as follows 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if 
the minor is of the ase of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the minor 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if 
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after 
the service of the summons or if under that age or if the minor neglects so 
to apph then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or 
of any other paru to the action 
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(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon 
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable 
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defen-
dant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of 
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such 
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general 
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is 
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be 
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such 
minor, if over fourteen years of age. or, if under fourteen years of age, by 
such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad 
litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after ap-
pointment in which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or 
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or 
more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a 
partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business 
under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or 
not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained 
against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their 
joint liability. The separate property of an individual member of the associa-
tion may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a 
party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member. 
le) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a 
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade 
name, and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, 
superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any 
action arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
<d> has been changed to conform to the holding 
in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499 
'Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated 
association to sue in its own name. The rule 
continues to allow an unincorporated associa-
tion to be sued in its own name. The final sen-
tence of paragraph (d> was added to confirm 
that the separate property of an individual 
member of an association may not be bound by 
the judgment unless the member is made a 
party. 
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the 
rule make the terminology gender neutral. In 
part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the 
word "infant," in order to maintain consistency 
with recent changes made in Rule 4<e)<2). In 
Rule 4 an infant is defined as a person under 
the age of 14 years, whereas the intent of Rule 
17(c) is to include persons under the age of 18 
years. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective September 1, 1991, substituted 
"minor" for "infant" throughout Subdivisions 
(bi and <c); in Subdivision <d), substituted "sue 
or be sued" for "be sued" in the heading and 
the first sentence, divided the former language 
into the present first two sentences, in the sec-
ond sentence substituted "the association" for 
"the defendant" and "parties" for "defendants," 
and added the third sentence; and made stylis-
tic changes throughout the section. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 17, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5-
101 et seq. 
Service of process. Rule 4. 
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Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrong-
ful act. 
Class action distinguished. 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of 
wrongful act. 
Shareholders' action against former corpo-
rate directors and officers for alleged conver-
sion of corporate assets and for breach of fidu-
ciary duties was barred by this rule where the 
shareholders did not acquire their stock until 
after the events complained of and the shares 
did not devolve on them by operation of law. 
Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
Class action distinguished. 
Action by corporate shareholders which al-
leged injury to the corporation only, and not to 
them as individuals, was a derivative action 
and could not be brought as a class action. 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 
636 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 
§ 2250. 
C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 564 to 
566. 
A.L.R. — Communications by corporation as 
privileged in stockholders' action, 34 A.L.R.3d 
1106. 
Allowance of punitive damages in stock-
holder's derivative action, 67 A.L.R.3d 350. 
Application to derivative actions for breach 
of fiduciary duty, under § 36(b) of Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (15 USC 5 80a-35(b)), of 
requirement, stated in Rule 23.1 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that complaint in de-
rivative actions allege what efforts were made 
by shareholders to obtain desired action or rea-
sons for failure to do so, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 542. 
Key Numbers. — Corporations «» 206, 207. 
Rule 24. Intervention. 
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permit-
ted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be per-
mitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action 
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for 
ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered 
by a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, require-
ment, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, 
the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in 
the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the 
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of 
the original parties. 
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to inter-
vene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state the 
grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the 
claim or defense for which intervention is sought. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
shall direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only 
from the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satis-
faction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satis-
faction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed 
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment 
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket 
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same 
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal 
rule covering this subject matter. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfac-
tion and discharge operated to satisfy and dis-
charge everything merged m and adjudicated 
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v Keith 
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916). 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with-
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
ment does not include his personal right to exe-
cute against the judgment debtor. Utah C V. 
Fed Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
ANALYSIS 
Court. 
—Duty. 
Attachment. 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment. 
Owner or attorney 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
Court. 
—Duty. 
Attachment. 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
collected through attachment proceeding. 
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906). 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment. 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-
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(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment. Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
for new trial. § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Abandonment of motion. Evidence. 
Accident or surprise. —Sufficiency. 
Arbitration awards. Excessive or inadequate damages. 
Caption on motion for new trial. —Punitive damages. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Correction of record. Filing of affidavits. 
Costs. Grounds for new trial. 
Decision against law. —Particularization in motion. 
Discretion of trial court. Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
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Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Key Numbers. — New Trial <s= 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect: (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action: <5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application: or (7^ any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to to set aside judgment. §§ 78-3-16.5, 7S-4-24, 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 78-6-14; Appx. D. Code of Judicial Administra-
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion tion. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
"Any other reason justifying relief.' Void judgment. 
—Default judgment. —Estate record. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. Inherent power of courts. 
—Incompetent counsel. —Intent of court and parties. 
—Lack of due process. —Judicial error distinguished. 
—Merits of case. —Order prepared by counsel. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. —Predating of new trial motion. 
—Real party in interest. Court's discretion. 
Appeals. Default judgment. 
Clerical mistakes. Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Computation of damages. —Admissions. 
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Rule 4-504 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small 
claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new complaint 
a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obligation. 
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(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court, 
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other agree-
ment which has not been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes, — The 1990 amend- The 1991 amendment added the final sen-
ment inserted "civil proceedings in" and "ex- tence to the Intent paragraph, deleted "and not 
cept small claims" under "Applicability" and of record" following "courts of record" in the 
made minor stylistic changes in the Statement Applicability paragraph, and added Subdivi-
of the Rule. sion (10). 
Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for affidavits in support 
of attorneys' fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must be filed with 
the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of 
the work performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute 
the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage 
for which attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the 
fees for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than 
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed. 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is 
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following 
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the 
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred 
in pursuit of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT 
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING 
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL 
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT." 
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they 
conform to the provisions of this rule and to state statute and case law. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- (2) to the former last sentence of Subdivision 
ment inserted "be filed with the court and" in (1), and in Subdivision (4) inserted the subdivi-
Subdivision (1), deleted the former Subdivision sion designation and the phrase beginning 
(2), requiring descriptions of fee arrangements "and" at the end. 
other than hourly rates, added the designation 
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ment would in effect be a reversal of the judgment and contrary to principle.7 
It has even been held that money paid on a void judgment may not be re-
covered where the payment was voluntary, but under a misapprehension as to 
the legal rights involved." But there is authority that where money has been 
paid under a judgment the execution of which would be enjoined if no pay-
ment had been made, restitution may be granted in equitable proceedings directly 
attacking the judgment.* 
As to a recover)' from a clerk of court or his surety, it has been held that the 
failure of a clerk to enter upon the docket of a judgment the fact of payment, 
as required by statute, when the money is paid to him under statutory authority, 
leaves the title to the money in the judgment debtor, so that in case of its mis-
appropriation by the clerk, the debtor has a valid claim against his surety. In 
such case, the death of the clerk prior to the discovery of the default does not 
defeat the claim.10 On the other hand, there is authority that an action for 
restitution does not lie against any officer who, acting in good faith and in 
conformity with process which, although invalid, is fair on its face, has received 
payment and has paid it over to the person specified in the process.11 
B. SETOFF OF JUDOMENTS 
1. I N GENERAL 
§ 9 9 9 . Generally." 
The satisfaction of a judgment may be wholly or partly produced by com-
pelling the judgment creditor to accept in payment a judgment to which he is 
subject," since it is a general rule that when mutual claims of parties have 
passed into judgments, one judgment may be set off against the other.14 
7. D P Medina v Grove, 10 QB 172, 116 Eng 
Reprint 67 (Ex C h ) . 
Annotation: 9 ALR 400. 
In Ro>al Indent. Co v Sangor, 166 Wis 
140, 164 NW 821, 9 ALR 397, it was held 
that money paid under a judgment rendered 
by a court of competent jurisdiction may not 
he recovered simply because it is afterward 
discovered not to be due. 
A person who has conferred a benefit upon 
another by complying with a judgment, or 
whose properly has been taken thereunder, is 
not entitled to restitution while the judgment 
remains valid and unreversed, merely because 
it was improperly obtained, except in a pro-
ceeding in which the judgment is directly 
attacked. Restatement, RESTITUTION § 72(1 ) . 
8. Boggs v Fowler, 16 Cat 559; Elston v 
Chicago, 40 III 514. See also Boas v Upde-
grove, 5 Pa 516. 
Annotation: 53 ALR 949, 961. 
9. Restatement, RESTITUTION $ 72(2) . See 
also § 7 3 ( 1 ) . 
10. State ex rel Oilmore v Walker, 195 NC 
460. 142 SE 579, 59 ALR 53. 
11 . Restatement, RESTITUTION § 7 3 ( 2 ) . 
9 4 
12. As to equitable relief from a judgment 
for the purpose of permitting a setoff, see 
$ 868, supra. 
As to the effect of an attorney's lien on a 
judgment on the right of setoff, see 7 Am 
Jur 2d, ATTORNEYS AT LAW $ 290. 
13. Vcrry v Barnes, 154 Minn 252, 191 
NW 5»9, 31 ALR 707 (holding that if a 
judgment debtor wishes to avail himself of the 
right to have his judgment against the judg-
ment creditor treated as payment pro tanto, 
he should apply to the court to have one 
judgment set off against the other, and not 
levy on the judgment against himself); Zinn 
v Dawson, 47 W Va 45, 34 SE 784. 
14. Scott v Rivers (Ala) 1 Stew & P 24; 
Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81 P 
527; Porter v Liscom, 22 Cal 430; Skrine v 
Simmons, 36 Ga 402; Puett v Beard, 86 Ind 
172; Benson v Haywood, 86 Iowa 107, 53 
NW 85; Ballinger v Tarbell, 16 Iowa 491 ; 
Alexander v Clarkson, 100 Kan 294, 164 P 
294; Jeffries v Evans, 45 Ky (6 B Mon) 119; 
Collins v Campbell, 97 Me 23, 53 A 837; 
Smith v Washington Gaslight Co. 31 Md 12; 
Verry v Barnes, 154 Minn 252, 191 NW 589, 
31 ALR 707; Hunt v Conrad, 47 Minn 557, 
50 NW 614; Tice v Fleming, 173 Mo 49, 72 
SW 689; Hovey v Morrill, 61 N i l 9; Chandler 
47 Am Jur 2d JUDGMENTS § 1 0 0 0 
§ 1000. Jurisdiction and authority of courts. 
Although in some jurisdictions the matter of setoff as between judgments 
is materially affected" or expressly authorized by statute,1* it is less dependent 
upon statute than is the jurisdiction to order setoffs generally," and courts do 
have jurisdiction in cases of setoff independent of statute." Indeed, the authority 
to set off one judgment against another is ancient and well established" under 
principles of common law,80 as an inherent power of the court.1 The exercise of 
the power depends mainly on the general jurisdiction of the court over suitors,* 
process,8 and judgments.* 
It is the modern view that although the right to offset judgments is of an 
equitable nature, courts of law may exercise the right.* Thus, the right to set 
off one judgment against another may be exercised in courts of law.* This rule 
has even been applied as to judgments rendered by different courts.7 Thus, it is 
not necessary that the court to which the application is made have control over 
the judgment to be used as a setoff.* 
As to the authority of appellate courts, although a setoff of one judgment 
v Drew, 6 NH 469; Murray v Skirm, 73 NJ 
Eq 374, 69 A 496; Dc Camp v Thomson, 159 
NY 144, 54 NE I I ; Cleveland v McCanna, 7 
ND 455, 75 NW 908; Barbour v National 
Exih. Bank, 5(1 Ohio St 90. 33 NE 512; 
Johnson v Noble, 179 Okla 256. 65 P2d 502, 
121 ALR 474; Johnson v Johnston, 123 Okla 
2"3. 254 P 494, 51 ALR 1265; Whclan v 
MiMahan. 17 Or 37. 82 P 19; Leitr v I toll-
man, 207 Pa 2119. 56 A 868; Thropp v Sus-
quehanna Mut. F. Ins. Co. 125 Pa 427. 17 A 
473; Simmons v Reid, 31 SC 389, 9 SE 1058; 
Ziun v Dawson, 47 \V Va 45, 34 SE 784. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 480. 
15. Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 480. 
16. Cleveland v McCanna, 7 NI) 455, 75 
NW 908 (denying the setoff under the cir-
rumstaiHes of the particular rase). 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 487. 
In Blount \ Windley, 95 US I 73, 24 L Ed 
424, it was held that the extent to whirh 
a right of setoff may be asserted against a 
judgment may be regulated by the legislature. 
17. Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 479. 
18. Scott v Rivers (Ala) 1 Stew & P 24; 
Puett v Beard, 86 Ind 1 72; Collins v Campbell, 
97 Me 23, 53 A 837; Franklin Co. v Buhl 
Land Co. 264 Mich 531, 250 NW 299; Hovev 
v Morrill, 61 NH 9; Barbour v National Exoh. 
Bank, 50 Ohio Si 90, 33 NE 542; Ramsey's 
Appeal (Pa) 2 Watts 228; Simmons v Reid, 31 
SC 389, 9 SE 1058; Citizens Industrial Bank 
v Oppenheim (Tex Civ App) 118 SW2d 820, 
error dismd; Zinn v Dawson, 47 W Va 45, 34 
SE 784. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 485. 
19. Franklin Co. v Buhl Land Co. 264 Mich 
531, 250 NW 299; Barbour v National Exrh. 
Bank. 50 Ohio St 90, 33 NE 542; Ramsey's 
Appeal (Pa) 2 Watts 228. 
20. Franklin Co. v Buhl Land Co 264 Mich 
531, 250 NW 299; Barbour v National F.xcli. 
Bank, 50 Ohio St 90, 33 NE 542; Simmons 
v Reid, 31 SC 389, 9 SE 1058. 
1. Pu.tt v Beard, 86 Ind 172; Franklin Co. 
v Buhl Land Co 264 Mich 531, 250 NW 
299; Harbour v National Exch. Bank, 50 Ohio 
St 90, 33 NE 542; Leitz
 v I tollman, 207 Pa 
289, 56 A 868. 
2. Scott v Rivers (Ala) I Stew & P 24; 
Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81 P 527; 
Poricr v Liscom, 22 Cal 430; Puett v Beard, 
86 Ind 172; Franklin Co. v Buhl Land Co. 
264 Mich 531, 250 NW 299; Barbour v Na-
tional Extb. Bank, 50 Ohio St 90, 33 NE 
542. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 485. 
3. Scott v Rivers (Ala) 1 Stew & P 24; 
Porter v Liscom. 22 Cal 430; Franklin Co. v 
Buhl Land Co. 264 Mich 531, 250 NW 299. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 485. 
4. Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81 
P 5 2 7 . 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 485. 
5. La Fleur v Schiff, 239 Miss 206, 58 NW 
2d 320. 
6. Murray v Skirm, 73 NJ Eq 374, 69 A 
496; Ramsey's Appeal (Pa) 2 Watts 228. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 488. 
7. § 1008, infra. 
8. SchauU v Kearney, 47 NJL 56. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 505-507. 
95 
§ 1001 J U D G M E N T S 47 Am Jur 2d 
against another has been refused by a court on the ground that its jurisdiction 
was essentially appellate in character,* other appellate courts have in fact granted 
a setoff as between judgments.10 
§ 1001. —Courts of equity. 
T h e right to set off one judgment against another may be exercised in courts 
of equity.11 Indeed, jurisdiction to order a setoff as between judgments was 
originally exercised exclusively by courts of equity,1 1 and even today there are 
cases where a court of equity will allow a setoff of judgments, where a court of 
law would not do so.1 ' T h e latter rule is particularly applicable where the judg-
ments involved were rendered by different courts.14 
O n the question whether a court of equity will exercise its jurisdiction to set 
one judgment off against another in a case in which such relief could be ob-
tained by motion in an action at law, there is a diversity of opinion.1* In some 
cases, relief in equity is denied because of the adequacy of the remedy at l aw , " 
while in others, it is declared that the assumption of jurisdiction by courts of 
law did not oust the pre-established authority of courts of equity in those cases 
to which its extraordinary jurisdiction applied.17 
jj 1002. Nature and purpose of remedy. 
T h e right to set off one judgment against another is not generally statutory, 
but is an incident of the general jurisdiction of the court over its suitors and is 
of an equitable nature.11 T h e power to set off one judgment against another 
is a remedy essentially equitable,19 governed by equitable principles,10 and in 
courts of equity such setoffs are allowed by the courts in the exercise of their 
equitable jurisdiction.1 
T h e purpose of permitting a setoff as between judgments has been declared 
to be the avoidance of multiplicity of suits or circuity of actions,1 and of needless 
9. Tenant v Marmaduke, 44 Ky (5 B Mon) 
76. 
10. Irvinr v Myers, 6 Minn 562, Gil 398; 
Sneed v Sneed, 82 Term (14 Lea) 13; Welsher 
v Libby, 107 Wis 47, 82 NW 693. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 491. 
11. Hollomon v Humber, 180 Ga 470, 179 
SE 365; Hovey v Morrill, 61 NH 9; Murray 
v Skiun, 73 NJ Eq 374, 69 A 496; Johnson 
v Noble, 179 Okla 256, 65 P2d 502, 121 AI.R 
474. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 489. 
12. See Haskins v Jordan, 123 Cal 157, 55 
P 786 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 488. 
13. Coonan v Loewenthal, 147 Cal 218, 81 
P 527. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 489, 490. 
14. H 1008, infra. 
15. Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 490. 
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16. Whclan v McMahan, 47 Or 37, 82 P 19; 
Zinn v Dawson, 47 W Va 45, 34 SE 784. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 490. 
17. Merrill v Souther, 36 Ky (6 Dana) 305. 
18. La Fleur v Schift, 239 Minn 206, 58 
NVV2d 320. 
Sec also § 1000, supra. 
19. Hovcy v Morrill, 61 NH 9; Johnson v 
Noble, 179 Okla 256, 65 P2d 502, 121 ALR 
474; Citizens Industrial Bank v Oppcnheim 
(Tex Civ App) 118 SW2d 820, error dismd. 
20. Collins v Campbell, 97 Mr 23, 53 A 837; 
Hovey v Morrill, 61 NH 9; Murray v Skirm, 
73 NJ Eq 374, 69 A 496; Johnson v Noble, 
179 Okla 256, 65 P2d 502, 121 ALR 474; 
Leitz v Hohman, 207 Pa 289, 56 A 868. 
1. Zinn v Dawson, 47 W Va 45, 34 SE 784. 
2. Johnson v Noble, 179 Okla 256, 65 P2d 
502, 121 ALR 474. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 498. 
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expenses or costs' incident to the issuance and levy of executions in favor of the 
respective parties.4 
T h e setofT of judgments is sometimes regarded as distinct from the setoff 
of claims not reduced to judgment, and as standing upon entirely different 
grounds.* But there is other authority that the setofT of judgments is not dif-
ferent from the setofT of claims not reduced to judgment, and that the basis of 
the right to set off judgments is not different from the right to set off mutual 
claims of any kind.6 An action to compel a defendant to allow the plaintiff's 
judgment to be set off against one held by the defendant has been regarded 
as an action on such judgment.7 
§ 1003. Allowance as matter of right 'or discretion. 
Although there are cases in which it is indicated that a setoff as between 
judgments is a matter of right, ' and this result is sometimes reached under ap-
plicable statutory provisions,' the rule, according to a number of cases, is that 
the exercise of the jurisdiction to set off one judgment against another is not 
demandable of right but is discretionary with the court.10 It is held that the 
setoff of one judgment against another is not a matter of right,11 but of grace,1 ' 
confined to the sound discretion of the court to which the application is made.1 ' 
T h e discretion of the court in allowing or denying a setoff as between judgments 
is not an arbitrary14 but a judicial one . " 
3. Johnson v Noble, supra. 
4. Martin County Nat Rank v Bird, 92 
Minn 110, 99 NW 780; Mt Adams v Randolph, 
12 NJL 332. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 498. 
5. See Brown v Warrrn, 43 NH 430. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 479. 
6. Odom v Attaway, 173 Ga 883, 162 SE 
279; Benson v Haywood, 86 Iowa 107, 53 
NW 85. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 479. 
7. DiefTenbach v Roch, 112 NY 621, 20 NE 
560. 
8. Scott v Rivers (Ala) I Stew & P 24; 
Haskins v Jordan, 123 Cal 157, 55 P 786. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 491. 
9. Ex parte Cooper, 212 Ala 501, 103 So 
474; Hurst v Sheets, 21 Iowa 501. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 492. 
10. La Fleur v SchifT, 239 Minn 206, 58 
NW2d 320; Verry v Barnes, 154 Minn 252, 
191 NW 589, 31 ALR 707; Alexander v 
Durkee, 112 NY 655, 19 NE 514; Spokane 
Sccur. Finance Co. v Bevan, 172 Wash 418, 
20 P2d 31. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 492. 
Even though an order granting a setofT 
against a decree for dower might legally be 
made, an application thciefor it addressed to 
(47 Am Jur 2d]—7 
the discretion of the court, and if injustice 
would result by allowing the setofT, it should 
be refused. Needles v Dougherty, 134 NJ Eq 
108, 31 A2d 396. 
11. Verry v Barnes, 151 Minn 252, 191 NW 
589, 31 ALR 707; Needles v Dougherty, 134 
NJ Eq 108, 34 A2d 396; De Camp v Thomson, 
159 NY 444, 54 NE 11; Leitz v Hohman, 
207 Pa 289, 56 A B6H; Thropp v Susquehanna 
Mut. F. Ins. Co. 125 Pa 427, 17 A 473. 
12. Scott v Rivers (Ala) 1 Stew & P 24; 
Needles v Dougherty, 134 NJ Eq 108, 31 A2d 
396; Thropp v Susquehanna Mut F. Ins. Co. 
125 Pa 427, 17 A 473. 
13. Verry v Barnes, 154 Minn 252, 191 NW 
589, 31 ALR 707; Hovey v Morrill, 61 NH 
9; Murray v Skirm, 73 NJ Eq 374, 69 A 496; 
De Camp v Thomson, 159 NY 444, 54 NE 11; 
Barbour v National Exch. Bank, 50 Ohio St 
90, 33 NE 542; Montalto v Yeckley, 73 Ohio 
App 480, 29 Ohio Ops 144, 57 NE2d 144, 
afTd 143 Ohio St 181, 28 Ohio Ops 107, 54 
NE2d 421; Johnson v Noble, 179 Okla 256, 
65 P2d 502, 121 ALR 474; Leitz v Hohman, 
207 Pa 289, 56 A 868; Simmons v Reid, 31 
SC 309, 9 SE 1058; Black v Whitewater Com-
mercial & Sav. Bank, 188 Wis 24, 205 NW 
404. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 492. 
14. Murray v Skirm, 73 NJ Eq 374, 69 A 
496. 
Annotation: 121 ALR 478, 495. 
15. Leitz v Hohman, 207 Pa 289, 56 A 868. 
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